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ABSTRACT 
The overall objective is to provide a theoretical basis for a case-based learning 
model of the technical and business processes in an organisation. As a result of this 
work, it will be possible to design a prototype system for capturing case histories in 
a corporate memory to support organisational decision making. The specific 
objectives are to present a model of knowledge as a set of interacting processes with 
emergent properties and to describe how a grounded theory methodology provides 
the basis for an appropriate and formal explanation of the interactions and 
meanings of these interacting processes. 
The representational relevance of the form and vocabulary of the Process model 
explanation as defined by a grounded methodology is demonstrated. This includes 
a description of how a Process model explanation can be used to represent emergent 
properties in a machine-based system. A formal method that discriminates 
between stored Process model explanations using a measure of connectivity is 
presented. Finally, the way in which a Reflective Process memory may aid 
corporate decision making is discussed. 
To gauge the dependability of competing decision paths, a decision maker needs to 
have experiences of decision expectations. Expectation failures are used to 
discriminate between competing decision paths. An explanation serves as a 
reminder that indicates how and why the expectation failed and what was done to 
resolve that failure. It is hypothesised that these contextual explanations should 
consist of interacting processes. The relevance of selected failed explanations relies 
on appropriate indices of features that are related to those expectation failures and 
grounded in experiences of those failures. It is suggested that notions of 
dependability and justification are used within a reflective activity to re-evaluate 
the relevance of the actual versus the predicted expectation failures of previous 
decisions. 
If case-based systems are to help human decision makers question the effectiveness 
of the proposed solution, then these systems must include a representational 
structure that can capture, identify and then recognise those emergent properties 
in other case-histories. The representational appropriateness of this model 
depends upon the model being able to express not only the emergent properties of 
the external object, but also the interacting processes that connect those emergent 
properties. A grounded theory analysis is used to define those aspects of a situation 
that are responsible for causing a particular problem. The results are expressed as 
U 
a Process Model. Aspects that are considered responsible for causing a problem are 
categorised as being predictive of a problem. The recognition of predictives in a 
new decision path will help in the selection of case histories. The uncertainty of the 
selection process is represented by a discrimination measure that selects and ranks 
case histories on the basis of the connectivity of these predictives. 
In conclusion, the Process model explanations that are selected could, (i) provide the 
user with relevant reflections and actions on how, when, where and why a problem 
has previously occurred; (ii) point out to the user which aspects are responsible for 
the problem and; (iii) suggest to the user relevant questions that were needed to be 
asked (but were not), during the initial decision path. Thus, dependable evidence 
of failure surrounding similar situations could be added (by the user) to judgements 
about the present situation (through an audit) and future projections (from 
judgements about future opportunities). The diagnostic use of those Process model 
explanations leading to the anticipation of potential problems in future engineering 
projects would be especially valuable to the user. It is anticipated that the next 
stage of the work is the building and testing of a prototype corporate memory of 
case histories to aid decision making. 
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CASE FOR SUPPORT 
OBJECTIVES OF THESIS 
The objectives of this thesis are; 
" to present a model of knowledge as a set of interacting processes with emergent 
properties; 
" to describe how a grounded theory methodology provides the basis for an 
appropriate and formal explanation of the interactions and meanings of these 
interacting processes in context; 
" to demonstrate the representational relevance of the form and vocabulary of the 
Process model explanation as defined by the grounded methodology; 
" to describe how a Process model explanation can be used to represent these 
emergent properties in a machine-based system; 
" to present a formal method that discriminates between stored Process model 
explanations as defined by a measure of connectivity between predictive- 
processes; 
41 to present a critical analysis of the way in which a Reflective Process memory may 
aid corporate decision making. 
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
1. WATSON [1997] has argued that the commercial success of some case-based 
problem-solving systems is based in part on their successful implementation in 
shallow problem-solving exercises using simple case representations. These 
representations "will usually be flat file structures based on relational data-base 
technology" [WATSON, 19971. The knowledge structure of a flat file format forms 
part of a consensus concerning, (i) a measure of usefulness; (ii) defined by a degree of 
similarity as a function of a nearest-neighbour or induction metric and; (iii) 
governed by the shared data attributes of the flat file format [HAMMOND, 1989; 
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KOLODNER & MARK, 1992; HENNESSY & HINKLE, 1992; PEARCE ET AL, 1992; 
WATSON & MARRIR; 1994; WATSON, 1997]. In this respect, the use of case-based 
reasoning (CBR) in such shallow domains represents a "high, hard ground" in which 
"manageable problems lend themselves to solution" [SCHON, 1987]. 
2. BARR & MAGALDI [1996] have suggested that the traditional business 
environment is being replaced by a state that can be "characterised by instability, 
rapid technological advances and uncertainty". In this "swampy lowland" [SCHON, 
19871 of uncertainty, problem solving or decision making is composed of knowledge 
that is of a more imprecise, fuzzy and ambiguous nature. Therefore just as 
individuals within this domain provide complex and highly contextual explanations 
when deriving solutions [DUNCAN, 19871, then case histories should be "enhanced by 
supplementing them with descriptions of the informal rationale by which the final 
decision was made" [BARB & MAGALDI, 19961. They suggest that this requires "a 
fundamentally new knowledge management technology infrastructure not currently 
met by conventional data-focused systems". 
3. Consider a geophysicist assessing the geology of competing field developments. 
In such an uncertain environment a geophysicist needs to have experiences of 
differing expectations of reservoir complexity. To discriminate between these 
competing expectations, then the geophysicist also needs experiences of the many 
failures of those expectations. An explanation serves as a reminder that indicates 
how and why the expectation failed and what the individual did to resolve that 
failure. It is hypothesised that these rich contextual explanations may consist of 
interactive processes with emergent properties. Some of these emergent properties 
of the problem-solution environment may represent the reasons behind that failure. 
These interactive processes and emergent properties have not previously been 
thought significant. Expressed in case-based terms, this requires an appropriate 
representational format (storing and indexing) and the means of identifying those 
explanations that are relevant to the particular problem under consideration. 
4. The relevance of selected failed explanations relies on appropriate indices for 
those emergent properties. They have to be related to those expectation failures 
and grounded in experiences of those failures. The explanation of expectation 
failures is connected with the notion of justification. That is, the ability to defend a 
decision. It is suggested that this forms part of a reflective activity. In which the 
actualities of the expectation failures of previous decisions are compared with the 
predicted expectation failures of future decision. It is hypothesised that the 
prognostic use of previous qualitative event sequences could lead to the anticipation 
of potential problems in future projects. This would be especially useful if this 
prognoses could identify relevant questions that should have been asked at the time 
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but were not. 
5. If case-based systems are to help human decision makers question the 
effectiveness of the proposed solution, then these systems must include a 
representational structure that can capture, identify and then recognise those 
emergent properties in other case-histories. In addressing these issues the author 
has 
, (i) considered the identification of information uncertainty as 
it impinges upon 
the way management decisions are made and how appropriate actions are 
identified, planned and executed; (ii) proposed a formal methodology to capture, 
identify and recognise the emergent properties of previous decisions and; (iii) 
considered the representational appropriateness of this formal methodology. 
FOCUS AND STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The layout of the thesis is as follows; 
9 In Chapter 1 current theories of expert reasoning and decision making are 
reviewed. Explanations of rule and model based reasoning and their accounts of 
expert performance during problem-solving tasks in an uncertain world are 
examined. This review leads to the conclusion that the way in which expert's 
categorise objects will critically influence how expert's reason about them. 
" In Chapter 2 the linguistic aspects in the categorisation of objects are discussed. 
It is suggested that when an expert uses a concept description to reason about an 
external object, he is testing a hypothesis about the meaning and the dependence 
of that concept on the content and context of the object situation. This testing is 
a function of the expert using past knowledge in deciding if he/she has or has not 
seen this concept description before. It is hypothesised that decision making is a 
type of reflective-explanation. 
" In Chapter 3 the reflective-explanation model of decision making is presented. It 
is hypothesised that individuals use their experiential memory to identify pivotal 
events (or emergent properties) of the problem. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion on the representational structure that a reflective-explanation may 
need and how the reflective-explanation must include a vocabulary for describing 
those experiences. 
9 In Chapter 4a formal representation of reflective-explanation called a Process 
Model explanation is presented. It is argued that a grounded theory methodology 
provides a formal explanation of the interactions and meanings of emergent 
properties as they relate to the content and context in which they occur. This 
analysis will result in the generation of an array of concepts, categories and their 
processes and process-interactions that provide the building blocks of the Process 
Model explanation. 
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" In Chapter 5 the representational appropriateness of the form and vocabulary of 
the Process model explanation as defined by a grounded methodology is 
demonstrated. It is suggested that a grounded Process model explanation can 
represent experiences in a machine-based Reflective Process Memory. The 
Reflective Process memory could create an index of Process model predictives that 
are associated with previous failure conditions. By recognising those predictives, 
the Reflective Process memory will be able to anticipate similar failure-conditions 
in other Process model explanations of decision problems. 
" In Chapter 6a formal methodology that discriminates between stored Process 
Model explanations is presented. This discrimination may be defined by a 
measure of connectivity that exists between predictive processes and process- 
interactions. A comparison algorithm that selects Process model explanations as 
defined by their relevance to the problem is introduced. 
" In Chapter 7a series of case studies of a frequent petroleum engineering problem 
[implementing time-depth conversion] are presented. The case studies represent 
open world decision problems in the field of reservoir evaluation. These case 
studies are used to demonstrate the complete methodology from knowledge 
acquisition to the selection of the most-relevant Process model explanation of the 
decision problem. 
" In Chapter 8 the conclusions of the thesis are presented. These conclusions lead 
to a critique of the thesis and number of alterations to the existing work are 
presented. The possible use of a Reflective Process Memory in capturing corporate 
experiences and how this may aid organisational decision making is discussed. 
4 
1. THE REPRESENTATION OF KNOWLEDGE 
1.1 OBJECTIVES 
" To review critically some current theories of human reasoning. 
" To explore the nature of the internal models representation of the external object. 
1.2 INTRODUCTION 
1. RUMELHART & NORMAN [1985] have stated that, "most of the 
representational systems that have been developed and evaluated to date fall into the 
category of propositional representations". Further, "these representational systems 
all share the characteristic that knowledge is represented as a collection of symbols" 
consisting "of formal statements that reflect the represented world" [RUMELHART & 
NORMAN, 19851. These propositional representations may be divided into separate 
and possibly two distinct categories. These categories may be classified as mental 
logic (or rule-based) theories [RIPS, 1983] and mental model (or knowledge-based) 
theories [JOHNSON-LAIRD, 1983]. 
2. Mental logic theories of human reasoning state [RIPS, 19831 that 
individuals continuously develop and refine a mental logic representation of the 
problem. It is assumed that inferences are drawn from conditional statements. For 
example, if p then q. RIPS [1983] suggested that the reasoning mechanism applies 
this mental logic to an abstract form of the problem. This abstraction is defined by 
an encoding device, which has extracted this abstraction from a given information 
set. Some followers [RRAINE & O'RRIEN, 1991; OSHERSON, 1975; Rips, 19831 of the 
mental logic argument have suggested that human subjects use a natural logic. It 
is assumed that this mental logic forms a direct, but abstract correspondence to the 
external object. Furthermore, this natural logic consists of a set of general inference 
rules. Only a small number of rules are necessary, since they could be applied 
iteratively and in combinations thereof. For example, consider the following; 
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If there is an A, then there is a B. 
There is an A. 
Therefore, there is a B. 
3. The testability of this argument relies on the application of an appropriate 
rule. In this example, such a rule could be defined by the {implication} connection. 
If we let p represent there is an A and q represent there is a B. Then following, if p 
then q, the conclusion; therefore, there is aB is readily asserted. This relatively 
simple example adequately demonstrates the deductive methodology of rule-based 
theories. If inference rules have an abstract form, then some mechanism must 
encode the domain specific problem into an abstract format. This mechanism must 
then decode the generated abstract solution. However, what are the operational 
requirements of this encoding and decoding mechanism? Consider the notion of 
appropriateness. How does the reasoning mechanism generate the most- 
appropriate inferences from this abstract representation? In the example above, 
the most-appropriate inference was the {implication} connection. How did the 
reasoning mechanism know this? How does the reasoning mechanism know that 
the {implication} connection is more-appropriate than a {conjunction} connection? 
RIPS [19831 suggested that a combination of forward and backward reasoning 
operations can be applied, until each assertion has been proved true or false. 
However, in an open world full of incomplete and inconsistent information, what do 
the terms true and false (as defined by RIPS) mean? As Evans [19891 points out "the 
results of the many hundreds of such experiments that have been reported in the 
psychological literature indicate that subjects' responses very frequently deviate from 
the logically prescribed answers". 
4. In an attempt to overcome these difficulties, JOHNSON-LAIRD [1983] has 
proposed an alternative theory. He suggested that human reasoning is not based on 
mental logic, but upon the manipulation of mental models [JOHNSON-LAIRD, 1983; 
JOHNSON-LAIRD & BYRNE, 1991; JOHNSON-LAIRD, SCHAEKEN & BYRNE, 19921. The 
generation of these models are defined by tokens and tokens represent all possible 
states of the problem. These tokens (although not explicitly stated) are probably 
abstract representations of the problem. In this way the mental model represents 
an abstract plan of the problem. Therefore, when the human subject reasons, the 
individual constructs a mental model that represents the various ways in which the 
premise of an argument could be true or false. Problems are solved by reading a 
semantically informative [JOHNSON-LAIRD & BYRNE, 1991] statement, that is 
developed during the manipulation phase of the model's construction. Some 
followers [JOHNSON-LAIRD, SCHAEKEN & BYRNE, 19921 of this hypothesis assume 
that this semantic information (which has not been explicitly stated during the 
construction phase) is derived from information that is implied by the premise. If a 
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conclusion is derived from information implied by a premise, how is this different 
from mental logic theories? How does the semantically informative statement know 
that the {implication} connection is more-appropriate than a {conjunction} 
connection? How does this statement deal with incomplete and inconsistent 
information? 
5. JOHNSON-LAIRD [1983] suggests that in any inference task the human 
subject will attempt to formulate other models as a search for counter examples. 
These other models will be consistent with the given premises. JOHNSON-LAIRD & 
BYRNE [1991] believe that human subjects having formed a provisional conclusion 
will actively search for other models, that while compatible with the given premises, 
can be used to invalidate the inference. If no counter examples are found, then the 
inference is deemed appropriate. However, it is worth noting here, that the 
constraints of the working memory may restrict the number of models available for 
comparison. 
6. Consider the following example; 
If C is greater than B and A is less than B. 
Then C is greater than A. 
7. In the mental logic approach a rule may be defined by the assertion, (p n q) 
--> r. Therefore, if we let p represent the statement C is greater then B and q 
represents the statement A is less than B, then the application of this rule to the 
premise C is greater than B and A is less than B implies r which represents the 
conclusion C is greater than A. See truth table below. 
p q pnq r pnq -->r 
T T T T T 
8. However, in the mental model approach it is assumed that human subjects 
will attempt to construct a complete representation of the external world problem. 
This representation will integrate (or combine) the two separate premises. 
Therefore, the first premise would allow the human subject to form a model as 
shown by the representation c>b in which c (representing C) holds a relationship 
with b (representing B). The second premise will extend the model 
c>b>a 
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9. When the human subject interrogates the model, c>a (representing C is 
greater than A) may easily be derived. However, as EVANS points out; "the basic 
problem is that the theories are formulated in very general terms which are 
necessarily augmented by many ad-hoc assumptions when applying the theory to 
model in any given context" [EVANS, 19911. He then goes on to state that "it seems 
very likely that models based on either set of principles will be able to be constructed 
to fit any given set of data" [EVANS, 19911. 
10. ROBERTS, has argued that "if a theory of reasoning is being proposed that is 
intended to describe the processes used by all people for all reasoning tasks, then 
what is the status of this theory if it is subsequently found that not all people are 
using the same processes? " [ROBERTS, 1993]. For example, research by GALOTTI ET 
AL (1986) indicates that when human subjects use mental models in problem 
solving tasks, they may also discover logic rules. If mental models can be used to 
identify logic rules, then human reasoning must depend upon mental models and 
rule-based reasoning is a function of the underlying mental model reasoning 
mechanism. However, research undertaken by SHAVER ET AL [1974] appears to 
demonstrate the complete opposite. According to SHAVER ET AL [1974], mental 
model reasoning is a function of the underlying rule-based reasoning mechanism. 
Reasoning by rules and reasoning by models, offer incomplete and incompatible 
explanations of human reasoning. 
11. A considerable amount of attention has been directed towards deciding 
whether the fundamental reasoning mechanism is based upon mental logic or 
mental models. Unfortunately, the existence of differences presents problems when 
judging the universality of one theory over an other. If individual differences exist, 
then reasoning theories cannot be universal. A universal reasoning theory will 
always be weakened by its persistent failure to account for the irregular 
performance of human subjects. Notions of personalised representations 
[BANNISTER & FRANSELLA, 19711 and reasoning strategies [ROBERTS, 1993] may 
account for the differences shown by individuals and may be viewed as a 
mechanism by which individuals solve reasoning tasks. 
12. DUNCAN, (1987); RASMUSSEN, (1987); REASON, (1987) suggest that humans 
have developed reasoning strategies that attempt to match current problems with 
previous solutions. These stored solutions may be viewed as a set of personalised 
representations. The appropriateness of those representations are dependent upon 
the point-of-view of the individual and the role-requirements of the problem-solution 
environment. In this context, a problem-solution environment consists of the 
problem inputs and the solution outputs with the transformation in-between. This 
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represents a holistic view of the problem-solution domain. For example, this view 
may be a closed world, deterministic problem-solution domain, in which the 
appropriateness of the solution outputs can be defined by comparison with the 
problem inputs. It could also be an open world, non deterministic problem-solution 
domain, in which case a comparison may not be possible. In each case, the role- 
requirements will differ. In a closed deterministic problem-solution domain, the 
role-requirements may be defined by the need for a correct solution and the means 
for checking on the correctness of that solution. However, in an open problem- 
solution domain, the role-requirements may be defined by the degree of acceptable 
uncertainty in the solution outputs. 
13. These role-requirements may help the individual in deciding have they or 
have they not [REASON, 19871 come across this particular problem before. For 
example, conclusions could be compared with previous conclusions derived from 
similar inferences. This would help the human subject when choosing if a 
conclusion is believable, or unbelievable. If from a [PETROLEUM ENGINEERING] 
point-of-view, the individual recognizes particular role-requirements of problem- 
solution environment, then this may aid the individual in determine if they have a 
pre-formed corrective solution available. However, it is worth noting, that although 
problems may be the same, individuals rarely are. Consequently, individuals may 
have differing points-of-view, they may recognize differing role-requirements of the 
problem-solution environment and therefore the re-called solution may also differ. 
For example, a [PETROLEUM ENGINEERING] solution will be defined by a 
[PETROLEUM ENGINEERING] point-of-view. An [RESERVOIR ENGINEERING] solution 
will be defined by a [RESERVOIR ENGINEERING] point-of-view. Consequently, the 
[PETROLEUM ENGINEERING] solution may not be the same as the [RESERVOIR 
ENGINEERING] solution. 
14. These personalised representations could act as an operational definition of 
the task under consideration. For example as ROUSE & MORRIS state (when talking 
about mental models) such representations must include "knowledge about the 
system to be controlled, knowledge about the properties of disturbances likely to act 
on the system, and knowledge about the criteria, strategies, and so forth associated 
with the control task" [ROUSE & MORRIS, 1986]. Individuals will "use their 
knowledge of the language and their general knowledge to understand the premises; 
they construct an internal model of the state of affairs that the premises describe" 
[JOHNSON-LAIRD & BYRNE, 19911. When "interacting with the environment, with 
others and with the artefacts of technology, people form internal, mental models of 
themselves and of the things with which they are interacting" [NORMAN, 1983] and 
that, "these models provide a predictive and explanatory power for understanding 
the interaction" [NORMAN, 19831. This construction will have to be consistent with 
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the individuals understanding of the role-requirements of problem-solution 
environment, in which personalised representations are used for explaining 
observed events, predicting future events and determining appropriate actions to 
alter those events. However, while this hypothesis presents a reasonable 
understanding of the human reasoning processes, how do human subjects develop 
and modify their strategies? What factors constrain the development and 
modification? 
15. BRECHTEL [1990] has argued that solving problems and the way in which 
the problem solving task is performed, appear to be dependent upon the nature of 
the problem and the way in which the individual understands the problem. He 
states that the "perspective which characterises people and the information they 
have about their environment plays a critical role for those developing any internal 
processing". Hence, the selection of an appropriate strategy may be constrained by 
the task that the human subject needs to perform. So how do individuals select the 
most appropriate reasoning strategy? It has been previously suggested by REASON 
[1987], that individuals confront a task by deciding have they, or have they not come 
across this particular problem before. If a particular problem is recognized, then 
the individual will determine if they have a pre-formed problem-solution pattern 
available. However, there may not be an available match or the match may be only 
partial. In this situation the individual (in an attempt to generate a solution), may 
modify an internal representation of the problem. This modification may reflect a 
more abstract representation of the problem-solution environment. DUNCAN [1987] 
believes that this decision to generate a more abstract form of the problem-solution 
pattern depends upon a complex interaction between uncertainty and stress. For 
example, the failure of successive attempts at a problem solution, will increase the 
stress levels and hence this interaction. This in turn, will trigger the focus of the 
problem-solution response to become more abstract. Consequently, the generation 
of an appropriate strategy may be constrained by the problem-solution 
environment, the role-requirements of that environment and the point-of-view of 
the individual. Such a strategy represents the individuals understanding of the 
problem-solution environment. 
1.3 UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM-SOLUTION ENVIRONMENT 
16. Understanding may be described as a highly developed repertory of 
pattern-oriented representations [REASON, 1987] of the problem-solution 
environment. Experts (when reasoning at the knowledge-based level), have been 
shown to develop conceptually abstract models of the task that confronts them 
[RASMUSSEN, 19871. These representations allow experts to encode new information 
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quickly and completely. For example, research [DREYFUS & DREYFUS, 19861 has 
demonstrated that expert chess players were able to recall clusters of information, 
that represented entire attack or defence configurations. BRECHTEL [1990] has 
argued that "if Dreyfus and Dreyfus are right, pattern recognition may figure in even 
what seemed to be exemplars of high-level reasoning tasks". Consequently, 
reasoning, problem-solving and decision-making, may be dependent upon the 
individual discriminating between a selection of retrieved conceptual patterns and 
recognizing "a situation as being like certain previous ones and responding to it in 
similar ways" [BRECHTEL, 1990]. However, this discrimination and recognition 
process may place a heavy burden upon the capacity of the working memory. It is 
possible therefore, that tasks may be pattern-limited, that is, tasks may have a 
limited range of available patterns, or (given the limitations of the working 
memory), a limited range of feasible patterns. 
17. Research by BREHMER [1986] & TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN [1986] into 
decision-making demonstrates that irrespective of how individuals cope with 
familiar problems, tasks or situations, performance will begin to deteriorate once 
the repertoires of patterns and models are exhausted by the demands of problem. 
One explanation of this stems from "that of generalisation from experience" [EVANS, 
19891. For example, EVANS [1989] suggests that "a young child whose experience 
has been largely confined to cats might well over-generalise and classify' the first dog 
it sees as a cat". Hence "this false deduction implies possession of an incorrect rule 
which is consequently revised" [EVANS, 1989]. TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN [1986] have 
suggested that individuals rely on heuristics or rules of thumb because of the 
limited cognitive processing capacity of human subjects. As TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN 
state, "these heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to 
systematic and predictable errors" TvERSKY & KAHNEMAN [1986]. Further, "a better 
understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they can lead could 
improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty" [TVERSKY & 
KAHNEMAN, 19861. This argument is continued by BREHMER [1986], who suggested 
that the reason why individuals have difficulty with uncertainty is, "that they lack 
the necessary basic schemata to help them understand and use the information 
provided by their experience". He goes on to state that "if we do not learn from 
experience, this is largely because experience often gives us very little information to 
learn from" [BREHMER, 19861. 
18. For example, when solving well-structured exercises, the expertise consists 
in identifying the correct procedure to obtain a solution and then applying it. The 
procedure may be learned by experience or instruction. The procedure is known to 
provide a correct solution and provides the means of checking on the correctness of 
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the solution. However, when problems are solved or decisions are made under 
uncertainty, the correct procedure remains unknown and unclear. There is no 
definitive way of evaluating the effectiveness of the modified model on the outcome 
of the task. Therefore, the degree of model manipulation remains unknown and 
unclear. Consequently, the amount of manipulation may be too little or too much, 
resulting in under or over estimations of the problem solution. CAMERER & 
JOHNSON, [19911, indicated that expert decision making under uncertainty may be 
influenced by their attention to different variables within the model. While REASON 
has suggested that, "accuracy of reasoning performance is a consequence of whether 
the problem solver's attention is directed to the logically important rather than to the 
psychologically salient aspects of the problem" [REASON, 19871. 
19. Given that some domain specific information may be uncertain, then how 
can individuals use that information to represent the properties of the problem- 
solution environment. If the degree of representation becomes more abstract, at 
what basic abstract level will the human subject acquire the most relevant 
information? How is this level designated? When BRECHTEL [19901, argues that 
how we categories objects (or items), will critically influence how we reason about 
them, it will also influence how we develop and modify our conceptual patterns. 
Hence, any generated explanations (and therefore solutions) can be dependent upon 
the nature of the task representation. 
1.4 THE NATURE OF THE TASK REPRESENTATION 
20. As RUMELHART & NORMAN [19851 state "the problem of representation is 
one of determining a mapping between the concepts and relations of the represented 
world and the concepts and relations of the representing world". They have 
suggested that this problem has resolved itself into a debate "over the distinctions 
between representational formats: propositional versus analogical, continuous 
versus discrete, and declarative versus procedural". The nature of the declarative 
and procedural representations will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, but in 
essence this controversy "really reflect differences in the accessibility of the 
information to the interpretative structures" [RUMELHART & NORMAN, 19851. Some 
of the issues of the propositional versus analogical controversy have been discussed 
above. In this respect a distinction can be drawn between "formal statements that 
reflect the represented world, either in the form of networks, schema-based structures, 
or logical formulae", and those representation formats that attempt "a direct 
mapping between the characteristic of the represented world of primary importance 
and the represented world" [RUMELHARRT & NORMAN, 19851. However this 
distinction may be meaningless since the very nature of a representational format 
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is "to capture the essence of the represented world" and is therefore analogous of that 
world [RUMELHART & NORMAN, 1985]. The following will concentrate on the 
discrete versus continuous controversy. 
21. THE SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY defines representation as, "the 
action of presenting to the mind or imagination; an idea thus presented; a clearly 
conceived idea or concept". PALMER states that a "representation is something that 
stands for something else" [PALMER, 1978]. In this context, a representation may be 
viewed as an implied agreement, or understanding between an object and a related 
but separate object that represents it. These have previously been termed 
represented and representing worlds. However, in this thesis, they shall be referred 
to as the external problem-solution environment and the internal conceptual 
pattern respectively. In which the conceptual pattern reflects (or symbolizes) some 
aspect of the problem-solution environment. PALMER suggests that, "the nature of 
representation is that there exists a correspondence (mapping) from objects in the 
represented world to objects in the representing world, such that at least some 
relations in the represented world are structurally preserved in the representing 
world" [PALMER, 1978]. 
22. For example, let a relationship RE, symbolize an information set of a 
problem-solution environment. 
RE _{ xE, YE } In which xE and YE are external information. 
23. The representational mapping would therefore require a corresponding 
relationship RI. Where RI symbolizes the information set of the conceptual pattern. 
Furthermore, there must also exist a corresponding agreement between RE and RI, 
such that RI may represent RE. 
RI ={ x1, yI } In which xI and yI are internal information. 
24. Therefore, "world X, is a representation of another world, Y, if at least some 
of the relations for objects of X are preserved by relations for corresponding objects of 
Y' [PALMER, 19781. However, while in this example the internal conceptual pattern 
conforms to the external object, there may be times in which representations can 
differ. One way to account for human inconsistencies and the consequences of such 
inconsistencies (the generation of errors), is that the information remains the same, 
but the representations differ. Therefore, conceptual patterns may differ in the 
representations that they represent. This may be defined as the difference between 
specified and realized representations. If a problem-solution environment specifies 
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particular information, then the conceptual pattern could either realize different 
relationships of the problem-solution environment, or realize the same relationships 
in different ways. Therefore, if each representation realizes different relationships 
of the same specified information, then each conceptual pattern would not be able to 
provide the same answer to the same question. PALMER [19781 suggested that one 
way to account for the differences between specified and realized representations 
will rely on the notion of qualitative differences. Some aspects of the problem- 
solution environment may be symbolically different in each representation. 
However, these representational differences may also be a result of a conceptual 
pattern only storing some of the problem-solution information. For example, let 
some problem-solution environment be specified as, [PALMER, 19781 
RE ={ XE, YE } {relative mass of object, relative gravity }. 
25. During the representational transformation phase, two conceptual patterns 
are realized. Which are, 
R1' ={ x1 } {relative mass of object } and 
RI2 ={ yj } {relative gravity }. 
26. Consequently, the differences in these representations, would make it 
impossible to answer (is it heavier than) questions much less (how heavy is it) 
questions about particular objects. 
27. Representations may not have similar values of categorization. For 
example, in one, mass may be categorized into a big and small value hierarchy. In 
another internal representation, mass could be categorized into an infinite number 
of values. These representations are non-equivalent. Similar questions will provide 
different answers. For example, objects classified as having either a big weight, or 
small weight, when using the two-valued representation, will be classified as having 
different weight categories when using the infinite value representation. (Unless, 
the two objects are identical. ) 
28. Representations may not have similar types of categorization and may not 
contain information sets that correspond to the same information sets in the 
problem-solution environment. For example, road maps may have different types of 
categorization representing the same road type or city size [PALMER, 19781. In one 
map, the cities may be represented by dots of differing sizes. In this map the larger 
the city the larger the dot. However in another map, the city size is symbolized by 
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different colours. Unless a key indicates a size-to-colour relationship, then all the 
information that this map can provide is when city sizes are similar and when they 
are different. Without the key the two maps are not equivalent. For the 
representations to be compatible, then the number of representational levels and 
the categorization of these levels must be similar. 
29. Representations may not be numerical. For example, representations could 
be classed as concept's, theories and knowledge. While numerical representations 
maybe able to confer meaning to similar concepts, how will non-numeric 
representations perform the same task? Human subjects must be able to identify 
the mutual and reciprocal relationships of non-numerical transformations and 
thereby assign a meaning value to these concepts, theories and knowledge. Note, it 
cannot be assumed that similar concepts will result in similar representations. In 
Chapter 2, the manner of this categorization, the way in which individuals assign 
meaning and the implications this may have on the representation of knowledge 
will be discussed. For the moment, it is accepted that representational methods 
may differ and it is assumed that any reflections of the problem-solution 
environment that they represent will remain the same. Consider the following 
conditional example [PALMER, 19781. 
CONDITION 1: ASYMMETRY. 
If object x is larger than object y, then y cannot be larger than x. Therefore in this 
representation, the IS LARGER than relationship may be logically defined as 
ASYMMETRIC, that is the relationship only holds for one way. 
CONDITION 2. TRANSITIVITY. 
If object x is larger than object y, and y is larger than z, then x is larger than z. In 
this representation, the IS LARGER than relationship may be logically defined as 
TRANSITIVE Such that if the relationship holds between the first element and the 
second element, and between the second element and the third element, it also holds 
between the first and third elements. 
30. PALMER [1978] has suggested that these asymmetric and transitivity 
relationships are constraints of the internal model. For example, if the {is larger 
than} relationship is represented by two relationships, then both relationships will 
need to be asymmetric and transitive. The {is larger than} relationship may be 
replaced by a {is longer than} relationship. If the internal model's information set 
represents a {is longer than} relationship for object [x] and object [y], then [y] cannot 
be longer than [x]. Let the information set now represent a {is longer than} 
relationship for objects [x] [y] and [z]. If [x] {is longer than} [y] and [y] {is longer 
than} [z], then the internal model must also represent the conclusion that [x] {is 
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longer than} [z]. Therefore, this new {is longer than} relationship could also be 
considered to be both asymmetric (CONDITION 1) and transitive (CONDITION 2). This 
method of knowledge storage (or intrinsic representation) allows the stored 
information set to be categorized as belonging to the essential nature of the concept 
being represented. 
31. PALMER [19781 has extended this hypothesis by suggesting that in a 
different model a {is connected to} relationship now represents the {is larger than} 
relationship. Consequently, [x] {is connected to} [y] will now allow [y] to be or not to 
be connected to W. Previously, the {is larger than} relationship is deterministic and 
[x] {is larger than} [y], could be measured, evaluated and analysed. However, as 
PALMER [1978] argues, just because [x] {is connected to} [y], does not mean that [y] 
{is connected to} W. Similarly, if [x] {is connected to} [y] and [y] {is connected to} [z] 
then [x] might or might not be connected to [z]. This connectivity "is not necessarily 
either asymmetric or transitive, although it is possible for it to be either or both" 
[PALMER, 1978]. Further, he suggests that "asymmetry and transitive can be 
literally imposed on it by requiring that it preserves the structure of its represented 
relation". To ensure that both asymmetry and transitivity are imposed, then any 
representation must reflect the total knowledge structure of the problem-solution 
environment. According to PALMER [1978] the internal representation "cannot be 
dissociated from the operators that define the information it contains", and "once the 
information content has been discovered, it must be related back to the world it 
represents". In this respect "the most important point of a representation is that it 
allows us to reach conclusions about the thing being represented by looking only at 
the representing world" [RUMELHART & NORMAN, 19851. From this it could be 
surmised that the representation can only be considered complete, if and only if, the 
constraints of the conceptual pattern are a reflection of similar constraints of the 
problem-solution environment. For example, if there exists a relationship [x] {is 
connected to} [y] and this relationship is constrained by the relationship [y] {is 
connected by} [x], then the conceptual pattern must also reflect these constraints. 
Consequently, the conceptual pattern can easily answer any connected-to and 
connected-by questions. How will these constraints be imposed? To address this 
issue, in the next section consideration will given to the nature of the relationship 
between the external world and the internal model. 
1.4.1. THE EXTERNAL OBJECT & THE INTERNAL MODEL 
32. A theory is essentially an abstract description of principles offered to 
explain a phenomenon. A model is a concrete embodiment of a theory. The 
relationship a model holds with the theory must satisfy specific assumptions of that 
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theory. In this respect, the internal model is a representation of the external object 
and the cognitive model is in turn a representation of that internal model. Thus the 
cognitive model is a representation of a representation of the external object. Both 
the internal model and the cognitive model are representations of the same external 
object. As RUMELHART & NORMAN [1985] state "in studying representational 
systems, it is important to realise that there are several different pairs of representing 
and represented worlds, and that our theories of representation are in actuality 
representations of a representation: that is representations of the mental activity that 
in turn is a representation of the environment". Therefore, what sort of equivalence 
can be achieved between the internal model and the hypothetical cognitive model of 
that model? This equivalence must be at a level of abstraction that is appropriate 
and this appropriateness must be of such a level, so that the cognitive theory can 
simultaneously describe both the internal and cognitive models. 
33. It is suggested that the development of appropriate theory of 
representation will have to address the nature of the correspondence between the 
object meaning of the external object, the represented meaning of the internal model 
and the represented meaning of the cognitive model. Where does this 
correspondence exist? Does it exist in language or does it exist in human thought? 
Furthermore, how does this correspondence become known? How do individuals 
come to know the correspondence shared by all [MOTORCYCLES]? For example, to 
grasp a concept such as [MOTORCYCLE], is it necessary to have some knowledge 
about individual [MOTORCYCLES]? Is it necessary to understand the concept 
[MOTORCYCLES] to recognize that individual [MOTORCYCLES] all share something? 
This has been previously defined as the learning paradox. Note, this paradox is not 
new, in its earliest form it was considered by PLATO in his dialogue The Meno [DAY, 
1993]. For PLATO [DAY, 19931, the learning paradox arises from the situation, in 
which to learn something new, a human subject must already know something old. 
However, how is this something old related to the something new. For example, let 
something old be [x] and something new be [y]. If [x] and [y] are identical, then an 
individual knows what they need to know about [x] to understand [y], since [x] and 
[y] are identical. If [x] and [y] are different, then an individual does not know what 
they need to know about [x] to understand [y], since they do not know what [y] is. 
PLATO [DAY, 1993] gets around this paradox by simply suggesting that human 
subjects are able to grasp the structure of more complex objects then they presently 
know, since they have buried within their minds remembrances of past lives that 
have not been washed down, what PLATO terms the river of forgetfulness. It would 
appear that individuals are able to grasp these complex structures because we 
begin to remember our past lives. This theory of recovery has been embraced (in a 
modified form) by people such as CHOMSKY [1967,19681 and FODOR [1981,1990] 
when they talk about a public and private language and the language of thought 
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respectively. However, while they are able to explain the use of this sub-language 
by individuals, they have to yet adequately define where this sub-language comes 
from. FODOR [1981,1990] looks upon this sub-language as an innate quality that 
we have and which is universal to all human subjects irrespective of creed, colour or 
religion. However, if individuals use their private language of thought to grasp the 
structure of more complex objects that they already know, then their private 
language of thought must be a conceptual richer language than their public 
language of actions. How might this be so? This may be a function of the social and 
cultural aspects of knowledge growth. In other words a social and cultural 
construct [BANNISTER & FARNSELLA, 19711 forms a link between the knowledge in 
the environment and the knowledge in the mind. Therefore, an attempt to solve 
this paradox may be made by considering the social and cultural mechanism of 
knowledge acquisition (or learning). This will be considered in more detail in 
Chapter 2. 
34. In this respect, the hypothesized conceptual patterns may be said to form a 
connection between the knowledge of the problem-solution environment and the 
individual. This connection should reflect the (i) situation description 
(categorization process); (ii) situation format (classification process); (iii) situation 
function (operational process) and; (iv) situation status (condition process) of that 
environment. This connection should be consistent with individuals understanding 
of the premises, context and content and should reflect relevant and appropriate 
information about the problem-solution environment. This consistency may be 
viewed as a relationship between the knowledge in the environment and the 
knowledge in the individual. In this respect, knowledge as represented by a 
conceptual pattern involves a dynamic interaction between the memory and the 
problem to be solved. This is used by the individual to understand the context and 
content of the problem-solution environment and thus generate a descriptive, 
explanatory and predictive analysis of the problem-solution environment. 
35. Aspects that are specific to the external concept [MOTORCYCLE] may be 
stored with the representation {motorcycle}. Aspects that are specific to the concept 
[TRIUMPH] may be stored with the representation {triumph}. The representation 
{motorcycle} will at some point overlap with the representation {triumph}. For the 
model to operate at these different levels, with higher order levels being dependent 
upon the lower order levels, then these conceptual patterns must carry relations 
that link one pattern to another. Thus reasoning about an object may be defined by 
the relations that may exist between two or more conceptual patterns. That is, if a 
pair of conceptual patterns can be considered to be a particular object, then 
reasoning can be considered to be a process relation of that pattern pair. This may 
be termed the "associative nature of knowledge" [RUMELHART & NORMAN, 1985]. 
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Thus the conceptual knowledge may be reflected as associations that connect these 
hierarchical conceptual patterns. 
36. However, for a conceptual pattern to provide a human subject with an 
understanding of the description, explanation and prediction status of the problem- 
solution environment, then a control and monitoring function must be able to 
understand and inferential manipulate these patterns. This function must be 
capable of, (i) examining these patterns; (ii) determining their dependencies and 
their meanings and then; (iii) executing specified actions. It is hypothesized that 
the control and monitoring function performs categorization and classification 
transformations. For example, assigning defined meaning-values and determining 
the range of situations for which a conceptual pattern provides a dependable 
explanation of the problem-solution environment. This will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 2. They will also perform operational and conditional 
transformations, for example, accessing them, comparing them and depending on 
the comparison, initiating actions. This has been termed reflection and will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Note, it is possible to make a distinction 
between deductive and inductive representations of knowledge. However, Evans 
[19891 has concluded that "inductions and deductions may alternate, as a 
provisional rule which has been induced is then applied deductively to a new 
example". In later chapters, particularly Chapter 4, the implications of inferring 
the specific from the general will be addressed. 
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1.5 CONCLUSIONS 
" There appears to be evidence to suggest that reasoning by rules and reasoning by 
models offer incomplete and incompatible explanations of human problem 
solving. 
9 Solving problems and the way in which the problem solving task is performed, 
appear to be dependent upon the nature of the problem and the way in which the 
individual understands and represents that problem. 
" Individual's seek out commonly occurring patterns. These are cued from the 
individual's memory as required and matched with the current problem. If there 
is an exact match then patterns of the previous experience are re-used. If an 
exact match is not possible then the pattern will undergo some modification. 
9 It is hypothesized that, (i) conceptual patterns are used by individuals to 
understand and thus generate an analysis of the problem-solution environment; 
(ii) they consist of descriptive, explanatory and predictive processes and; (ii) 
knowledge may be represented by a set of hierarchical conceptual patterns. 
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2. CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTUAL PATTERNS 
2.1 OBJECTIVES 
" To review the use of categories and concepts in human reasoning. 
" To discuss the linguistic aspects in the construction of conceptual patterns. 
" To explore the hypothesis that the use of conceptual patterns in human 
reasoning is part of a reflective process loop. 
2.2 INTRODUCTION 
1. In Chapter 1 it was hypothesized that knowledge may be represented by a 
set hierarchical conceptual patterns and that these patterns are used by individuals 
to understand and thus generate an analysis of the problem-solution environment. 
This understanding may be governed by the point-of-view of the individual and the 
role-requirements of the problem-solution environment. Since, a point-of-view is 
particular to each individual and the role-requirements of the problem-solution 
environment is dependent upon the problem-solution domain, then the represented 
characteristic knowledge of some external objects may not be universal. 
2. Before continuing, please note the following nomenclature. Concepts may 
be identified by square brackets and upper case font, e. g. [LITHOLOGY], whereas an 
external object may be represented by square brackets and an italic font, e. g. 
[lithology]. The conceptual pattern (or the individuals internal model of the 
external object) is represented by curly brackets and an italic font {lithology}. 
3. Consider the concept [LITHOLOGY]. A conceptual pattern that an individual 
may have of that concept could be expressed as, {the visible characteristics that 
impart individuality to the rock}. Obviously, this pattern will depend upon the 
individual identifying and hence understanding the defining nature that constrains 
the concept [LITHOLOGY]. That is, the external object will have a range of these 
definitions that make up the totality of [lithology]. These definitions will be 
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manufactured with the intention of fulfilling the expected role-requirements of the 
external object [lithology]. Understanding these requirements relies on the human 
subject being able to generate (or have access to) related background information 
about which there is general agreement. Further, this understanding will be 
defined through the point-of-view of the individual, which in the main is defined by 
the experience, education and cultural aspirations of the individual. In Chapter 1, 
it was suggested that a conceptual pattern that an individual may have of the 
concept [LITHOLOGY] would reflect a series of processes that form a connection 
between the knowledge in the environment and the individual. Since the 
conceptual pattern represents the total understanding that an individual may have 
of the external object [lithology], then a conceptual pattern is the means by which 
external objects are categorized into a set of processes and relations that represent 
the concept [LITHOLOGY]. 
4. However, what are concepts? HAMPTON & DUBOIS [19931 use "the word 
concept to refer to the idea or notion by which an intelligence is able to understand 
some aspect of the world". SMITH & MEDIN, suggest that concepts provide, "a 
taxonomy of things in the world and to express relations between classes in that 
taxonomy" [SMITH & MEDIN, 1981]. Is this taxonomy universal? Are concepts a 
singular and identical description of similar objects and is this description a 
representation of a defining knowledge common to those objects? If the 
understanding an individual has of an object is defined by the point-of-view of the 
individual, will a different point-of-view generate a different understanding? For 
example, will a petroleum engineers conceptual representation of the concept 
[LITHOLOGY] be the same as a reservoir engineers conceptual representation? Will 
these differences influence how individual's develop and modify their conceptual 
patterns and will they also influence how individual's use these conceptual patterns 
to reason about the external object? 
5. The discussion in the following section will focus on the categorization and 
classification mechanisms and the results of research on the nature of concepts. In 
later sections, the linguistic aspects in the categorization of objects are discussed. It 
is suggested that when an expert uses a conceptual pattern to reason about an 
external object, they are testing an hypothesis about the meaning-values and the 
dependence-condition of that conceptual pattern on the content and context of the 
object situation. This testing is a function of the expert using past knowledge in 
deciding if he/she has or has not seen this object situation before. It is hypothesized 
that this decision making is a type of reflective-explanation. 
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2.3 THE PRINCIPLES OF CATEGORIZATION 
6. RUMELHART & NORMAN [19851 have suggested that "perhaps the simplest of 
the propositional systems is the assumption that concepts are properly represented as 
a set of semantic features". These features could be the essential elements of 
reasoning [SMITH & MEDIN, 1981]. For example, an individual may have no 
previous knowledge or experience of a new concept (apart that is, from its 
membership of a specific category). The individual may use this membership to 
infer that the new concept has the characteristics that are common to the category 
membership. This view of reasoning assumes that this membership may be defined 
by "set relationships: two concepts can be disjoint (have no attributes in common); 
overlap (have some but not all attributes in common); be nested (all of the attributes 
of one concept are included in another); or be identical (be specified by exactly the 
same set of features)" [RUMELHART & NORMAN, 1985]. These attributes can be used 
to classify the membership level of that object [SMITH & MEDIN, 19811. 
Consequently they may be viewed as a description that the individual uses to 
identify the object as belonging-to or not-belonging-to a category membership. 
However, how do individuals classify and categorize these descriptions? How do 
individuals combine simple descriptions to form more complex descriptions? 
7. HAMPTON & DuBOIs [19931, suggest that categorization rules are used to 
categorize external objects and that these categorization rules are influenced by 
descriptive property information. For example, the development of a conceptual 
pattern {table} would involve interrogating descriptions of external [table] objects 
and identifying those descriptives that define the external object. This operation 
would separate (or classify) the external objects into [tables] and [non-tables]. 
Therefore, some descriptive property information may be classified as physical (flat, 
square, stable), while others may be classified as functional (support's weight). 
Others may involve complex combinations that are embedded in an implicit higher- 
level conceptual pattern held by the human subject, for example, {Chippendale}. 
HAMPTON & DUBOIS [1993] suggest that these descriptives may be looked upon as 
properties. For example, a property could be is black & white. This could be 
considered an attribute property termed colour, with a given value property of being 
black & white. Thus attribute properties may be looked upon as properties with a 
finite list of mutually exclusive value properties. Therefore, attribute properties 
allow these properties to develop into contrasting information sets, with the value 
properties providing a means by which attribute properties within a domain may 
differ. For example, consider the characteristic properties for the concept [CUP] 
[SMITH & MEDIN, 19811, such that, 
[CUP] specific object, concave, can hold liquids, has handle 
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8. These characteristics would appear to offer a unitary description of the 
concept [CUP]. However, as noted by SMITH & MEDIN [1981] teacups used in 
Chinese restaurants do not normally have handles, yet they may still be classified 
as [cups]. Furthermore the remaining characteristics may also be true for [non- 
cups], for example, [bowl], [dish] or [vase]. This suggests that a human subject's 
understanding of the concept [CUP] may not only be reflected by characteristic 
properties. That is, there may be non-characteristic properties that define the 
concept [CUP]. Non-characteristic properties that are not common to all members of 
that category. Thus a [cup] ISA [CUP], if a majority agree that the external object is 
a [cup] as defined by the conceptual pattern, {a small open drinking vessel, that is 
usually bowel-shaped and has a handle on one side}. 
9. According to GARNER [1978] and TVERSKY [1977] a distinction could be 
made between component and holistic properties. A component property may be 
thought of as one that helps to provisionally describe a concept, while not usually 
constituting a complete description. For example, the component properties of 
concept [MOTORCYCLE] may be described as two wheels, engine, characteristic shape. 
Note, some of these component properties may refer to specific parts of the concept, 
for example, two wheels, while others may depict a totality of the entire concept, for 
example, characteristic shape. On the other hand a holistic property offers a 
complete description of the concept. The concept [MOTORCYCLE] may be a holistic 
pattern that represents a current production motorcycle, for example, Triumph. 
However, in the [MOTORCYCLE] example, what is the difference between the 
component property {characteristic shape} and the holistic property {Triumph}? It is 
suggested by SMITH & MEDIN [19811 that since the concept [MOTORCYCLE] will be 
made up of more than one component property, then each component is processed as 
an individual entity. They suggest that each of the component properties of a 
concept are individual and independent. This view is reflected in conventional 
similarity measures. In which each property is an independent and discrete data 
entity and the more of these independent and discrete data entities two concepts 
share the closer the similarity [TvERSKY, 1997]. This they argue contrasts with a 
holistic property, where the holistic property attempts to represent the totality of 
the object class. The holistic property is the complete unit. A unit that represents 
the totality of the object's knowledge. 
10. However, how do individual's differentiate between similar, but differing 
external world objects? For example, a human subject may have a holistic 
representation {Triumph} for the object [motorcycle]. When confronted by an actual 
external world object of another motorcycle, for example [Ducati], how will the 
holistic representation help to distinguish between the two? How can the human 
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subject recognize that the object [Ducati] is not represented by the holistic pattern 
{Triumph} and consequently why [Ducati] IS-NOT -A [Triumph]? 
11. SMITH & MEDIN [1981], have argued that when an object is represented by 
a holistic property, it is often intended as a point-for-point representation. For 
example, an individual's holistic representation {Triumph} is a point-for-point 
representation of a particular object [motorcycle]. Therefore, having used the point- 
for-point representation of {Triumph} to classify [Ducati] as the external object 
[motorcycle], then a discrimination function at the next level of classification will 
distinguish between [Triumph] and [Ducati]. This discrimination function could 
make use of a particular component property, for example, characteristic shape with 
which to identify the differences between [Triumph] and [Ducati]. 
12. Therefore, individual's have to choose the most appropriate way to 
categorize these components [TVERSKY, 19771. For example, individual's could 
categorize them as quantitative components (or dimensions) and as qualitative 
components (or features). Dimensions are the state variables of the component 
properties. Whereas features are the characteristic attributes of the component 
properties. Consider the concept [MOTORCYCLE]. This concept could be represented 
by the dimensions of cost, speed, make or model. Therefore, the concept [SPORTS- 
MOTORCYCLE] would be at one end of a dimension speed while the concept [MOPED- 
MOTORCYCLE] would be at the other end of the dimension speed. Alternatively, each 
concept [MOTORCYCLE] could be represented by a set of features, such as two-wheels, 
characteristic-shape, etc. If two objects differ with respect to a particular dimension 
then one object must have more of that dimension. In the motorcycle example, the 
concept [SPORTS-MOTORCYCLE] will be faster than the concept [MOPED- 
MOTORCYCLE]. However, if two objects differ with respect to a feature, such that one 
object has IT, what ever IT is, while the other does not have IT, then the other may 
not be a motorcycle. For example, let the missing feature be two-wheels. If having 
two-wheels is a defining feature of a motorcycle, then an object that does not have 
this feature will not be a motorcycle. 
13. ROSCH [19771 suggests that the fundamental conceptualization of external 
objects may be thought of as discrete prototypes. For example, some concepts when 
compared to a prototype, are judged to be better examples of a category than others. 
This is an important point, since the human conceptualization process will have to 
compare concepts with a prototype, to classify that concept as belonging-to, or not- 
belonging-to the category membership. ROSCH and her co-workers, suggest that 
some members of an information set are assumed to be critical characteristics (or 
weighting functions), of that set. Therefore, for a defined purpose, an object whose 
sets with more of the critical characteristics than others, will appear to be more 
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representative of that concept. 
14. The Roschian view of the classification of external objects rests on the 
following assumptions, (i) external object characterizations do not occur 
independently (creatures with feathers are more likely to have wings than creatures 
with fur); (ii) there is one basic-level object at one level of abstraction (the human 
subject is able to obtain the majority of information with the least cognitive effort) 
and; (iii) even with the partial representation of external objects or when the 
characteristic attributes are continuous (and would normally produce categories 
that have a tendency to merge with other categories at similar abstraction levels), 
categories are still maintained as discrete information sets. 
15. Note, these views of reasoning are concerned with defining characteristics 
of the external object. As stated above in order for defining properties to categorize 
the object, then those properties must be singularly necessary and jointly sufficient. 
Therefore, for a characteristic to be singularly necessary then every instant of that 
object will have that singular necessary characteristic. For a set of characteristics 
to be jointly sufficient, then every entity with that set must be an instance of that 
object. 
16. For example, if a singularly necessary characteristic of the concept 
[MOTORCYCLE] is two-wheels then every instance of the concept [MOTORCYCLE] must 
have two-wheels. For a set of characteristics to be jointly sufficient, then every 
entity having that set must be an instance of the object. For example, if a set of 
jointly sufficient characteristics of the concept [MOTORCYCLE] includes two-wheels 
and characteristic-shape, then every entity with the set two-wheels and 
characteristic-shape must be an instance of the concept [MOTORCYCLE]. Consider 
the concept [TRIANGLE], this could be represented using the characteristics closed- 
figure, three-sides, three-angles & the-sum-of-all-angles-is-180-degrees, etc. 
Therefore, being a closed-figure is a singular necessary condition, since the object 
[triangle] must have this characteristic. The same is also true of the characteristic 
three-sides, three-angles and the-sum-of-all-angles-is-180-degrees. However, these 
four characteristics are also jointly sufficient. Since any entity defined as a closed- 
figure, with-three-sides, with- three-angles, with-the-sum-ofall-angles-being- 180- 
degrees must, by those conditions be a [triangle]. Therefore such necessary and 
sufficient characteristics may be viewed as defining characteristics. 
17. However, what is the defining characteristic of the object [games]. It cannot 
be a, competition-between-teams, or even a condition that there must be, at-least- 
two-individuals-involved, since [solitaire] is a [game] that has neither 
characteristic. Similarly, a [game] cannot be defined solely by the need to have a, 
26 
winner. For example, the [game] [ring-a-ring-a-rosy] has no such characteristic. 
Lets consider a more abstract characteristic, in which anything is a [game] if it 
provides, amusement. [Football] is clearly a [game] that provides, amusement, but 
for whom. Do professional footballers consider their Saturday outings, amusing and 
for that matter do the fans? Even if they do and, amusement is a singular necessary 
characteristic of [game], then [whistling] could also be considered a [game]. 
18. One solution to this problem is provided by KOESTLER [1976] and DIAS & 
BLOCKLEY [1995], namely the notion of emergent properties. In that the 
categorization of object is a function of its emergent properties. Consider the use of 
the concept [MOTORCYCLE] in the problem-solution environment, is-x-a-motorcycle? 
When an individual uses the concept [MOTORCYCLE], a set of emergent properties 
are implied or associated with the object [motorcycle]. Properties that emerges from 
the fact that bits of, steel, plastic and rubber have been assembled to form a 
characteristic-shape. They all co-operate when the ignition key is turned and the 
concept [MOTORCYCLE] has a existence. Thus the concept [MOTORCYCLE] becomes 
more than the sum of its parts. Some of these emergent properties will be 
culturally, contextual and content driven and so will emerge from the point-of-view 
of the individual. Some of them may emergent from an individuals understanding 
of the role-requirements of problem-solution environment. These emergent 
properties are used to classify the membership level of the new object. This implies, 
that if the emergent property of an object suggests that the object belongs to a 
particular concept category, then inferences may be deduced about the object. For 
example, let the concept [MOTORCYCLE] be represented by the conceptual pattern, {a 
motorized two wheeled vehicle, used for carrying two people on the highway}. 
Furthermore, let the individual recognize from the emergent properties of 
[MOTORCYCLE], that x-ISA-motorcycle. Having used the emergent properties to 
classify the membership level, then additional inferences can be made. For 
example, if [x] was seen in the UK, then [x] would need an [mot] and [road tax]. The 
level of confidence and appropriateness of these inferences will be a function of the 
human subject's understanding of the content and context of the problem-solution 
environment. For example, if the individual saw [x] on the [motor-way], then the 
content and context of the problem-solution environment would tend to reinforce the 
belief that x-ISA-motorcycle. However, if [x] was found in a [Kellogg's Corn flake 
package], then the content and context of the problem-solution environment would 
tend to suggest that x-ISA-toy-motorcycle. Therefore, it could be argued that 
categorization rules are constrained by the content and context of the problem- 
solution environment of an object and will generate a belief that two objects belong- 
to, or do-not-belong-to a category. This is done by comparing the emerging 
properties that are perceived by the individual, (i) as being shared by the two 
objects; (ii) given the point-of-view of the individual doing the classification and; (iii) 
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the understanding the individual will have of the role-requirements of the objects 
problem-solution environment. This would suggest that individual's engage in a 
multi-level classification procedure and implies that individual differences in the 
classification procedure will exist. 
2.3.1 TIE STRUCTURE OF A CONCEPT 
19. Consider the concept [LITHOLOGY] definition of the object [lithology] as 
expressed by the following statement, "visible characteristics that impart 
individuality to the rock" [CHAMBERS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DICTIONARY, 1988]. 
This expression may be interpreted as follows, (i) a rock's individuality that is 
imparted by its visible characteristics and; (ii) those visible characteristics that 
impart the rock's individuality. Let the representation of a definition be dependent 
upon the representation of its parts. In the expression, a rock's individuality that is 
imparted by its visible characteristics, the explanation is a function of the 
relationship between a rock's individuality and its visible characteristics, which is 
only understood by semantic interpretation of that is imparted by. If however, the 
latter is replaced with that is crushed by, then the interpretation of the whole would 
change. This much is obvious. However, a deeper inspection, reveals that the 
semantic interpretation must be more abstract. For example, the interpretation of 
that is imparted by, underlies not only, a rock's individuality that is imparted by its 
visible characteristics, but also, the visible characteristics that impart individuality 
to the rock and the visible characteristics that impart the rock's individuality. 
20. However, neither, the visible characteristics that impart individuality to the 
rock, nor the visible characteristics that impart the rock's individuality contains, 
that is imparted by, as a constituent part (or surface structure). Thus an abstract 
explanation, which underlies, (the visible characteristics that impart individuality 
to the rock) and (the visible characteristics that impart the rock's individuality), 
must have a direct correspondence (or connection), with an abstract explanation 
underlying, a rock's individuality that is imparted by its visible characteristics. This 
correspondence must exist despite the differences of the constituent parts. The 
interpretation of, that is imparted by its visible characteristics, is derived from that 
is imparted by and its visible characteristics and the interpretation of, a rock's 
individuality that is imparted by its visible characteristics, is determined from, a 
rock's individuality and that is imparted by its visible characteristics. For 
individuals to undertake such interpretations will require them to divide, a rock's 
individuality that is imparted by its visible characteristics, into separate 
constituents. This requires the human subject to firstly, represent the grammatical 
relationships and secondly, understand that, its visible characteristics, is a DIRECT- 
OBJECT [CHOMSKY, 19671 of, that is imparted by and that a SUBJECT-PREDICATE 
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[CHOMSKY, 1967] relationship must exist between, a rock's individuality and, that is 
imparted by its visible characteristics. 
21. CHOMSKY, feels that these interpretative components are applied to 
determine, "the semantic interpretation of a phrase X of the deep structure from the 
semantic interpretations of the immediate constituents of X, and the grammatical 
relation represented in this configuration off, and its parts" [CHOMSKY, 19671. How 
might this be organized? CHOMSKY [19671 states "of the many alternatives that 
might be suggested, the linguistic evidence now available seems to point consistently 
to the conclusion that the syntactic component consists of rules that generate deep 
structures combined with rules mapping these into associated surface structures". 
For example, the process could be composed of rules that firstly generate the 
constituent parts, then map these rules onto the associated abstract explanation. 
Conversely, rules that the generate abstract explanations may combine with an 
associative surface structures that map these rules onto the constituent parts. Or 
the process might operate via independent rules that are able to generate 
associative abstract explanations and constituent parts that have conditions of 
compatibility imposed them (or they express relations between them). 
2.4 DISCUSSION 
22. CHOMSKY [1967] has argued that a generative grammar may be said to 
generate a set of structural descriptions. Each of which incorporates a deep 
structure, a surface structure and a methodology that provides the human subject 
with a semantic and a syntactic interpretation of the concept. He suggests that 
syntactic attributes will give a formal characterization to the linguistic structure of 
a concept. He has argued, that the syntactic attributes are composed of, (i) a phrase 
structure that defines the underlying linguistic structure and; (ii) a 
transformational component, which converts these underlying structures into a 
surface structure. CHOMSKY [19671 assumes that individuals engage in a linguistic 
understanding process by recovering the underlying structures, when they reverse 
this transformation mechanism. However this assumption implies two conditions. 
Firstly, an individual "must somehow mobilise rules of grammar that parse the 
sentences she hears into semantically significant parts of speech from which they are 
composed" [LYCAN, 19901. Secondly, where do these rules of generative grammar 
come from? 
23. The notion that an individual uses rules of grammatical transformations to 
convert deep structures to surface structures lead CHOMSKY [1967] to an interesting 
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conclusion. Since these rules are able to define the specific properties of syntactic 
properties so precisely, then a basic-level structure may exist. Further, this basic 
structure may exist as a "universal grammar" [CHOMSKY, 19671. LYCAN [19901 
defines a universal grammar as "a device that takes an infant's environmental input 
and turns it into knowledge of a particular natural language such as English or 
Japanese". However, as LYCAN [1990] states, how can individuals "develop, not just 
the same language or other, but everywhere much the same language so far as 
grammar is concerned". FODOR [1981,19901 accounts for this, by postulating a rich 
internal structure. He concludes that when human subjects use (or learn) a 
language, they are testing (or confirming) a hypothesis about the truth (or meaning) 
conditions of that language. He suggests that such hypotheses take the general 
form, P(y) is true, iff (if and only if) G(x). Where P is a meaning-value of the 
language to be learnt and G is a meaning-value in the language of thought. FODOR 
[1981,19901 has argued that to be able to form such hypothesis, let alone test them, 
will require the individual to already have the meaning of G. Hence, the language of 
thought must be at least as conceptually rich as any natural language. If language 
learning is hypothesis testing, then the hypothesis must be developed from a 
language that is already as rich as the language to be learnt. 
24. Despite the commitment of both FODOR [1981,1990] and CHOMSKY [1967] 
to the notion of innateness (that is, existing in or belonging to the individual), not all 
concepts need be innate. For example, it is dubious whether individuals have 
innate representations of the complex concepts [SEMI-SUBMERSIBLE DRILLING 
PLATFORMS] or [GENERICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS]. However, it does seem possible 
that these non-innate complex concepts could be composed of innate elementary 
meaning-values. Further, the notion of total innateness may be minimized, if it is 
assumed that only some concepts are innate and that innateness may be conferred 
on concepts by a degree of similarity to an exemplar (or prototype). For example, 
individuals may not have an innate representation for the concept [ROBIN], simply 
some mechanism for attaching an exemplar [BIRD] to the concept [ROBIN] and 
stipulating similarity rules for further use of the concept [ROBIN]. however, neither 
FODOR [1981,1990] nor CHOMSKY [1967] give any attention to the interaction 
between language and its environment and the manner in which the environment 
attaches a meaning-value to a concept. Therefore, while certain aspects of a 
concepts construction may be explained in linguistic terms, other aspects, such as, 
(i) the combination of elementary meaning-values and; (ii) environmental influences 
can only be accounted for by the general and specific knowledge of the external 
world and the constraints and conditions this knowledge imposes on that 
construction. If representations are to provide meaning-values and dependency- 
conditions, then an account of how the meaning and dependency of the 
representations change must be forthcoming. CHOMSKY [1967] suggests that 
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concepts are constrained by the environmental input, without explaining how and 
FODOR [1981,19901 relies on the individual intuitively grasping the 
representational semantics, without discussing where this intuition comes from. 
25. In section 2.3, the notion that human subjects can abstract descriptions, 
such that individuals can judge category membership by the degree of similarity to 
an abstract prototype [RoSCH, 1977; 19781 was introduced. This description 
abstraction may have an average profile. Hence, individuals could judge 
membership and hence the meaning of an object, by judging the similarity of the 
object to an average profile. BOSCH [19781, suggested that judgements of human 
subjects concerning category membership appear to be scalar. Such that, a human 
subject will classify the object [a] as belonging to concept [B] to a greater or lesser 
extent [CLARK, 19931. For example, human subjects will classify a robin as being a 
more dependable exemplar of bird than a duck. It would appear that such a theory 
represents a degree of reality that is at odds with the classical model of the 
psychological mechanisms that human subjects use to classify category 
membership. Especially if such models simply involve, "testing for the presence of 
the defining features picked out by some set of necessary and sufficient conditions, for 
such features will either be present or absent, and hence there will be no metric by 
which to gauge goodness of example; the concept will either apply or fail" [CLARK, 
1993]. Consequently, the more representational and hence more dependable 
members are those that demonstrate more defining features. CLARK [1993], 
suggests that the representation becomes a better member of that category because 
of these increased defining features. Furthermore, SMITH & MEDIN [19811, suggest 
that categories may be represented by stored indications (or exemplars) of actual 
category members. They argue, that the existence of these exemplars, allows for a 
graduated membership to be explained by a separation distance from these 
exemplars. Note, this theory appears to have similarities with the prototype 
hypothesis proposed by RÖSCH [1977,19781. Such that a concept's defining 
characteristics can be developed into an abstraction of those characteristics, with an 
average profile, or statistical central tendency [CLARK, 19931. Hence, an individual 
can subsequently judge the meaning and dependence of an object, by judging the 
similarity of the object to an average profile. 
26. However, while such prototype theories are helpful in explaining how 
individuals understand and reason with simple concepts, they appear to be unable 
to explain how individuals understand and hence reason using complex 
conjunctions. To counter this problem, OSHERSON & SMITH [19811, suggested that 
the only means of describing prototypical combination (and thus determine the 
truth conditions of propositions) was ZADEH'S fuzzy logic [ZIEH, 1982,19931. This 
logic relies on the assumption that category membership may be defined by a degree 
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of acceptability. They suggested that fuzzy logic is able to provide rules, such that 
the negation, conjunction and disjunction functions can operate with the category 
membership propositions. These rules may be classified as operational functions 
that evaluate the truth value of the complex conjunctive, given the truth values of 
constituent components. 
28. However, the fuzzy logic-prototype theory was shown to be invalid when 
HAMPTON [1987] demonstrated the difficulties fuzzy logic had in paralleling the 
ability of a human subject. While the conjunction of motor and bike to form 
motorbike was relatively easy, it was difficult to develop a single representation of 
kindergarten, school or university that captured their characteristic. Many 
proposals have tried to account for this discrepancy. For example, TAKAGI [1994] 
(extending ZADEH'S [1982] idea that an appropriateness rule within the fuzzy logic 
operators may be related to the domain of the concept), suggested that conceptual 
fuzzy sets may be able to use context sensitive knowledge. TAKAGI proposes that a 
conceptual fuzzy set may be realized as an associative memory, conforming to 
WITTGENSTEIN'S idea of concept meaning. Yet another approach has been proposed 
by YAGER [1995]. YAGER investigated the appropriateness of a general 
characterization function as a measure of ambiguity. (This appropriateness is with 
respect to the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence). YAGER demonstrated that 
notions relating to uncertainty (taken from fuzzy logic), for example, measures of 
fuzziness, of specificity, of possibility (certainty interval), may satisfy this 
characterization function, thereby generating a degree of conceptual fuzziness that 
can operate within contextual constraints. All these proposals argue for a function 
operator (or a set of function operators), that predict the appropriateness of an 
attribute in a conjunction [A] + [B]. This appropriateness is dependent, (i) upon the 
appropriateness of the attributes within the constituent concepts [A] and [B] and; 
(ii) upon access to other extensional information. That is, information on the other 
objects within the conjunction. 
29. HAMPTON [19871 has argued that since conventional extensional 
mathematical inferences rely on the abstraction of propositions whose existence is 
independent of the individual then "fuzzy logic, which like classical logic, operates in 
extensional domain, does not address how the meanings of concepts modify each 
other when they combine". He proposed a different approach to fuzzy set 
conjunction and suggested that the prediction of the conjunction is impossible 
without "identifying the rules by which it inherits attributes from its constituent 
concepts". He has suggested that the inheritance of these attributes forms part of a 
intension process during the conjunction. This will be a function of an interrogation 
process and "that the intension of a conjunction is formed as the union of the 
constituent attribute sets" [HAMPTON, 1987]. During this process only some 
32 
attributes for each constituent part will be appropriate for the conjunction. 
Hampton terms this a composite prototype. This composite prototype is governed by 
two constraints, "one constraint is that attributes that are necessary for either 
constituent (i. e., common to all members) will also be necessary for the conjunction. 
The other, converse, constraint is that those attributes that are impossible for either 
constituent will similarly be impossible for the conjunction" [HAMPTON, 19871. 
Therefore, the conjunction will not carry every attribute of all the constituent parts. 
Thus an exemplar's typicality during conjunction will outweigh its typicality for 
either constituent. 
30. MURPHY [19881, takes an even more extreme view and argues that 
conjunction does not function as a simple linear rule (or relations). He argues that 
"people do not have sets of pets and fish in their heads, and therefore they cannot 
perform set intersection. More likely, they have intensions in the form of mental 
representations or rules that allow them to pick out the exemplars of a concept. Thus, 
any extensional explanation must also supply an intensional explanation of some 
kind in order to be a psychological model". This conjunction requires the reference 
of external objects relations, so that the human subject is able to place the most 
appropriate attributes within the conjunction. This would help human subjects 
predict how the resulting combination would be influenced by the particular 
structure of the environment in which the conjunction takes place. Murphy, 
stresses that the conjunction formations are non-compositional, in that the 
conjunctions attributes will not just be those of the constituent parts. Thus the 
conjunction may be considered to be greater than the sum of their parts and part of 
properties that emerge from the individuals understanding of the problem-solution 
environment. 
31. ALLWOOD, ANDERSSON & DAHL [1977] state that "many of the types of 
reasoning we normally engage in cannot be captured in the simple type of predicate 
logic" [ALLWOOD, ANDERSSON & DAHL, 1977]. They go on to argue that "when we 
give an account of the meaning of a linguistic expression, it is not enough to relate it 
to an object or set of objects; we must also provide a sense or a concept for the 
expression" [ALLWOOD, ANDERSSON & DAHL, 1977]. Since the subject matter of the 
expression will consist of personal constructions (or objects) and the existence of any 
personal construct will be defined both by (i) the individual that constructed it and; 
(ii) the environment in which it was constructed, then it cannot exist independently 
of that individual and the environment of the individual [BANNISTER & FARNSELLA, 
1971 ]. As MURPHY [1988] states "how do people combine concepts X and Y is not a 
well-specified question. It is only in the context of some task that it takes on a clear 
meaning". Therefore, assuming that the categorization serves the needs of the 
problem-solution environment, then it might be more appropriate to consider this 
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conjunction hierarchy being dependent upon that environment. For example, as the 
problem-solution environment becomes more knowledge-based, then the concept 
conjunction level becomes more informationally dense. In a manner similar to 
RASMUSSEN'S [1983] hierarchy of reasoning, then conjunction may also be defined as 
a hierarchical process. Thus, at the skilled-based level, the conjunction could be 
considered instinctive, organized and highly practised. The conjuncture pattern 
matching becomes mechanical, where regular exposure develops a reflex skill. At 
this level, conjunction may be part of some evolutionary defence mechanism, that 
would have been a necessary response during our past evolutionary periods. At the 
rule-based level, the conjunction of more complex or novel situations takes place. At 
this level, the individual will attempt to minimizing the reasoning process by 
actively searching the memory and utilizing a conceptual pattern that fits the of the 
observed situation. For example, if an individual already has a conjunctive pattern 
for the concept [MOTOR-CAR], then a conjunctive pattern for the concept [MOTOR- 
CYCLE] will follow. At the knowledge-based level, reasoning in unfamiliar situations 
would require the development of a new conceptual pattern. However, despite the 
implication of a higher level of thought, it is almost certain that an existing 
conjunctive conceptual pattern would be accessed and modified to suit the present 
situation. 
32. This assumption is based on the premise that the categorization of a 
problem-solution environment is a function of its emergent properties. Some of 
these emergent properties will be culturally, contextual and content driven and so 
will emerge from an individuals point-of-view. Others may emerge from the 
individuals understanding of the role-requirements of the problem-solution 
environment. Those properties that emerge from an individuals point-of-view are 
perceptual (unique to human subject), whereas those that emerge from the 
individuals understanding of the role-requirements are functional (unique to 
object). These attributes form natural separations in the information sets. 
Therefore, conceptual patterns are derived from these separations. For example, let 
the concept [BEER] function at the rule-based level at which there are emergent 
properties common to all (or the majority) of members of that category. Then the 
category knowledge (at that abstraction level), may have a conceptual pattern of {an 
alcoholic drink brewed from fermented malt flavoured with hops}. Therefore at this 
level all alcoholic drinks, that have been brewed from fermented malt and flavoured 
with hops, may be categorized as [BEER]. At one level more abstract, that is the 
knowledge-based level, the concept could be become the conjunctive [ALCOHOLIC- 
BEVERAGE]. At this level, members share few emergent properties and those that 
are may be classified as functional. For example, the category knowledge may have 
the higher conceptual pattern of {intoxicating drink containing alcohol, where 
alcohol is a colourless volatile flammable liquid that is the intoxicating agent in 
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fermented and distilled drinks}. At one level less abstract, that is the skill-based 
level, the concept could be [GUINNESS]. The concept [GUINNESS] may contain many 
properties that overlap with other categories. For example, [GUINNESS] shares 
many properties with other kinds of [BEER], nonetheless it also contains properties 
specific to [GUINNESS]. At this level, the information sets may become more 
perceptual. The knowledge contained with the conceptual pattern has moved more 
towards the individual and is less concerned with the object. The knowledge is now 
governed more by the perceptual understanding the individual may have of 
[GUINNESS] and the value the individual places on that understanding. The 
knowledge becomes more subjective and less objective. For example, at the 
knowledge-based level the knowledge contained with the conceptual pattern 
{intoxicating drink containing alcohol, where alcohol is a colourless volatile 
flammable liquid that is the intoxicating agent in fermented and distilled drinks} is 
almost completely objective. This conceptual pattern represents a detailed 
explanation of the conjunctive [ALCOHOLIC-BEVERAGE] and could be used in some 
higher level reasoning about the effects of alcohol. Whereas, the information 
contained within the conceptual pattern representing the concept [GUINNESS] will 
be part of an individuals cultural and contextual understanding of that concept. 
33. How will the individual assign meaning and dependence to the descriptive, 
explanatory and predictive processes within the conceptual pattern? A hypothesis 
is required that views meaning and dependence as a fundamental relationship that 
links the conceptual pattern to the external object (and vice versa). In Chapter 1, it 
was suggested that a control and monitoring function performs categorization, 
classification and operational, conditional transformations. For example, assigning 
defined meaning-values and determining the range of situations for which a 
conceptual pattern provides a dependable explanation of the problem-solution 
environment. It is hypothesized that when an individual determines the range of 
situations for which a conceptual pattern provides an dependable explanation of the 
external object, they are testing a hypothesis about the meaning of the conceptual 
pattern and the dependence of that conceptual pattern, when compared to the 
component processes of the external object. This testing is a function of the 
individual using previous experience in deciding if they have or have not seen this 
conceptual pattern-object relationship before. In Chapter 1, it was suggested that 
the development of this decision strategy is based on operational and conditional 
transformations that access and compare conceptual patterns of similar 
experiences. This decision and hence categorization could be modelled as a type of 
reflective process loop. 
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2.4.1 THE NATURE OF REFLECTION 
34. Before discussing the rationale behind the use of a reflective process loop, it 
may be wise to explore the nature of reflection. BOLID, KEOGH & WALKER, have 
previously defined reflection as, "an important human activity in which people 
recapture their experience, think about it, mull it over and evaluate it. It is this 
working with experience that is important in learning. The capacity to reflect is 
developed to different stages in different people and it may be this ability which 
characterise those who learn effectively from experience" [BOUD, KEOGH & WALKER, 
19851. DEWEY adds, "reflective thinking, in distinction from other operations to 
which we apply the name of thought, involves (1) a state of doubt, hesitation, 
perplexity, mental difficulty, in which thinking originates, and (2) an act of 
searching, hunting, inquiring, to find material that will resolve the doubt, settle and 
dispose of the perplexity" [DEWEY, 19331. SCHON [19831 defines reflection in terms of 
knowledge gained from the individual's own experiences. He describes two forms of 
reflection. These are reflection-on-action and reflection- in-action respectively. 
SCHON [19831 argues that reflection-on-action is very similar to DEWEY's [19331 
ideas on reflection, where reflection-on-action can be seen as a systematic and 
deliberate thinking back over one's actions. However, reflection-in-action could be 
understood by the terms, thinking on your feet, keeping your wits about you and 
learning by doing. This suggests that not only do individual's think about doing but 
that individual's can think about doing something while they are doing it. 
Consequently, reflection-in-action will also consist of redefining the problem 
situation. 
35. DEWEY [19331 defined five phases of reflection. This, he argued, 
demonstrates that reflection is a purposeful and deliberate act of inquiry, through 
which a perceived problem is examined so that a thoughtful reasoned response 
might be tested. He has termed these phases as, suggestions, problem, hypothesis, 
reasoning and testing. These may not follow the same order or sequence, but DEWEY 
[19331 suggests that they will combine to form what he defines as a reflective cycle. 
It is important to note, that although the definition of reflection suggests that it is a 
type of reasoning-after-the-event, reflection could occur before, during and after an 
experience. DEWEY [19331 makes no reference to the influence of context in the 
problem recognition process. The context of the problem-solution may well 
influence the nature of the reflection itself. An experience from one context may 
influence thoughts and actions in another context. Context may well embrace 
domains, such as content, knowledge, experience, time, action, feelings and self 
confidence. All these will vary from situation to situation and individual to 
individual and will be very closely linked to their educational and cultural 
backgrounds and experiences. 
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36. Some results from the testing phase of the reflective cycle may ne satisfy 
the individual and consequently could lead to further reflection. In this respect, 
reflection may be defined as a consequence loop. The individual, (i) will develop a 
working hypothesis; (ii) they will make observations and; (iii) in consideration of 
those observations evaluate the hypothesis. As a consequence of that evaluation a 
conclusion will be generated. This conclusion is defined by its dependability. If the 
hypothesis is considered to be dependable, then it is accepted. If the hypothesis is 
non-dependable, then more information is acquired and the hypothesis is re- 
evaluated. This loop continues until the hypothesis is either accepted or rejected. 
37. Dependability is a function of evidence. Therefore, when an individual 
enters the consequence loop with a proposed hypothesis, the individual looks for 
evidence to support that hypothesis. If the evidence can be found that supports the 
hypothesis, such that the belief in the conclusion that follows is greater then the 
non-belief, then the loop can be closed and the hypothesis can be accepted. 
However, not all evidence is equal. For example, some evidence may be, (i) more 
appropriate to the defined conclusion than others or; (ii) preferential selected to 
support a pre-defined conclusion. Some evidence may be uncertain. For example, 
this uncertainty may manifest itself in doubts over the quality of the supporting 
evidence. An individual categorizes an external object by referring to a process of 
gathering evidence and forming a belief about the object belonging-to or not- 
belonging-to a category. If the quality of evidence indicates that the individual has 
no sure knowledge on which to fall back on, then a degree of uncertainty will creep 
into the process. If there is some uncertainty between categories, then there will be 
a degree of hesitation in categorizing the object. How is this confusion resolved? 
38. Contemporary theories of concepts and categorization, for example 
TVERSKY [1997]; HAMPTON '[1987]; MURPHY [1985]; TAKAGI [1994] and YAGAR [1995] 
make little reference to the problems of uncertainty in the categorization processes. 
Any attempt by the individual to resolve that uncertainty, will involve an 
examination of other information. This information may be a previous experience. 
For example, observations may indicate that some aspects of the object are similar 
to a previously known object. An individual will scrutinize the information 
provided by the memory and look for evidential experiences that will support their 
chosen belief. In this way, the reflection links the past to the future. For example, 
when a medic makes a diagnoses, they will use the past to define the present. They 
will also make a prognoses of the possible outcome. They will make use of the past 
to anticipate the future. In this respect a medical diagnosis and treatment is a type 
of hypothesis testing, with the difference between the prognoses and the actual 
outcome of the treatment helping to modify the development of future hypotheses. 
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39. Testing is used to confirm (or refute) the inference, [A] ISA [B]. Testing is an 
opportunity to find out how well the individual has thought about the situation. 
This can be very helpful, since failing is instructive and is very important part of 
the learning process. As DEWEY states, "it either brings to light a new problem or 
helps to define and clarify' the problem on which he has been engaged. Nothing 
shows the trained thinker better than the use he makes of his errors and mistakes" 
[DEWEY, 1933]. POPPER suggests that "criticism of our conjectures is of decisive 
importance: by bringing out our mistakes it makes us understand the difficulties of 
the problem which we try to solve. This is how we become better acquainted with our 
problem, and able to propose more mature solutions: the very refutation of a theory- 
that is, of a tentative solution to our problem-is always a step forward that takes us 
nearer to the truth" [POPPER, 1972]. Reflection may provide a means of learning 
from past mistakes in order to anticipate future problems. 
40. In this manner, a reflection process loop using previous experiences will 
help an individual, (i) to hypothesis a possible solution; (ii) to test that hypothesis 
and from those tests to make a prognoses of the possible consequence and; (iii) 
hence anticipate the evidential course of a particular problem-solution 
environment. The outcome of which is used to modify future hypotheses. This is 
explored in more detail in Chapter 3, in which the notion of decision making as a 
reflective learning process is discussed. 
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2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
" It is hypothesized that the categorization of an object is a function of its emergent 
properties. Some of these emergent properties will be culturally, contextual and 
content driven and so will emerge from an individuals point-of-view Some of 
them may emerge from the individuals understanding of the role-requirements of 
the object. 
" When an individual uses a conceptual pattern to reason about an external object, 
they are testing the hypotheses about the meaning-values and dependence- 
conditions associated with the object environment. This testing is a function of 
the individual using past knowledge in deciding if they have or have not seen this 
conceptual pattern before. 
" It may be useful to model this decision making as a type of reflective process loop. 
This will be explored in Chapter 3. 
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3. DECISION MAKING AS A REFLECTIVE PROCESS 
3.1 OBJECTIVES 
" To explore the idea that reflection is a process of envisaging the possible 
consequences of pursuing various possible courses of action and evaluating the 
merits of the possible courses of action in terms of their possible consequences. 
" To define a model of decision making as part of a reflective learning process, 
supported by a reflective loop [BLOCKLEY, 1992; DIAS & BLOCKLEY, 19951, 
between the information acquisition, the process model and the evaluation of the 
available courses of action. 
" To discuss how this model is derived from a view of understanding as an 
explanation process. 
3.2 INTRODUCTION 
1. Many theories of human reasoning view decision making as a logical 
activity [NEWELL & SIMON, 1972; MCGREW & WILSON, 1982; CARLEY, 19821. This 
implies that the building of a decision is looked upon as a purely abstract and 
rational process that ignores other aspects of human behaviour. It will be argued 
that individuals use their experiences to develop decision paths as part of a 
reflective process. 
2. Before continuing this chapter, two important assumptions concerning 
decision making need to be discussed. The first assumption is concerned with the 
notions of decisions and how individuals choose between alternatives in a complex 
open world [NEWELL & SIMON, 19721. They suggest that any proposed methodology 
depends upon individual choices being reduced to comprehensible models that 
identify and explain the world and the processes involved in making decisions about 
that world. For example, a decision to place a bet on the Grand National or vote for 
a particular political party or indeed undertake a Ph. D., are all judgements 
undertaken by an individual. Consequently, it is assumed that the individual has 
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an understanding, (i) of the external environment; (ii) of what they want from that 
environment and; (iii) of how they need to react with that environment to achieve 
that need. 
3. The second assumption is concerned with the thoroughness of investigation 
and presupposes that individuals are able, (i) to thoroughly investigate a wide 
range of alternative scenarios and; (ii) to make choices between these scenarios on 
the basis of reasoned arguments as defined by supporting evidence [NEWELL & 
SIMON, 19721. These assumptions have been defined by a procedural criterion 
[JANis & MANN, 19771. This criterion implies that the human subject is a conscious 
entity that actively, (i) conducts a search for alternative responses to a defined 
problem and ensures that the search process is based on the objectives to be 
satisfied and on the evidence that results from the response being able to satisfy 
those objectives; (ii) analysis this evidence dispassionately comparing the risks as 
supported by the negative evidence with the benefits as supported by the positive 
evidence; (iii) searches for new evidence that will contradict the accepted view and 
when evaluating the alternatives takes account of this new evidence, even when it 
does not support the response that is preferred; (iv) examines all the positive and 
negative evidence (even if some of that evidence is considered to be unacceptable), 
before making a decision and (v); makes detailed plans for the implementation of 
the chosen response and reacts to the development of unacceptable risks within the 
chosen response by defining and initiating a contingency response. 
4. These criterion suggests the individual, (i) is able to rank alternatives in 
the order of maximized usefulness; (ii) possesses all the relevant information 
concerning the decision problem; (iii) knows all the possible decision solutions from 
which they can choose; (iv) as well as knowing all the consequences of each decision 
solution. For example, consider an individual who is contemplating a period of 
study leading to a Ph. D. To begin with, this contemplation may require the 
individual to have some conceptual understanding of a Ph. D. and the value that 
they bestow upon it. The individual will need to develop some definition of how 
supervisors and universities should be judged. Having defined those attributes as 
significant, then the individual may have to order those attributes, such that the 
individual can order the available choices. Others may require the individual to 
have complex conceptual patterns supporting that simplified representation. For 
example, when a geophysicist constructs a velocity model of a particular reservoir 
there are assumptions in that model. Implicit in the assumptions of that model are 
the hidden complexities and uncertainties of homogeneity, fluid flow, permeability, 
porosity and the migration of sound waves. 
5. In the following sections a review of contemporary decision models and 
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some ideas on a reflective model of human decision making will be presented. 
Perhaps at this stage, a few definitions concerning the attributes of a proposed 
model should be outlined. To begin with, can the model successfully demonstrate, 
(i) how the individual selects their preferences; (ii) how the individual chooses 
between those preferences and; (iii) hence how the individual builds a decision path. 
If the model can, then it will provide an explanation of what lies behind those 
preferences and how the decision path is built. For example, if a model can 
predicted that the reason why individuals undertake a Ph. D. was a function of the 
supervisor concerned and that the model successfully explained this function (later 
confirmed by empirical research), then it could be argued that the model was 
heuristically effective in that particular situation. 
6. However, this does not presume that the model will be as equally effective 
in predicting and explaining why individuals undertake an undergraduate course. 
It must be made clear that the presented reflective model does not represent some 
truth of correspondence. The reflective model is an attempt at an explanatory and 
prescriptive representation of the decision building process. It will attempt to 
explain the actuality of the how and the why of a particular decision path. It will 
also attempt to predict the potentiality of the how and the why of a particular 
decision path. It is suggested that this duality of actuality and potentiality (as 
represented by the reflective processes of the model), should not be considered to be 
true, only more appropriate and more dependable. 
3.3 WHAT IS A DECISION? 
7. Decision making could be defined as a selection between alternatives. 
However this implies that decision making is a static activity. It could be better 
defined as a path through a state space (in which the selection of the final decision 
is the end state of a series of interdependent processes), governed by the problem- 
solution environment. For example, consider the following. Harriet Harman MP 
announced recently that as a package of measures to reduce the governments public 
sector borrowing it had been decided to restrict the financial subsidy given to single 
parent families. In this example, the problem-solution environment may be defined 
by the Labour Party's perception, (i) of how the electorate will react to Harriet 
Harman's announcement; (ii) of how the electorate understood the Labour Party's 
manifesto promises; (iii) of the consequences of a decision, especially a reflection 
and re-evaluation by the electorate of that previous understanding and; (iv) of how 
such a decision could inflict serve damage to the credibility to the present 
government, etc. In this example, the processes may be viewed as the various 
meetings, presentations and reports, etc., that make up that path. Recently, my 
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brother and his wife decided to have a baby. This decision could also be viewed as a 
path through a state space governed by the problem-solution environment. In this 
example, the problem-solution environment will be completely different and may 
include such states as, (i) are we both ready to start a family; (ii) is this the right 
environment to raise a child and; (iii) can we afford the necessary time and 
resources, etc. The processes could be defined as medical examinations, seeking 
advice, etc. However, in these differing contexts, what is understood by the notion 
of decision and decision making and are they the same? 
8. MACKENZIE [1982] states that the major difficulty "has been whether to 
accept the word `choice' as synonym for `decision"' [MACKENZIE, 1982]. MCGREw & 
WILSON suggest "that the conception of decision which MacKenzie offers is one of a 
process: a cumulative sequence of stages of choice" [MCGREw & WILSON, 19821. This 
may be looked upon as decision path. A sequence of choice that defines a path 
leading from the problem-space [NEWELL & SIMON, 1972] to the decision-space 
[MCGREW & WILSON, 1982; CARLEY, 1982]. MCGREW & WILSON suggest that the 
notion of decision and deciding can be, "simply reduced to the notion of a final 
definitive solution in a problem-solving process" [MCGREw & WILSON, 19821. 
However, is there another level to this decision making process? Is it possible as 
stated by MCGREw & WILSON [1982) and defined by [JANIS & MANN, 19771 that 
"behind the decision is an element of procedure". Or do "decisions arise from a 
complex process of interactions among actors" [HALL, 1982]. Can these actors be 
defined as, (i) identify the current state(s) of the problem; (ii) define the desired end 
state(s); (iii) construct various paths for achieving those end state(s); (iv) examine 
those paths using some sort of selection procedure and; (v) finally end the process by 
defining a response. And are their interactions part of the decision process? Is this 
decision process universal? Do these assumptions imply that even when operating 
in an ill-conceived and badly-ordered external world of uncertainty, that all decision 
building processes consists of well-structured and well-ordered steps of certainty? 
These issues will be addressed by considering the development of a decision making 
model. 
3.3.1. MODELS OF DECISION MAKING: A DISCUSSION 
9. The development of a decision making model will be used to address the 
concerns set out above. To begin with, consider the notion of a problem-solution 
environment as a well-structured and well-ordered domain. If all the costs to be 
incurred and all the benefits that resulted from using any decision path were 
completely known, then decision making would be operating in a closed world 
environment. In a closed world the problem space, the decision path and the 
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decision space are related and the best decision can be calculated. Fortunately, the 
external world is not a closed system, but open and uncertain where information is 
incomplete and inconsistent. In this sort of environment it may not be possible to 
define a desired end state let alone the decision path necessary to reach it. The 
distinguishing characteristics of decision making in the external world may be 
classified as the uncertainty within that world and the constraints imposed by those 
uncertainties. For example, consider again the decision taking by Harriet Harman 
MP. How did the decision makers address the uncertainties imposed by such issues 
as, (i) single parent poverty; (ii) the effect this will have on the child's development 
and; (iii) the moral and ethic issues associated with the financial punishment of 
those, who are already at the bottom of the social pile. 
10. In explaining the decision making process, all theories structure their 
explanation as a function of implicit models. These implicit models may be looked 
upon as assumptions about the behaviour of the individual. These assumptions will 
consequently constrain the nature of that explanation. MCGREW & WILSON [1982] 
have proposed three dominant perspectives on decision making (which they suggest 
have been derived from those assumptions) namely, "the rational, organisational 
processes and political bargaining models", respectively. The organisational 
processes model is built around the notion that "an organisation should not be 
considered as some sort of `super-individual' behaving as a true individual but with 
greater information-handling and calculation capabilities" [MCGREW & WILSON, 
1982]. For example, "an organisation does not have in practice, a single set of goals 
with an agreed order of preference amongst them, nor does it carry out a similar 
search process amongst its means, as an individual might" [MCGREW & WILSON, 
1982]. Consequently, an organisation may develop a decision path that was 
different from that of an individual, even if that individual had the similar 
objectives and constraints as the organisation. MCGREW & WILSON [1982], suggest 
that the "organisational process model emphasises the centrality of routines and 
procedures in reducing the effects of uncertainty, and also emphasises the 
management of information to protect individual and departmental interests in the 
organisation". This has links with the political bargaining models, in which "any 
collective decision is a process of bargaining, with its own (usually) implicit rules, in 
which outcomes are determined by the relative resources devoted by each participant 
to the achievement of some satisfactory solution". How is this process defined? 
MC GREW & WILSON [1982], suggest "by a general process of bargaining and trade- 
offs between participants a final outcome is arrived at which has general support 
and in which the interests of all are seen to be accommodated". In this respect, the 
derived decision can be considered to be a rational agreement between participants, 
in which lesser interests are sacrificed to ensure the greater good is accrued to the 
decision maker(s). 
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11. The explanation of a decision path as defined by a rational process depends 
upon certain assumptions surrounding human behaviour and the ability of an 
individuals to analysis the problem-solution environment. Consequently, as 
[MCGREW & WILSON, 19821, state rationality implies that the decision path "can be 
both explained and justified by relating it to the objectives of the decision maker. " 
Given that a decision path must have a set of input states and desirable end state, 
then a rational individual when faced with a given problem-solution environment 
"will attempt to rank his/her objectives or goals in some kind of relative order" 
[MCGREW & WILSON, 1982]. This they suggest will leave the individual free to 
concentrate on examining all the alternative decision paths needed to achieve that 
end state. Consequently, the individual will then choose the decision path that 
either maximizes the values of the desired end state, or minimizes the ill-effects 
incurred if the desired end state is not reached. In process model terms an 
explanation of the decision path could be defined as, (i) a process model 
representation of the current state inputs; (ii) the desired end state; (iii) the sub- 
process hierarchy needed to reach that end state; (iv) the organisation of the 
decision path and; (v) the control and constraints that were imposed on the decision 
path. 
12. The major problem with rationality stems from the variations in attributed 
definitions. For example, a rational individual may be defined as, "endowed with 
reason, reasoning; sensible, sane, moderate, not foolish or absurd or extreme; of, 
based on, reasoning or reason, rejecting what is unreasonable or cannot be tested by 
reason in religion or custom" [THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT 
ENGLISH, 19641. However, LEVINE et al [1975] state that some scholars believe 
rationality, "means achievement of goals, some associate it with individuals 
maximising satisfaction, others conceive of it as a decision making process without 
regard to how successful a person is in achieving goals, and still others consider 
rationality to be broadly synonymous with intelligent and purposeful behaviour". 
13. CARLEY [19821 suggest that a distinction can be drawn between the 
objectives and the decision path used to satisfy those objectives. This may be 
viewed as a decision strategy. A strategy, based on the perceived objectives of the 
individual can be used by the individual to, (i) analysing and evaluating the 
advantages and disadvantages of each alternative decision path and; (ii) in the 
selection of the optimum or most relevant solution to the decision problem. 
Consequently, such decisions can be justified to others [MCGREw & WILSON, 1982] 
and once this justification is accepted than an agreement may be reached. 
Especially, when in reaching that agreement, the individual can show evidence of 
rejecting what is unreasonable or cannot be tested by reason in religion or custom. 
45 
14. In this context the notion of justification and agreement may be viewed as a 
pre-requisite of the prescriptive nature of all models of human decision making. 
However, a clear distinction should be drawn between rational and irrational 
decisions. This distinction implies that a distinction can also be drawn between the 
degree of justification and agreement applied to such decisions. For example, 
irrational decisions could be defined as rational decision that have become confused. 
This confusion may be the difference between the intention of the individual and 
the decision path that is selected to achieve that intention. Decisions that have 
become confused do so because either the individual fails to define the objectives of 
the problem-solution environment or is unable to do so because of the uncertainty 
that surrounds that environment. 
15. The usefulness of rational models have been defined by MCGREW & WILSON 
[1982] as "(a) finding the conditions under which human agents can calculate the 
consequences of their decisions with a reasonable degree of certainty, and (b) defining 
the rules of calculation which will choose the best alternative from the means 
available. " Note, since this depends upon the individual being able to anticipate the 
determinants of the consequences of their decisions, then the model must also act as 
a predictive mechanism. MCGREW & WILSON [1982] suggest that this "strong 
meaning of `rational' is a way of modelling the outcomes of consequences of decisions 
so that the decision-maker has one and only one way of arriving at a best decision - 
and what is best is itself defined by the model and the assumptions which it makes". 
ZEY [1992], has suggested that these theories of rationality view the notion of a best 
decision as utility maximising and that "neoclassical theorists see utility as the basic 
unit of all human preferences and profit maximisation as the ultimate individual 
goal". She points out that this "economic metaphor" is used to "explain not only 
economic behaviour but also the behaviour studied by nearly all social science 
disciplines, from political philosophy to psychology" [ZEY, 19921. 
16. In this context, the economic metaphor, may be defined as "the price which 
will maximise the producer's profits (his optimum solution) is the marginal cost of 
production" [MCGREW & WILSON 19821. This view of human decision making 
implies that if the individual did not calculate the price in this manner, then the 
individual will suffer. That is, the competitive nature of market forces will ensure 
that individuals who do follow this decision strategy will be more successful, than 
individuals who do not follow this decision strategy. As MCGREw & WILSON [1982], 
state, individuals "who did not follow rational rules would leave the market". This 
notion of decision making suggests that individuals are not concerned with how 
decisions are made. If the how is defined by the rules that form part of the rational 
decision strategy that governs the market place, then individuals just follow the 
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rules. 
17. ZEY [1992] points out that the social-economic-political theoretical 
implications of utility underlie all rational models of human decision making. She 
argues that utility is viewed as a measure that indicates the way in which the 
individual seeks to optimise their goals, satisfy their objectives and hence maximise 
their success. In this respect individuals, (i) will attempt to reduce costs and 
thereby maximise rewards; (ii) allocate their resources according to a defined utility 
function (in that individuals thereby allocate these resources in a rational and self 
interested manner) and; (iii) have a ranking of preferences. Rational models 
assume individuals are able to rank alternatives in the order of maximized utility. 
SIMON [1987], has suggested that the "assumptions of utility maximisation" does 
not "provide a sufficient base for explaining" the notion of profit maximisation is 
always being the ultimate individual objective. SIMON [1987] has argued that to 
preserve this notion of utility maximising requires a number of very dubious 
empirical assumptions. He suggests that, "when verification is demanded, they tend 
to look for evidence that the theory makes correct predictions and resist advice that 
they should look instead directly at the decision mechanisms and processes" [SIMON, 
1987] and that, "it fails to observe that most of its "action" - the force of it predictions 
- derives from the, usually untested, auxiliary assumptions that describe the 
environment in which decisions are made" [SIMON, 1987]. Furthermore the neo- 
classical economic theorists will always reach a decision that is, "objectively, or 
substantively best in terms of the given utility function" [SIMON, 19871 and what 
these theories of rationality fail to address, is that any value of utility is 
"subjectivity because it is defined as individual preferences and therefore varies from 
individual to individual" [ZEY, 19921. 
18. As ZEY [1992] points out, "the rational choice models assume that 
individual choices are independent of one another. They fail to acknowledge that our 
utility may be a result not only of our own welfare but also of the welfare of those for 
whom we care". These theories argue that humans are only self-interested and 
have only self-interested preferences. However, they cannot account for the reasons 
why an individual "might act against his or her self-interest and in the interest of 
another person" [ZEY, 19921. In this respect this action of non self-interest may be 
viewed as an emotional driven response and "the emotion has some utility" [ZEY, 
1992]. It may have some utility attached to it, but how can it be measured? 
Emotions may have a benign or malignant effect upon the individual. Will a benign 
emotion have a greater utility value then a malignant emotion?. However, rational 
theories of decision making view these values as "value-neutral" [ZEY, 19921. 
19. SIMON [19871 has suggested that we should stop debating over "whether a 
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theory of substantive rationality and the assumptions of utility maximisation 
provide a sufficient base for explaining and predicting economic behaviours. The 
evidence is overwhelming that they do not". This is highlighted by SAMUELSON 
[1982] who considered that the majority individuals instinctively recognize that "in 
the real world, competition is nowhere near perfect' and that individuals do not 
always suffer, if they break the rules. As McGREW & WILSON [1982] state, "unlike 
the perfectly competitive market, decision makers operate under conditions where 
both information itself and the consequences of decisions are characterised by 
uncertainty to some degree or other". If the problem-solution environment is placed 
within an open world of uncertainty, then any outcomes of the decision process will 
contain uncertainties. The rules of rational economics cannot function and a certain 
solution to an uncertain problem is not possible. Empirical research by NEWELL & 
SIMON [1972] & SIMON [1982] would appear to confirm that claim. Rational choice 
models may be limited by the complexities of the external world. SIMON [1982], 
defines these limitations as being the product of the incompleteness and the 
inadequacy of the individual's knowledge. Furthermore, there are he suggests 
conflicts and inconsistencies within the preferences and beliefs of the individual. In 
suggesting that uncertainty and complexity are two major limitations of rational 
choice theory SIMON [1982] is outlining the limits of human rationality. These 
limits of rationality will not only be constrained by the inconsistencies of the 
preference of the individual, but also by the conflicts of belief and values of the 
pluralistic society in which they live. As SIMON [1982], SMITH & MAY [1982], JABES 
[1982] and LINDBLOM [1982] point out, even before individuals reach the decision 
path, the observational and explanatory abilities of individuals, let alone the 
selection of relevant information may be flawed. 
20. Assumptions that lie at the very heart of economic theories of human 
decision making appear to be insensitive to the cognitive limitations of human 
subjects [REASON, 1990]. SIMON [1982], has argued that individuals when making 
decisions will have a bounded rationality. Individuals may only compare and 
evaluate a small number of alternative decision paths and their objectives. SIMON, 
states that "they use selective heuristics and means-end analysis to explore a small 
number of promising alternatives. They draw heavily upon past experience to detect 
the important features of the situation before them, features which are associated in 
memory with possibly relevant actions. They depend upon aspiration-like 
mechanisms to terminate search when a satisfactory alternative has been found" 
[SIMON, 19821. In some respects, these alternatives may be edited [MCGREW & 
WILSON, 19821 using a strategic analysis [LINDBLOM, 1982]. This may account for 
the way in which individuals deal with the open world environment. For example, 
cognitive and temporal limitations may force the individuals to "stop the search 
when they find a satisfactory alternative" [ZEY, 1992]. Having selected the most 
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satisfactory alternative, then the individual may preferentially seek information 
that proves rather than disproves, the selection. This has been termed a 
confirmation bias [REASON, 19871. ZEY [1992] argues that since individuals 
selectively gather information and "cannot obtain complete information even before 
making important decisions, all possible alternatives are not known, outcomes 
attached to each alternatives are not obvious". Consequently, individuals will not 
have the complete information set and therefore cannot fully predict the result of 
their decisions. These decisions would obviously be non-maximized and sub- 
optimal. Since it is now very difficult for the individual to place objective values "on 
all the consequences of choices, so the subjective values (utilities) of the actors 
prevail" [ZEY, 19921. REASON [1987], has also argued that instead of considering all 
the alternatives, only those alternatives that have been recently used, will 
dominate, this he terms as frequency gambling. There will only be a small number 
of these, thereby limiting the number within which a satisfactory solution can be 
selected. Additional research by REASON [1987], suggests that the ability of an 
individual to make decisions may seriously decline in situations of high stress. 
REASON [1987], defines these problems with decision building as arising from stress 
escaping behaviour and that they fall into three categories, (i) a simplification bias, 
in which memory limits cause the simplest solution to be favoured; (ii) an ignoring 
bias, defined as out of sight is out of mind, the mind will not easily call up variables 
that have dropped out and; (iii) a mind set bias, where there is a focus on events 
that favour the working decision and a disregard of counter evidence. 
21. Rational theories of human decision making are unable to provide an 
explanation of why these limits should occur. They concentrate instead on the 
definition and development of pure logical as the fundamental understudying 
behind the human decision making process. As NORMAN states, "while there has 
been considerable process in some areas of cognitive science, overall the 
understanding of the individual has still not advanced much beyond pure intellect 
and reason" [NORMAN, 19851. Such theories still view decision making as some sort 
of logical dialogue between the problem space and the decision space, in which 
individuals perceive and think with a logical and abstract mind. Furthermore, this 
idea of abstract reasoning at a purely symbolic level is constrained by the notion of 
a universal mind language. Since, individuals are modelled as reasoning at an 
abstract level when deciding between competing solutions to everyday problems, 
then such abstract symbols must be shared between all individuals at a similar 
level of abstraction. CHOMSKY [1967,1968] and FODOR [1990] suggest that such a 
level must be universal, however there is no evidence to support that suggestion. 
22. But why should decision making be looked upon as a pure abstract activity 
divorced from experience and learning? This question is partly answered by the 
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way in which mathematics provides the models of human decision making. As 
mathematical models are defined by the logical and abstract qualities of 
mathematics, then mathematical models will continue to define a logical and 
abstract image of the individual. Thus, the individual when making decisions, will 
be continually defined as a computational general purpose problem solver separated 
from their experiences, their emotions and their ability to learn. There appears to 
have been too much emphasis on the formal properties of a human decision making 
and not enough consideration given to the informal properties such as experiential 
reasoning, reflective learning and process explanations. They appear to ignore any 
considerations of other aspects of human behaviour, especially the interaction with 
other people and the interaction of the individual with the environment. By not 
considering the influence of the individuals own experience on this decision building 
process, then these theories also ignore the cultural identity that each individual 
will bring to, (i) their understanding of the environment and; (ii) the methodology 
used to solve a problem and make a decision. 
3.4 THE NATURE OF REFLECTION 
23. BOLID, KEOGH & WALKER [1985] have suggested that the reflective 
processes may be composed of, "returning to the experience, attending to feelings and 
re-evaluating the experience" and that the nature of reflection is conditioned by the 
individuals memory of decision experiences. For example, the experience of an 
individual may include external world knowledge, behaviour, ideas, feelings and 
plans. This knowledge can be both objective (of the problem-solution domain) and 
subjective (of individuals understanding of the problem-solution environment). 
This knowledge may include possible outcomes, scenarios, actions and hazards 
associated with a particular decision path. In this, the reflection process functions 
as a conduit, through which a previous decision experience communicates with the 
selected decision path and vice versa. Consequently, the reflective process acts as a 
control and learning loop that monitors and evaluates the outcome of the selection 
process and communicates that analysis to the stored decision experiences. 
24. BOUD, KEOGH & WALKER [1985] state that "one of the most useful activities 
that can initiate a period of reflection is recollecting what has taken place and 
replaying the experience in the mind's eye". Reviewing that experience, observing 
the salient aspects of that experience as they occurred, interrogating the experience 
to explain the how, what and why and analysing the response is considered by BOYD 
& FALES [19831 to be of fundamental importance in a decision building process. 
BOUD, KEOGH & WALKER [19851 suggest that this may help the individual to, (i) 
recognize details that were originally either ignored or if considered, then only 
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cursory and; (ii) reconsider and re-examine the feelings and responses that built the 
original decision. This review forms the foundation upon which any reflection 
undertaken by individual may be based and that "this description provides the data 
for subsequent processing and can help to ensure that our reflection is on the basis of 
the actual events as we experienced them at the time, rather than in terms of what we 
wished had happened" [BOUD, KEOGH & WALKER, 1985]. 
25. This review can be considered "a more complete identification or 
clarification of the problem as it is experienced by the self, [BOYD & FALES, 19831. 
This clarification of the understanding by the individual of the events that make-up 
a particular decision, could include external events that were initially considered 
outside the sphere of interest. For example, the individual may wish to consider the 
wider context in which the event sequences were operating. The individual could 
include an awareness of new knowledge that may be now linked to the initial 
decision. This awareness could be combined "with the ability to observe and take in 
from a variety of perspectives" [BOYD & FALES, 19831. For example, the response 
and behaviour of those other individuals that are effected by the decision, additional 
ideas, feelings and plans that are part of the reaction to the selected decision path 
and ultimately the outcome of that path. In this respect, the review may include 
some "observations of judgements and interpretations" [BOLID, KEOGH & WALKER, 
1985] that occurred during the initial decision building experience. Consequently, 
this review may carry some a priori beliefs in the appropriateness of the decision 
path and these beliefs may act as pre-selectors and blind the individual to any 
further evaluation. As BOLID, KEOGH & WALKER, state, "our perceptions of events 
are conditioned by past experiences which has shaped our response to the world 
around us" [BOUD, KEOGH & WALKER, 19851. For example, positive feelings about 
the benefits that may accrue from a selected decision may override the 
understanding the individual may have surrounding the hazardous consequences of 
such a decision. These feelings of positive self-confidence may allow the individual 
to develop and pursue a decision path that is excessively optimistic. This was 
demonstrated by empirical studies conducted by PASCOE & PIDGEON [1995], in 
which individuals classified as risk seeking consistently selected more risky 
decision strategies. These strategies, when successful achieved higher gains. 
However, the positive self-confidence of these individuals led them to overlook the 
more likely dire consequences, in favour of the less likely greater gains. It may be 
useful if the representative model of the reflective process is able to recognize the 
occurrence of these feelings and ideas, since these positive and negative feelings 
form an inherent part of the decision building process. 
26. BOUD, KEOGH & WALKER [1985) suggested that emotions play an important 
part in the development of an intuitive appreciation of some hidden truth and 
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explanation of the salient events that make up decision path. They may help the 
individual to enter the next phase of the decision process in which the newly 
developed insights as well as the recalled experiences are involved in the re- 
evaluation stage of the reflection process. BOLID, KEOGH & WALKER [1985] stress 
that the emotions of an individual can be an important component process of 
decision making. BOYD & FAZES [1983] argue that the insight is re-evaluated in 
terms of its emotional affect. That is, "safest (emotionally) in terms of not brutally 
shattering the subjective certainty of its rightness" [BOYD & FALES, 1983]. However, 
REASON [1987] suggests that emotions can be substantial barriers to effective 
decision making. For example, individuals may be so constrained by the emotional 
background, that the individual becomes fixed to one perspective, or indeed fixed to 
a given interpretation of previous decision experiences. In some respects the 
individual becomes blinked or develops tunnel vision, to such an extent that the 
individual discontinues the reflection phase. The tunnel vision focuses the 
individual and instills a belief in the individual that the understanding of the 
decision building experience is appropriate to the current situation. A belief that 
when looked upon in the cold light of hindsight may not be as appropriate as first 
thought. 
27. BOLID, KEOGH & WALKER [19851 have distinguished four elements which in 
their view contribute to the re-evaluation phase of the reflection process. These, 
they have termed, "association, that is relating of new data to that which is already 
known; integration, which is seeking relationships among the data; validation to 
determine the authenticity of the ideas and feelings which have resulted; and 
appropriation, that is, making knowledge one's own". In the following paragraphs, 
the ideas surrounding these processes are briefly discussed. 
28. The first phase deals with the connection of new knowledge to that which 
already forms part of previous decision experience. The connection of knowledge 
and the linking of related conceptual elements becomes the foundation of associated 
knowledge and a possible pre-requisite of the learning process. This phase of 
reflection is considered by BOLID, KEOGH & WALKER [19851, to be essential in 
developing a clearer understanding of the problem-solution environment. They 
suggest that this clearer understanding will help the individual to identify those 
elements of the initial knowledge that are no longer consistent with the 
requirements of the current problem-solution environment. Those elements that 
are no longer consistent while need to updated or modified. However, connections 
may be brought together arbitrarily. All these new connections will have to be 
examined. It is at the integration phase, that the active discrimination between 
these connections will occur. The integration process seeks to identify any 
relationships that may exist through these connections and then use those relations 
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to develop some conclusions. BOUD, KEOGH & WALKER have termed this the 
synthesis of the integration phase, in which "we seek insight, which is the basis for 
further reflective activity" [BOLID, KEOGH & WALKER, 1985]. BOYD & FALES [1983] 
state that this "new insight or changed perspective is analysed in terms of its 
operational feasibility" and "attempts are made to "figure out" how it will work in 
practice". 
29. The next phase is the validation process. This activity attempts to 
determine the authenticity of those changed perspectives. For example, the 
individual could check the validity of the derived insights against some degree of 
reality test [BOLID, KEOGH & WALKER, 19851, in which "we are testing for internal 
consistency between our new appreciations and our existing knowledge and beliefs, 
for consistency between those and parallel data from others and trying out our new 
perceptions in new situations" [BOUD, KEOGH & WALKER, 1985]. This reality test 
may be governed by two certainty principles, namely coverage and coherence 
[PENNINGTON & HASTIE, 1993]. PENNINGTON & HASTIE [1993] define coverage as 
referring "to the extent to which the story accounts for the evidence". For example, 
the coverage of the derived insights could be defined by the manner in which the 
insight supports the necessary evidence for and the possible evidence against 
acceptance. A high coverage implies that the insight is a dependable explanation, 
whereas a low coverage would suggest a lower overall confidence in the derived 
insights and consequently in the confidence in the derived decision path. 
PENNINGTON & HASTIE [1993] state that coherence "also enters into its acceptability 
and the level of confidence given that the story is accepted" and is defined by three 
attributes; "consistency, plausibility and completeness". In this context an insight 
may be considered to be, (i) consistent if the insight does not contain contradictory 
explanations; (ii) plausible if the insight corresponds to the decision makers 
understanding of the external world and therefore does not contradict that 
understanding and; (iii) complete if the insight is able to account for all the 
identified relations. Therefore, the coherence of the insight represents the 
consistency of the explanation both with itself and the external world. The 
individual is checking the consistency of these insights in which the individual is 
comparing the derivation of the insights with their existing knowledge and 
understanding of the decision problem-solution environment. BOLID, KEOGH & 
WALKER [1985] have suggested that, if any contradictions appear, then the 
individual will attempt a reappraisal and on the basis of this reappraisal either 
carry on down this decision path or go back. Note, just because a new insight is not 
consistent with conventional wisdom does not imply the automatic rejection of that 
insight. The decision that may be produced from this new insight could be the most 
effective solution to the decision problem-solution relation. 
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30. The final process deals with the consolidation of the knowledge into the 
decision building process. It is at this stage that notions of reflective learning 
become dominant. As BOYD & FAZES [1983] state, "as a result of the internalization 
and acceptance of the changed perspective, the individual is faced with the challenge 
of relating his or her changed self to the past self, to other areas of his or her present 
life, and to future behaviour". BOUD, KEOGH & WALKER [19851 suggest that "some 
learning can become so related to the self that it enters into our sense of identity and 
can have a considerable importance and become a significant force in our lives". 
They go on to say that "significant feelings can come to be attached to this type of 
learning and any learning experience which touches this area can give rise to strong 
emotions that may need to be taken into account in future reflection" [BOUD, KEOGH 
& WALKER, 19851. For example, during a decision building process, new connections 
may emerge between previously isolated states. Any future decision experiences 
that are similar to the above decision building process may, as part of the connection 
process, end up with similar emotions attached. In this respect, the above processes 
may be influenced by the intent of the decision maker. For example, individuals 
may not want to reflect upon their previous decisions at the same analytical level. 
There may be some decisions that the decision maker may wish to forget. The 
ability of a reflective model to explain the interaction between the previous decision 
experience and the current decision building activity is a function of the reflective 
model being able to account for the intentions and objectives of the decision maker. 
Unfortunately, during the decision building process, the intentions and objectives of 
the decision maker may not remain static. It is expected, that they will change. 
This then adds a temporal dimension to the decision building process and the 
problem of incorporating time into the reflective model of decision making. 
3.5 A REFLECTIVE PROCESS MODEL 
31. It is now possible to define a reflective process model of decision making. 
This model will emphasis the importance of experience and the role that reflection 
plays in the decision building process. The core of this model could be defined as 
process model explanations of the problem-solution environment used to guide the 
retrieval and selection process. This model is defined by an experiential 
explanation, reflective and predictive view of decision making, in which, (i) 
explanations of the current problem-solution environment are compared with 
explanations of similar experience and; (ii) a process of reflection uses previous 
experiences to transform the current state to a desired end state. 
32. In the context of defining a model of reflective decision making, it is 
hypothesized that the mechanism of reflection as governed by, "returning to the 
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experience, attending to feelings and re-evaluating the experience" [BOLID, KEOGH & 
WALKER, 19851 consists of two component processes. These processes may be 
viewed as the selection and retrieval process and the reflective and predictive 
process. It is suggested that the process of accessing previous decision experiences 
consists of three component sub-processes, (i) recognizing that salient aspects of the 
current problem-solution environment are the same as those in a stored problem- 
solution environment; (ii) remembering where the stored problem-solution 
environment can be found in the decision memory and; (iii) reviewing those salient 
aspects. It is felt that the individual having selected and retrieved relevant 
experiences, the individual will then begin to evaluate those experiences. 
Evaluation (or in the light of additional information, re-evaluation), will involve the, 
(i) possible modification of the initial decision path; (ii) re-examination of that 
decision building process as compared to its performance and the decision makers 
intent (which may be different form the original intent of the initial decision path) 
and; (iii) integration of any new decision path into the decision makers conceptual 
pattern of the current problem-solution relation. Contrary to the discussion above, 
the notion of attending to feelings has not been ignored, merely integrated into the 
selection, retrieval and re-evaluation, prediction stages. Since these processes are 
conditioned by the individual and include the subjective and objective elements of 
the decision experience, then the feelings or point-of-view of the individual will not 
be a separate entity, but a connection that links one activity to the other. 
33. Therefore, rather than just making decisions and then forgetting the 
results of those decisions, an individual will treat those results as opportunities to 
learn more about their domain and the problems that arise in it. Consequently, the 
nature of reflection in the Reflective Process model views decision building as an 
activity that tests an individuals understanding of the external world. Decision 
building forms a reflective loop, in which the failures of past decisions lead the 
individual to learn more about what caused them. Consequently, the individual 
develops a better understanding of how to avoid them. 
3.5.1. DEFINING THE PREMISE OF THE REFLECTIVE PROCESS MODEL 
34. The proposed reflection-explanation model is assumed to follow three 
component processes. Firstly, there is the construction process that accounts for the 
transference of information from the explanation of the problem-solution 
environment to the reflection-explanation model. Secondly, a decision building 
process that accounts for the classification of this reflection-explanation model into 
a best-fitting category. It is suggested that this decision building process is a 
function of a problem identification stage, a selection stage and a modification stage. 
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For example, the most-relevant decision path is selected and then modified to suit 
the current situation. It must be remembered, that the term most-relevant (as used 
above), does not refer to most-relevant as defined by the requirements of the 
situation, but the most-relevant as defined by the individuals understanding of the 
situation. In the majority of cases the most-relevant as defined by the situation and 
the most-relevant as defined by the individual will be similar, however in some 
cases they will not. Lastly, a reflection process that monitors, (i) the transference of 
information between the problem-solution explanation and the reflection- 
explanation model; (ii) the interaction of the construction and decision building 
processes and; (iii) the performance of the selected decision path, when operating in 
the external world. This model can be summarized as follows. 
" The decision process cannot retrieve and access a relevant decision experience 
unless it understands the current problem-solution environment. This 
understanding may be defined as a reflective-explanation of that environment. 
The process of defining a reflective-explanation of the problem-solution 
environment is composed of two processes. These are (i) problem identification 
and; (ii) selection. During the construction of this explanation salient events of 
the explanation are compared to aspects that have be shown to contribute to the 
failure of previous decision paths. In this respect the decision memory is 
organized as a predictive function using an index of negative aspects and 
negative interactions that have been shown in previous decision paths to develop 
into failure conditions. The decision memory will use this index to interrogate 
the explanation of the problem-solution environment and identify those aspects 
that have (in previous decision paths) a proneness to failure. Those aspects 
having a proneness to failure attached are classified as predictive and used by 
the decision process to select a relevant decision experience. This index may be 
looked upon as dynamic and constantly evolving memory. 
" It is unlikely that a previous decision experience will be exactly similar to the 
current problem-solution environment. Therefore, it will be necessary to modify 
the previous decision path to fit the current decision problem. Modification is 
part of the reflection stage and is connected to the processes of (i) re-evaluation 
and acceptance and; (ii) integration and monitoring. Modification, attempts to 
compensate for those aspects of the current problem-solution environment that 
are different from the selected decision experience. At this point, the decision 
process can either accept the modified decision path and let the decision memory 
proceed to integration and monitoring phase or the decision process could send 
the modified decision path back to the problem identification phase to be re- 
examined. 
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" At the integration and monitoring phase the decision memory integrates the 
decision path into the decision memory by comparing the anticipated outcome of 
the modified decision path with the predicted requirements of the problem- 
solution environment. This may be looked upon as the learning phase of the 
decision process and can be seen to occur as a natural consequence of decision 
making. For example, during modification the accessed experience a new 
decision path is derived. When this new path is executed its performance is 
monitored. If the performance monitoring indicates that the new path is a 
success, then the new decision path is remembered. The decision path is part of 
the current experience and stored within the decision memory. 
However, if during the performance monitoring of the new decision path 
problems are found to exist, then those problems may be added to the index of 
those aspects that have a proneness to failure. A warning could be attached to 
those aspects, so that when they are identified in another decision path, the 
decision memory could be reminded that its understanding of the problem- 
solution environment (associated with that decision path) and hence the 
explanation derived from that understanding is inaccurate. If an attempt is 
made to repair those problems then the new explanation (derived from that 
repair) could be considered to be a modification of the knowledge found in the 
initial decision experience. Note, an explanation provides a means of defining 
the usefulness of a decision experience and since the explanation of the initial 
decision experience has been modified, then the usefulness of that decision 
experience has also been modified. 
3.6 MAKING DECISIONS FROM EXPERIENCE 
35. It is hypothesized that the proposed model will provide, (i) a means of 
organizing and retrieving experiences; (ii) a set of primary and secondary processes 
used in making decisions from these experiences and; (iii) a way of integrating 
learning with the decision process. This section will consider these claims carefully, 
looking at the ways in which retrieved events are used for decision making. 
36. One of the underlying premises of the reflective memory is that 
experiences, are necessary in understanding and making decisions. It is accepted 
that these experiences are not the only form of information within a reflective 
memory. However, it is assumed that experience and the act of reflecting upon that 
experience are the generator of responses to a particular decision problem. Each 
experience is indexed by the interacting processes and emergent properties that 
make up the experience. Experiences stored in the reflective memory will include 
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the interacting processes that were defined at the time of storage and additional 
emergent properties that were derived during the elicitation of that experience. 
Any of those interacting processes and emergent properties are available for use as 
an index. Some of these interacting processes and emergent properties may have 
failure conditions attached. Failure conditions are used by the individual to identify 
particular problems with a retrieved experience. 
37. Accessing previous experiences and the act of reflecting on these 
experiences are the primary processes in any reflective decision building activity. 
These processes are composed of secondary processes. It is hypothesized that the 
primary process of accessing consists of the secondary processes, problem 
identification and experiential selection and that modification, re-evaluation and 
acceptance, integration and monitoring are secondary processes of the primary 
process of reflection. The ability of the individual to access and then reflect upon 
those experiences, is defined by the ability of the individual to understand the 
current problem-solution environment. Individuals will only be reminded of 
previous situation, when they begin to understand the current situation. A 
complete understanding may be defined as being able to, (i) explain the current 
situation; (ii) identify the problems; (iii) select a relevant experience; (iv) modify the 
conceptual pattern that represents that experience; (v) re-evaluating that 
modification; (vi) use the modified conceptual pattern to make predictions; (vii) 
monitor the performance of those predictions (as compared to the role-requirements 
of the problem-solution environment) and; (viii) then integrating that modified 
conceptual pattern into the memory. These component sub-processes have 
similarities with SCHANK'S [1985) notions of memory organisation packets. 
38. Since a reflective memory will change with each new experience, then 
reflection implies an evolution. This may help to explain why given two decision 
problems of a similar nature the individual may not select the same decision path 
twice. Experience may have taught the individual to act differently. The 
accumulation of experiences also implies an evolution that is both dynamic (time 
variant) and idiosyncratic (culturally variant). This may explain the influences of 
time and cultural identity on the ability of individuals to make decisions. 
Something that the rationale models of human decision making have not been able 
to do. This evolution may be defined as, (i) acquire new experiences; (ii) re-index 
those experiences; (iii) create new explanations from those experiences; (iv) discard 
inappropriate explanations; (v) use those explanations to modify those experiences; 
(vi) monitor those modifications and (vii) acquire new experiences from those 
modifications. This may be thought of as a reflective learning loop. As part of a 
reflective learning loop new experiences are acquired from new decisions. If new 
experiences are understood by an explanation, then those new explanations (when 
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contrasted and compared to previous explanations), can be indexed in the reflective 
memory by violations (as defined by that contrast and compare exercise). For 
example, when an explanation of a previous decision experience is accessed and re- 
evaluated it may be found to be inappropriate to the current problem-solution 
environment. The relevance of that recalled experience is re-analysed and re- 
indexed as defined by the individuals new understanding of it. (Note, this may also 
occur if the previous experience has been modified or if a previous decision 
experience is re-used. ) 
39. SCHANK [1985), has argued that when several similar experiences are met 
during the accessing stage, then individuals will extract commonalties from these 
similar experiences and thereby construct generalized memory packets (MOP's). It 
is accepted, that generalized experiences may exist, but it is suggested that specific 
experiences will also exist. For example, the structure of the decision path (whether 
buying a book or buying a motorcycle), could appear to be instinctive, organised and 
highly practised [RASMUSSEN, 19831. Consequently, regular exposure develops a 
reflex skill. However, at another level, the structure may be a function of failure or 
success. With success being defined by the usefulness of using a decision path to 
buy a book, when buying a motorcycle. In this situation, an explanation is used by 
the individual to search their memory; select a previous decision experience and 
then modify it to fit the observed problem-solution environment. The individual 
begins the construction of the new decision path by accessing a previous decision 
path. However, if the individual is unsure of the current decision problem domain, 
then accessing a previous experience may not be particularly helpful in predicting 
potential problems. In this situation the modification of experiences may be guided 
by previous modifications under similar problem-solution domains. If the modified 
decision path begins to fall short of the predicted requirements of the problem- 
solution environment, then the chosen modification strategy may be refined. As a 
result (and in a manner similar to the memory organisation packets of SCHANK 
[19851), the individual may develop a set of modification strategies linked to a 
particular group of decision problems. A product of this construction is the 
derivation of explanations. The derivation of these explanations may help the 
individual to uncover misconceptions and misunderstandings, that may exist in 
their view of the problem and the external environment in which it operates. 
40. The ability of the model to explain the interaction between the previous 
decision experience and the current decisions building activity is a function of the 
ability of the model to account for the intentions and objectives of the decision 
maker and problem-solution environment. This forms part of the construction of an 
explanation and will discussed in Chapter 4. 
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3.7 CONCLUSION 
"A reflection-explanation model of decision making has been presented. This 
model may be defined as, (i) accessing previous decision experiences; (ii) 
explaining those experiences; (iii) re-evaluating those experiences; (iv) 
envisaging the possible consequences of pursuing various courses of action; (v) 
evaluating the merits of those various courses of action and then; (vi) monitoring 
the performance of the selected decision. 
" Reflection could be considered to be part of a learning loop, in which the 
individual uses their experiential memory to identify pivotal events of the 
problem-solution environment. 
" These events could be used to select a set of alternative decision paths (as defined 
by the experiential memory of the individual), from which a response will be 
chosen. Note, these alternative decision paths may simply be the re-use of stored 
memories, or they may involve the modification of those stored memories. 
After selecting a decision path, the individual will then monitor that decision and 
compare the potentiality of the chosen decision with the actuality of that decision 
in the external world. This will contribute to the confidence that is assigned to 
the appropriateness of the selected decision. 
" However, a knowledge structure for acquiring and modelling those experiences as 
well as a vocabulary for describing those experiences is required. This will be 
discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
" These hypotheses are not yet in a testable form. A system will be presented in 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 that has been designed to be testable. However, the 
dependability of these ideas will not be known empirically until that work is 
completed. 
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4. -MODELLING REFLECTIVE DECISION MAKING 
4.1 OBJECTIVES 
" To explore the concept of a process model as a formal representation of the 
understanding by the individual of an external object. 
9 To explain how a grounded theory methodology can be used to tease out that 
understanding. 
" To discuss how such a methodology can help build Process model explanations of 
previous experiences. 
4.2 INTRODUCTION 
1. In Chapter 3 the notion of reflecting upon previous experiences in decision 
making was introduced and a model of reflective decision making based on a 
reflective learning loop was proposed. In this Chapter a knowledge structure for 
acquiring and modelling those experiences is introduced. The need for a vocabulary 
that is able to describe those structures will also be considered. It is proposed, that 
such a vocabulary could be based on a process model algorithm [BLOCKLEY, 1997]. 
2. The ability of an individual to understand a previous decision problem will 
require the individual to compare and understand the differences between types of 
decision objectives, decision paths and decision outcomes. These may be classified 
as, (i) the different decision objectives; (ii) the different types of decision objectives; 
(iii) the relationship between the different objectives; (iv) the different decision 
paths used to satisfy these objectives and objective types and; (v) the interaction 
between these different decision paths and those objectives. The representation of 
the decision building process requires a methodology that can acquire that 
knowledge and the organizational structure to represent that knowledge. 
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3. In section 4.3, the notion that a vocabulary of processes (as defined by the 
descriptive, explanatory and predictive processes of the decision path) may act as a 
formal representation of that decision is introduced. In section 4.4, the elicitation of 
those descriptive, explanatory and predictive processes is addressed. It is suggested 
that a grounded methodology may be used to tease out those processes and a Process 
Model explanation may represent those processes. Consideration is given to the 
structure of the Process model explanation as defined by a Process model algorithm. 
This algorithm may be looked upon as a vocabulary for describing and storing 
experiences within a process model explanation. It is hypothesized that the Process 
Model explanation will allow the Reflective Process Memory (RPM) to infer implicit 
events on the basis of previously encountered structurally similar events. 
4. The Process model explanation (as defined by its grounding in data and 
using a Process model algorithm) may be used to translate a messy external 
situation into a structured internal representation. The objective of such a 
methodology is the building of a machine-based Reflective Process memory that can 
infer implicit events on the basis of previously encountered experiences. The notion 
of inferring events on the basis of previous particular experiences is known as 
induction. In section 4.5, the nature of induction and the implications of using an 
inductive methodology for the Reflective Process memory are discussed. 
4.3 THE NATURE OF PROCESS MODELLING. 
5. In this section the notion of knowledge will be examined. This examination 
will consider how knowledge can be structured as a series of process descriptions 
and will explore the rationale and assumptions behind this description. 
6. Knowledge and the psychology of knowing something has often been 
defined as the difference between the declarative and the procedural components of 
knowledge [RICH, 1991; RUMELHART & NORMAN, 19851. Declarative knowledge is 
defined as knowing-that [WINOGRAD, 19751 and represents knowledge of some 
object, situation or concept. RUMELHART & NORMAN [19851 suggest that this 
declarative knowledge may help an individual describe the object, situation or 
concept. Declarative knowledge may be looked upon as descriptors of state 
variables, whereas procedural knowledge is defined by how individuals apply their 
declarative knowledge. Procedural knowledge may be classified as knowing-how 
[WINOGRAAD, 19751 and represents the transformation activities of knowing-that. 
7. RUMELHART & NORMAN [19851 have suggested that the difference between 
declarative and procedural components of knowledge may be nothing more than a 
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difference in accessibility. For example, in the case of declarative knowledge, the 
structure allows for the direct examination and manipulation of the knowledge, 
while in the case of procedural knowledge the structure does not. The procedural 
knowledge structure must be executed and it is only then, that the results of that 
execution can be examined. It is proposed, that the distinction between declarative 
and procedural components may be classified as a distinction between explicit (clear 
and unambiguous) knowledge structures and implicit (not directly stated) 
knowledge structures. Therefore, any distinction between, "what is declarative and 
what is procedural information is context dependent" [RUMELHART & NORMAN, 
1985] and that "any realistic information processing system has several levels of 
processing and interpretations, and what is procedural at one level of interpretations 
is most likely declarative at a different level. " [RUMELHART & NORMAN, 19851 
8. This multi-layered or hierarchical view of knowledge suggests that any 
distinctions between declarative and procedural components of knowledge are 
meaningless. In the following discussion it is argued that this distinction has 
caused much confusion. It is asserted that knowledge can be represented in terms 
of active processes, of which data is one set of attributes. 
4.3.1 THEORETICAL BASES FOR KNOWLEDGE 
9. Knowledge and the problem of representing knowledge can be divided into 
two camps. These camps may be classified as declarative and procedural [RICH, 
1991; RUMELHART & NORMAN, 1985]. This classification may be looked upon as a 
"philosophical distinction between `knowing that' and `knowing how'. " [WINDGRAD, 
1975]. Knowing-that knowledge may be looked upon as data or statement driven 
whereas knowing-how knowledge is represented as procedural or programme 
driven. For example, consider the concept [football]. A [football] can be completely 
characterized by a set of defined axioms. These axioms represent the knowing-that 
of the concept [football]. Now consider, the knowing-how for the concept [football]. 
This may be defined as the procedures for using those axioms. Knowing-how 
procedures are necessary for the successful understanding of the knowing-that of 
the concept [football]. Procedures are operational actions used to understand 
axioms. Therefore, the knowing-how procedures for the concept [kicking-a-football] 
are operational actions used by the individual to understand the knowing-that 
knowledge of the concept [kicking-a-football]. The knowing-how procedures for the 
concept [playing-football] are operational actions used by the individual to 
understand the knowing-that knowledge of the concept [playing-football]. In each 
statement the individuals understanding of the concept [football] will be different. 
This understanding depends upon the role-requirements that are assigned to the 
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concept [football] and the way in which the role-requirements interact with 
environment. In the first statement the role given to the concept [football] may be 
defined as [being a football; a large round inflated ball]. In the second statement 
the role given to the concept [football] may be defined as [being a game; a contest 
played according to rules]. 
10. Clearly, for an individual to distinguish between a [football] as [being an 
inflated ball] or [being a competition], then the concept [football] needs more than 
knowing-how and knowing-that. This requires the individual to know why such a 
role is needed. It is hypothesized that knowing-why is a process explanation of 
when it is appropriate for a concept [football] to be the process [being an inflated 
ball] and when it is appropriate for it to be the process [being a competition]. A 
process explanation views knowing-why knowledge as hierarchical knowledge. This 
explanation (governed by its assigned role), includes the knowing-how procedures 
that access, interpret and evaluate the knowing-that knowledge of the process 
[football]. 
11. The notion of knowing-why process explanations using encapsulated 
knowing-how procedures to operate on knowing-that data offers some advantages. 
For example, letting data be a description of the state of the process, allows the 
individual to access a process as data and compare it to the process requirements. 
Consider a process explanation of [kicking-a-football]. The individual could access 
the process as data and compare the data description of the process [football] with 
the role requirements of the process explanation [kicking-a-football] as defined by 
the individual. The data describes the state of a process and since this description 
can change through time, then data can be viewed as a process explanation. 
Therefore, having the data as a process explanation allows the individual to follow 
the process and predict the outcome of the process. The individual having assigned 
the role [being an inflated ball] to the sub-process [football] in the process [kicking- 
a-football] will check that the object called a [football] is [an inflated ball]. During 
the process [kicking-a-football] the data description of the acceleration and velocity 
of the process [football] will change. This change allows the individual to predict 
the trajectory of the process [football] and estimated where the process [football] 
will land. 
4.3.2 RATIONALE FOR STUDYING PROCESS KNOWLEDGE 
12. One of the basic premises of the theory of the Reflective Process memory is 
that experiential knowledge is organized hierarchically as interconnected processes. 
This process knowledge could be arranged in a series of process models of connected 
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experiences. These process model networks describe what the decision builder 
knows and forms the underlying structure of the reflective learning loop. This 
structure may be composed of two stages, (i) the reflective-explanation stage (during 
the accessing and re-evaluation of the process knowledge of the decision builder) 
and; (ii) the reflective-learning stage (during the modification and comparison of 
that knowledge). A process model network describes process knowledge and as such 
provides the vocabulary behind the representational assumptions made about 
process knowledge. The following will examine the rationale behind process 
knowledge. 
13. Firstly, it is asserted here as a basic hypothesis that processes underlie all 
knowledge. Meaning and hence understanding will not exist until a hierarchically 
process flow is established. For example, consider the process [playing-football]. It 
is the representation of this process by a knowing-why explanation that gives the 
concept [playing-football] its meaning. For example, at one level the sub-process 
[football] may have the role [a large inflated ball] in the process [playing-football]. 
At the next level the process [football] can be represented as a set of data states 
such as [circumference], [diameter] and [weight] in the process [being-a-football]. 
Note, that these state descriptions of a process attribute are not static. For 
example, the process [diameter] may change. However, while the process [football] 
can be represented as a state description, it is the knowing-why process explanation 
of when it is appropriate for the process [football] to be the process [being-an- 
inflated-ball] that gives the process [football] its meaning. A meaning that an 
individual will use to understanding how it relates to other processes ([football- 
pitch], [football-players]), that are connected, although not directly. Therefore, 
while each process may have a state description, it is the knowing-why description, 
that defines its interaction to other processes. An interaction governed by the role 
one process plays in another process. 
14. Secondly, process knowledge is considered to be an essential part of the 
accessing and re-evaluation components of reflection. In Chapter 1, the idea of the 
individual understanding an experiential event depends upon the individual using 
conceptual patterns was introduced. These patterns represent the individuals 
understanding of a particular experience. This model, as described in Chapter 1 
explains how understanding and hence meaning is developed from the process 
connectivity that make up these conceptual patterns. An experience represented as 
a conceptual process structure is more easily accessed and hence re-evaluated than 
lists alone. (Note, data which at best may be represented as structured list does not 
represent knowledge, it is the process explanation of the list that generates 
knowledge. For example, how the list was produced, how the list will be used, etc. ) 
In the paragraph above, the notion of process connectivity being dependent upon 
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the role that one process plays in another was introduced. The greater the role then 
the closer these interactions. Consequently, having accessed the role that the 
process [football] plays in the process [playing-football], then the easier it is to 
access and re-evaluate other related process. A comprehensive process structure 
defined by those process connections will facilitate the accessibility and re- 
evaluation of stored experiences. 
15. Lastly, individuals learn by assimilating experiences represented as 
conceptual process structures. In Chapter 3, the idea that individuals learn by, (i) 
accessing previous experiences; (ii) modifying those experiences to suit the current 
situation; (iii) re-evaluating those experiences; (iv) monitoring the modification and; 
(v) thereby comparing the potentiality of the predicted performance of the modified 
experience with the actuality of that modification was introduced. Learning is, in 
essence, the monitoring of new conceptual process structures built from old 
experiences. The development of a connectivity between previous experiences and 
new experiences will help the newer conceptual process structures to be integrated 
into the overall process knowledge structure. In this context learning may be 
viewed as the construction of new process knowledge, the development of new 
connections and the integration of this new knowledge within existing process 
knowledge. 
4.3.3 ASSUMPTIONS & LIMITATIONS OF PROCESS KNOWLEDGE 
16. RASMUSSEN [1983]; DREYFUS & DREYFUS [1986]; REASON [1990] have 
argued that human reasoning relies on the individual being able to recognize that 
one event has similarities with other previous events. Therefore, if those previous 
events had successful outcomes, then the individual will respond in a similar 
manner. DREYFUS & DREYFUS [19861 have suggested that this can be seen quite 
clearly in the difference between competent and expert chess players. They argue 
that this distinction between expertise and competence is dependent upon the 
ability of the individual to recognize how a current problem set resembles previous 
problem sets. The notions of identification and comparison represent a central 
premise of the approach undertaken in this study. 
17. However, theories that attempt to model an account of this pattern 
matching methodology are constrained by data. In this respect, reasoning is 
modelled as a data driven rule-based methodology. This is because the majority of 
the reasoning models have been developed from work previously done in 
mathematical logic and logic is rule based. However logic rules have difficulty 
dealing with uncertainty. The representation of decision making in many rule- 
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based expert systems (for example, MYCIN [SHORTLIFFE, 1985]) either do so in a 
closed world (in which everything apart from the solution is known) or have 
weightings attached to certain attributes of the decision problem. As KRAUSE & 
CLARK state, "uncertainty values are associated with the rules and combined using 
simple syntactic principles as the rules are fired. " [KRAUSE & CLARK, 1993]. That is, 
"the way in which the values are combined in a formula just depends on the structure 
of the formula and the uncertainty values of its subformula. " [KRAUSE & CLARK, 
1993] 
18. It has been hypothesized that this activity could be better performed by a 
process driven reflectionist methodology. This methodology is not data driven and 
hence rule based. Rather it is process driven, in which data and rules are merely a 
series of separate processes within a whole set of processes, which in turn make-up 
the attributes of the object or event. A process driven reflectionist methodology is 
able to classify an input with a stored experience, without accessing a stipulated but 
separate rule. This is because, firstly data (or state descriptors) and rules (or 
process controls and constraints) are already included within the process structure. 
Secondly, evidence (as defined by state descriptors and process controls & 
constraints) can assign a degree of belief Thereby indicating whether an object 
belongs, or does not belong to a category. These state descriptors and process 
controls & constraints are not static. Evidence as defined by those descriptors, 
controls and constraints will vary and so will the assigned degrees of belief. 
19. Since a logic-like representation has difficulty in dealing with uncertainty, 
it is hypothesized that individuals represent and hence reason about uncertainty 
using a different methodology. It is argued that processes represent experiences 
and that these processes are indexed by the relations that connect those processes. 
This approach views the memory in dynamic terms, as a function of the content and 
context of the social, environmental and cultural interactions of the individual and 
the constraints of the problem-solution relation. This is at odds with the 
conventional data driven view of memory, in which data is a static ordering of 
information and meaning is a function of the logic rules operating on that data. 
4.3.4 STRUCTURAL PROCESS KNOWLEDGE AS A BASIS FOR DECISION MEMORY 
20. SCHANK [19851, argues that to account for the ability of human subjects to 
learn from experiences requires a defined memory vocabulary. He proposes that 
this vocabulary must exist as a memory organization packet. The memory 
organization packet provides the means by which the human subject is able to infer 
implicit events on the basis of previously encountered structural similar events. In 
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a machine environment, it is hypothesized that structural process knowledge as 
represented by a Process model explanation (PMx), defined by a Process model 
algorithm [BLOCKLEY, 1997] and grounded in the testimony of experts may act as a 
process vocabulary. This PMX describes and explains previously encountered events, 
which are stored within the Reflective Process Memory (RPM). The RPM processes a 
new PMX by taking aspects of the new PMX that relate to an old PMX. These aspects 
may be defined as static attributes or they may be defined as dynamic connections. 
It then interrogates those aspects with reference to a series of indices. These indices 
could have conditions attached and if recognized in the new PMx could be used to 
remind the RPM of any consequences that may arise from those conditions. This 
interrogation will enable the RPM to infer implicit events when reminded of those 
events by similar Process model explanations. This structured process knowledge is 
a representation of the understanding of a process by an individual. It will include 
the current and desired states, initiating states, transforming states, scenario 
states and consequence states as well as the various roles and other attributes. The 
description will also include reference to any sub-processes on which the process 
depends. 
21. The advantages of using a qualitative structural process knowledge with 
quantitative state transformations of the state variables are (i) individuals appear 
to reason in a qualitative process fashion and since the processes are patterns 
rather than data representations of previous decision paths then the matching 
should improve the assimilation of information; (ii) the process models of the 
decision path are to be built up from a deep knowledge of actions teased out using 
grounded theory [PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY, 19911 and thus they contain the 
underlying physical and data sub-processes ready for presentation at a higher level; 
(iii) since the process representation is constructed from sub-processes, then 
changes are localized and modifications to previous decision paths that now appear 
inappropriate can be implemented more easily than a rule based system; (iv) since 
the decision path is represented as a pattern, the causes of changes or failures can 
be tracked and consequently the initiating event sequence that caused a particular 
failure can be identified and isolated; (v) the process models will work with sparse 
quantitative data. 
22. To summarize, structured process knowledge is a theoretical construct used 
during the reflection phase of a decision building process. It is a useful metaphor 
for describing the means by which individuals construct and store knowledge. The 
following sections of this Chapter are divided into (i) the use of grounded theory to 
elicit structured process knowledge; (ii) the implications of using Process model 
explanations to infer implicit events on the basis of previous experiences. It will be 
argued in the remainder of this Chapter and in Chapter 5, that the use of (i) 
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grounded theory in the elicitation of knowledge and (ii) the process algorithm to 
represent that knowledge as a reflectionists type Process model explanation can 
describe the states of the decision problem. In this respect a process representation 
of case histories may be looked upon as an appropriate methodology for the 
investigation of decision failures. Consequently, the inferential outcome of such a 
methodology represents a plausible explanation of the current situation. 
4.4 THE STRUCTURE OF THE PROCESS MODEL EXPLANATION 
23. The structure of the RPM must provide an appropriate representation of the 
behaviour of a decision path. This appropriateness may be defined by a description 
of the decision processes and an explanation of how those processes interact. A 
situation analysis is a formal catalogue of process descriptions and process 
interactions. Meaning and hence understanding of a decision path may be defined 
by the situation analysis of the processes and interactions as they correspond to the 
content and context of the decision problem. PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY [1991 
have argued that this type of knowledge acquisition "is similar to that of the social 
scientist analyzing qualitative data". This implies that a range of methods 
originally developed by social scientists for the analysis of unstructured and semi- 
structured qualitative material will be of assistance to the knowledge engineer. It is 
proposed that one such method, namely grounded theory [PIDGEON, TURNER & 
BLOCKLEY, 1991; STRAUSS & CORBIN, 1994; PIDGEON, 1996; PIDGEON & HENWOOD; 
1996] is useful for tackling this problem directly. A close and systematic analysis 
will result in the generation of an array of concepts, categories, their interacting 
processes and emergent properties. These provide the building blocks of the RPM. 
4.4.1 THE ELICITATION OF KNOWLEDGE 
24. It is has been proposed in previous sections of this chapter that process 
driven structural knowledge is a useful way to model the pattern recognition 
activities of human cognition. Therefore, a methodology is required for the 
elicitation of the knowledge of the individual and the representation of those 
underlying processes. JONASSEN, BEISSNEID & YACCI state that, "knowledge of 
interrelationships is most frequently and effectively elicited using word association 
or similarity rating tasks. The interrelatedness of the elicited knowledge is then 
evaluated using advanced statistical techniques, like principle components or cluster 
analysis or multidimensional scaling to discover the structural framework 
underlying the set of concepts" [JONASSEN, BEISSNER & YACCI, 19931. 
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25. The rationale behind these techniques stem from theories of long term 
memory. For example, concepts that are connected within the long term memory 
may be defined by their semantic proximity. These theories assume that concepts 
have a degree of stored closeness dependent upon the strength of that relationship. 
Consequently, semantic proximity theories assume that concepts (stored as 
associations within the long term memory) are therefore recalled from the memory 
as associations. Once one concept is recalled then others closely follow. These 
techniques assume that the transformation of the concept data into semantic 
distances can be represented by a dimensional geometric space. Unfortunately, 
each data point that is generated by these techniques will often be static. Concepts 
can only be included in one category (or data point) and one category only. However, 
some concepts may be in several categories. For example, (football] can be both a 
[sport] and a [profession]. These techniques are limited to categorizing as defined 
by observable similarities. This is rather restrictive, in that a fuller, richer and 
complete understanding of the cognitive structure of the individual and the 
meaning that the individual assigns to a particular concept is missing. 
26. Conventional knowledge elicitation techniques (that are anchored in data 
matching techniques and defined by a grid-like or dimensional metric) such as word 
association, similarity ratings, card sorts [JONASSEN, BEISSNER & YACCI, 1993] are 
constrained by the representational difficulties associated with dimensional indices. 
Other multidimensional scaling techniques requiring "a matrix of distance 
estimates for all pairs of items in a set to be scaled" [COOKS & MCDONALD, 19871 and 
techniques such as protocol analysis [ERICSSON & SIMON, 19841, repertory grids 
[GAINES & SHAW, 1980; SHAW & GAINES, 1987], psychological scaling techniques 
[COOKE & MCDONALD, 1987] will suffer from similar difficulties. These 
conventional methodologies rely on observed similarities between concepts being 
represented as a similarity metric between their respective points. Conventional 
knowledge elicitation techniques consider concepts to be individual and 
independent and do not consider the possibility of contextual interactions within 
concepts and between the concept and its social and cultural environment. These 
techniques can tell us nothing about the contextual interactions of the concept and 
hence nothing about which aspects of the concept that may be pivotal. 
4.4.2 UNSTRUCTURED DATA: A GROUNDED APPROACH 
27. Knowledge elicitation may be better described as an explanation. An 
assessment of meaning may be grounded in a theory which individuals construct to 
explain why [A] IS-A [B], why [A] IS-NOT-A [B], why [B]?, did [A] cause [B]? and what's 
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wrong with [C]?, etc. STRAUSS & CORBIN state that such a theory could be viewed as 
"plausible relationships proposed among concepts and sets of concepts" [STRAUSS & 
CORBIN, 1994]. They also suggest that a grounded methodology could be used too 
tease-out those relationships, along with patterns of action and interaction from 
unstructured data. PIDGEON [1996]; PIDGEON & HENWOOD [1996]; PIDGEON, 
TURNER & BLOCKLEY [19911 have argued that a grounded theory methodology can 
generate theoretical explanations that are conceptually dense and expressed in 
terms of emergent properties. These explanations may be viewed as definitions of 
content and contextual interactions. 
28. However the use of a grounded methodology in the generation of these 
explanations relies on interviewing domain experts. Interview data (which is the 
primary means of acquiring information from a domain expert [PIDGEON, 19961) is 
often classified as unstructured or retrospective data. PIDGEON, TURNER & 
BLOCKLEY state that dealing with such data "raises significant methodological and 
theoretical issues associated with the need to analyses systematically such 
qualitative data" [PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY, 19911. For example, 
unstructured data can be long and complex and, if completely unstructured it is 
only after the analysis of such data that the completeness of the information or lack 
of it, is ascertained. Such expert testimony will also consist of unspecified and 
unsubstantiated assumptions, background data and industry specific knowledge. 
In addition, individuals when accessing past experiences may (if the individual has 
completed a series of similar projects) access a similar experience and a confusion of 
experiences may result. ERICSSON & SIMON, [1993] suggest that accessed 
experiences will often contain redundant information and that this information is 
used by the individual to validate the accessed experience. Secondly, information 
acquired subsequently may be associated with information generated at the specific 
time of the experience. For example, individuals tend to recall information they 
cannot remember, but think they must have used [ERICSSON & SIMON, 1993]. In the 
following section, a discussion on the philosophical issues that underlie the use of a 
grounded theory methodology and the use of that methodology in knowledge 
elicitation will address those concerns. The practicalities of the methodology will be 
discussed in Chapter 5 and an example will attempt to demonstrate the 
methodology. 
4.4.3. THE USE OF GROUNDED THEORY IN KNOWLEDGE ELICITATION 
29. As STRAUSS & CORBIN state, "grounded theory is a general methodology for 
developing theory that is grounded in data systematically gathered and analysed" 
[STRAUSS & CORBIN, 19941. This requires a rigorous examination and detailed 
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analysis of data from which rich conceptual models (that describe and are therefore 
grounded in that data) are developed. It is hoped that use of the term data in this 
context will not confuse. In previous sections it has been argued that data is merely 
one on many process attributes. In this context the term data may be looked upon 
as the textual representation of open world information. This data may be 
expressed as a set of symbols that are points in the state space of the process. 
PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY [1991] suggest that "having obtained interview data 
the knowledge engineer is then faced with the difficult task of analysing what is 
initially relatively unstructured and complex material. " The use of grounded theory 
attempts to turn that unstructured data into a process map of the experts 
knowledge of a particular event, decision or domain. This analysis is not simply a 
passive one of transcription and description, but more active in which the individual 
who is conducting the exercise takes control. Therefore, the individual thereby 
creates a structure from no structure, identifying and keeping what is relevant and 
irrelevant, while at the same time representing the inherent complexities within 
the data. This requires the individual to be rigorous and systematic and to be able 
to generate a criterion of relevance. It could be said that all knowledge elicitation 
methodologies are systematic and rigorous. However, the advantage of grounded 
theory requires the individual not to be a passive spectator, but an active 
participant within the activity. 
30. PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY [1991] have suggested that the components 
of unstructured interview data have similarities with problems associated with the 
qualitative nature of data from the social sciences. They argue, that (i) since human 
behaviour, understanding and expertise are context driven, then aspects of acquiring 
domain knowledge will be context driven and hence domain specific; (ii) any model 
that attempts to capture the appropriate contextual complexity is dependent upon 
the appropriate identification of the event sequences that characterize the problem 
domain; (iii) expertise incorporates strong tacit components. In that experts have 
difficulty in describing their expertise in a way that is universally understood and 
"terms, symbols and ideas are normally left unspecified" in the belief that other 
experts have similar implicit assumptions and levels of understanding [PIDGEON, 
TURNER & BLOCKLEY, 19911. Grounded theory attempts to overcome these 
difficulties by an emphasis on "the creative and demanding task of deriving and 
checking out working hypotheses from the available data, rather than utilising the 
data to test hypotheses generated by a specific prior theory. " [PIDGEON, TURNER & 
BLOCKLEY, 19911. 
31. Thus a grounded analysis will help to highlight the underlying aspects of 
the decision and thereby generate a more appropriate representation of the decision 
path constructed by an expert. As mentioned by PIDGEON [1996]; PIDGEON & 
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HENWOOD [19961 and PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY [19911, any theoretical 
descriptions of the decision path will "emerge from and hence be firmly grounded in 
the available data" [PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY, 1991]. These emergent 
properties will form part of the developing theories (or explanations) and models 
that identify the event sequences of a particular solution, while also reflecting the 
rational behind the experts decision. 
32. The successful use of grounded theory relies on the knowledge engineer 
acknowledging various steps that, "guide the researcher along a path from 
unstructured materials, to the generation of descriptive codes, on to more developed 
conceptual understanding or links, and finally to wider theoretical interpretations" 
[PIDGEON & HENWOOD, 1996]. Relevant expertise can only be acquired from 
domain experts. Consequently, the knowledge engineer will have to engage, "them 
as active participants, rather than as mere subjects of the research" [PIDGEON, 
TURNER & BLOCKLEY, 19911. They go on to state, that the expert's "individual 
qualities and contributions therefore need to be acknowledged by the researcher, and 
taken into account in the analysis of the information collected and in the formulation 
of theoretical statements about behaviour" [PIDGEON, TURNE, & BLOCKLEY, 1991]. 
33. STRAUSS & CORBIN [1994] believe that this methodology could provide a rich 
set of process descriptives. They argue that grounded theory is concerned with, 
"discovering process - not necessarily in the sense of stages or phases, but of 
reciprocal changes in patterns of action / interaction and in relationships with 
changes of conditions either internal or external to the process itself' [STRAUSS & 
CORBIN, 1994]. The methodology concentrates on the systematic analysis of data 
and the development of an explanation. The theoretical conceptualization of that 
data represents the process patterns of the action and interaction of the problem- 
solution environment. But what does the explanation represent? PIDGEON states 
that the explanation consists of, "local interactions and meanings as related to the 
social context in which they actually occur" [PIDGEON, 19961. PIDGEON, TURNER & 
BLOCKLEY argue that the explanation is composed of, "theoretical accounts of a 
problem domain" [PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY, 1991]. While PIDGEON & 
HENWOOD state that the explanation will result in, "the generation of an array of 
concepts, categories and theoretical observations, which provide the building blocks 
for subsequent theorising" [PIDGEON & HENwOOD, 1996]. In this respect a process 
model explanation could be said to consist of contextual driven interactions and 
meanings and represents a theoretical description of the problem domain. This may 
viewed as conceptual knowledge of the external world, (i) that the individual uses to 
reason with and about that world and; (ii) the means by which the individual 
understands the external world and the way in which individuals assign a meaning 
to that world. Grounded theory is an attempt by social scientists to analysis 
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unstructured data and develop from that data an explanation that is conceptual 
rich enough to give meaning to that data. 
34. These explanations (or as described by STRAUSS & CORBIN [1994] these 
patterns of action and interaction), are concerned with processes or more precisely 
the action and interaction of these processes. These processes could be actors 
[STRAUSS & CORBIN, 1994], or players and roles [BLOCKLEY, 19971. The 
identification of these processes may be classified as a conceptualization of the 
actions and interactions of an event as constrained by the conditions that define 
that event [STRAUSS & CORBIN, 1994]. Furthermore, in a strictly limited sense, if 
the explanation is able to specify the conditions under which a particular event will 
occur then the theory could claim predictability. It may be looked upon as a causal 
theory of processes, which if matched to other causal theories may be able anticipate 
a similar outcome. For as STRAUSS & CORBIN state, "if elsewhere approximately 
similar conditions obtain, then approximately similar consequences should occur" 
[STRAUSS & CORBIN, 1994]. This may seem unnecessarily simplistic, but it must be 
remembered that if emergent concepts and categories fit the data, then the 
explanation may provide a recognizable causal description of the events. However, 
these descriptive events must be teased from the data and not imposed by the 
knowledge engineer conducting the elicitation exercise. If they are developed using 
a grounded methodology, then a generated causal explanation will represent 
"systematic statements of plausible relationships" [STRAUSS & CORBIN, 1994]. 
35. However, grounded theory can very easily become a type of content analysis 
and content analysis has very different objectives to that of the grounded theory 
analysis. Content analysis concentrates on, "the criteria of reliability and validity 
and the counting of instances within a pre-defined set of mutually exclusive and 
jointly exhaustive categories" [PIDGEON, 1996]. PIDGEON [1996]; PIDGEON & 
HENwOOD [1996] have defined two fundamental analytical commitments, namely 
constant comparison and theoretical sampling that "clearly differentiate grounded 
theory from traditional content analysis" [PIDGEON, 19961. The constant comparison 
techniques may be looked upon as a principal analytical task [PIDGEON, 19961, in 
which the knowledge engineer is in a state of flux and is constantly comparing data 
elements. PIDGEON classifies these elements as "basic data instances, cases 
emergent categories and theoretical propositions" [PIDGEON, 1996]. It is the 
contention of this Chapter that such elements are processes. Consequently, any 
emergent event sequences and the theoretical propositions that connect them are 
simply a sequence of processes that make up the particular situation in question. 
PIDGEON [1996], views theoretical sampling as the sampling of new cases defined by 
the requirements and results of the proceeding analysis. He suggests that in some 
situations, "negative case analysis, where the researcher explores cases that do not 
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appear to fit an emerging conceptual system" may prove beneficial. Especially if "it 
serves to challenge initial assumptions and categories" [PIDGEON, 19961. 
36. However, a grounded analysis using constant comparison and theoretical 
sampling is a, "highly interactive and iterative process in which the traditional 
distinction between the data collection phase and the data analysis phase of a project 
often breaks down" [PIDGEON, 1996]. Therefore, while a grounded theory approach 
may be a process of interpretation, it is also a process in which the knowledge 
engineer and the expert are connected. As PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY [1991] 
state "the naive empiricist notion that scientific enquiry is merely a matter of 
collecting and transcribing messages about the material world being studied has 
now almost receded from view. It is widely acknowledge that, in both natural and 
social science, the investigator and the investigated display an interdependence". In 
which the knowledge engineer attempts to develop appropriate models as a process 
of interpreting the problem-solution description as supplied by the expert. 
Interpretation is not only limited to a qualitative grounded theory analysis, 
however grounded theory highlights the role of the knowledge engineer as being 
central to the whole process. A role that is not simply one of passive process 
enquiry, but one in which their "interpretation of the experts language" is critical 
[PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY, 19911. A role in which their creative skills in 
labelling concepts, creating connections and organizing the data are actively 
involved in teasing-out the underlying theory or explanation. PIDGEON TURNER & 
BLOCKLEY have stated that such skills might include, "intelligence, sensitivity to the 
sources as well as the context of the data, creativity, thoroughness, stamina and 
perhaps above all a tolerance of ambiguity and disorder during the early stages of 
the analysis" [PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY, 19911. These skills do not come 
easily. The quality of the explanation is dependent upon the analysis having a 
measure of faithfulness to the problem-solution domain. Consequently, those skills 
must be developed, practised and refined. A goodness of fit between the model and 
the expert testimony is an essential property of the grounded theory methodology. 
If this goodness of fit is maintained then the model derived from the analysis will 
not only reflect this faithfulness, but will also highlight any ambiguities and 
inconsistencies that can creep into expert testimony. 
37. While the methodology requires rigour, this rigour also provides a means of 
documenting the progress of the analysis. The accountability and traceability of 
concept generation, process generation, the generation of relations that connect 
them and indeed the generation of the process maps that represent them, readily 
exists by simply checking through the documentation. This has proved invaluable 
to the author and can be seen in Appendices A and B. 
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38. To conclude this section, in other knowledge elicitation exercises the results 
of the analysis are expressed in a dimensional similarity metric. However, a data 
analysis using grounded theory will result in expressions of emergent properties 
(complete with definitions of content and contextual interactions) connecting 
concepts with process flow-maps (graphical representations) of the events. It is 
hypothesized that when these are combined with a process algorithm they will form 
a process model explanation. This process explanation can be used for describing 
the processes and the interactions between those processes and hence explain the 
process knowledge that underlies the textual description of the object, event or 
situation. This process map may be a powerful methodology for representing, 
accessing, re-evaluating and monitoring specific events or a sequence of events (as 
defined by grounded theory) that contributed to a particular consequence. This 
methodology may form part of a Reflective Process Memory. It is hypothesized that 
the system may be able to recognize patterns of events based on the processes and 
process interactions that may exist between them. This could be represented in a 
structured process hierarchy. 
4.5 INFERRING IMPLICIT EVENTS 
39. In previous Chapters it has been argued that the ability of human subjects 
to represent and learn from experiences requires a defined memory structure. A 
RPM that explains those open world experiences will also require a defined memory 
structure. In section 4.3, it was hypothesized that this memory structure must exist 
as a PMx. In section 4.4, the notion that a model of the PMX may be defined by a 
grounded theory analysis of the object, event or decision path was considered. It 
was suggested that the idea of process models of theoretical explanations emerging 
from and hence grounded in data may prove advantageous. Such a model may be 
able to achieve inferential operations in which implicit events are defined on the 
basis of stored case-histories. In this respect, the PMX provides the means by which 
the RPM is able to infer implicit events on the basis of the relevance of previously 
encountered similar processes. A descriptive methodology will be presented in 
Chapter 5, in this section the underlying philosophical issues surrounding the 
structure of the PMX will be discussed. 
40. POPPER [19721 has shown that the inference of implicit events and the 
development of generalized rules from observations to be logically false. Just 
because it always has been is no justification for assuming that it will always be. 
Experiential evidence may show that the hypothesis is correct, it will however, 
never prove that the hypothesis is true. In this section, the notion that a reflective 
process memory using experiential knowledge is not concerned with truth, but with 
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dependability {BLOCKLEY, 1980; COMERFORD & BLOCKLEY, 1993] will be addressed. 
41. A central premise of this thesis, is that a reflective learning loop (as 
represented in a Reflective Process memory) may infer implicit events on the basis of 
previously encountered experiences. If a new event has similarities to other well- 
known experiences, then predictions about the attributes of that event may be 
developed. If that experience is classified as a decision path, then the possible 
outcome or any problems associated with that decision path may be anticipated. 
The notion of inferring events on the basis of previous experiences is known as 
induction. Induction is an activity in which an extrapolation moves from the results 
of observations to universal statements or theories. (cf. Deduction in which an 
inference is made from the general to the particular by a series of logical steps. If 
each step is true, then any conclusions derived from those steps must also be true). 
HUME [1711-1776] first highlighted the central philosophical problem of inductive 
reasoning. MAGEE [1982] in his discussion on POPPER rather neatly states that 
"from the fact that all past futures has resembled past pasts it does not follow that all 
future futures will resemble future pasts. " POPPER [1972] circumvented some of the 
problems associated with induction, by suggesting that before recording any 
experimental observations, a pre-observational definition of appropriateness and 
relevance must be made. These observations must be governed by the requirements 
of the problem hypothesis. POPPER [1972] also argued that by beginning all 
inquiries with a hypothesis allows the individual to develop testable arguments 
from that hypothesis. These arguments which when tested will either confirm or 
refute that hypothesis. POPPERS reasoning may be represented as follows, (i) 
identify' the problem; (ii) formulate a proposed solution as a new hypothesis; (iii) use 
this hypothesis to generate testable arguments; (iv) test these arguments; (v) use the 
results of these test to establish a preference between competing hypotheses. 
42. The RPM (in a manner, similar to the Popperian view) attempts to overcome 
problems associated with the inference of implicit events from similar experiences. 
The RPM, (i) uses the problem input to access a series of stored experiences; (ii) from 
these experiences a selection of possible solutions are chosen for evaluation by the 
RPM; (iii) the evaluation criterion (as defined by the user) attempts to discriminate 
between the chosen solutions; (iv) the results of this evaluation are used to order the 
preference of the accessed experiences; (v) if a solution is accepted by the user, then 
the decision path of the problem input is modified in an attempt to reproduce the 
successful consequences of the chosen solution, while reducing its failings; (vi) the 
chosen solution is used by the RPM to make additional predictions on the successful 
outcome of the modified problem input. 
43. However, as stated above, just because it always has been gives no 
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indication that it always will be, then where is the justification in using theoretical 
explanations of past events to reason about future situations? POPPER [1972] has 
argued that the justification of generated explanations may be based on the 
testability of the explanation. The justification of an explanation is defined by the 
tests that are constructed to refute the explanation and the ability of the 
explanation to survive those tests. BLOCKLEY [19801 has extended this by arguing 
that a criterion for the justification of generated explanations in engineering 
practice should be based on their dependability. He has suggested that POPPER'S 
notion of testability may be looked upon as a necessary condition of dependability. 
However, testability can give no indication of the explanation being true. All that 
can be said about an explanation that is dependable is that it is not false. HTJME 
[1711-17761 noted, that while the inference of a set of event sequences from a set of 
similar event sequences may be well-founded, this well-foundness can not be 
proved. They can never be proved logically true. This pre-occupation with truth 
and the notion of truth may be misleading. As POPPER states "most formulae used 
in engineering... are known to be false, although they may be excellent 
approximations and easy to handle; and they are used with confidence by people who 
know them to be false" [POPPER, 19721. 
44. The foundations of modern science and engineering practice are not built 
on truth. They are built upon the generation of hypotheses, that have developed 
into plausible and dependable explanations. If truth was the pre-requisite of 
engineering practice, then the three central propositions of Newtonian mechanics 
would be invalid. The laws of Newtonian mechanics are not true, but dependable. 
Engineers can justify their use since they have proved to be a dependable 
explanation of the action and reaction of physical objects operating within a specific 
space-time. They have proved to be a dependable foundation upon which current 
human society can exist. If this current society was moving at nearly the speed of 
light, then this dependability breaks down and Newtonian mechanics would be 
inappropriate. Consequently, dependability is a function of the context of the 
problem-solution environment. And in the context of this problem-solution 
environment, the reflective learning from the grounded explanation of previous 
case-histories is an appropriate methodology for the investigation of decision 
failures. 
45. However, whilst induction is an activity that moves from results of 
observations to the generation of rules, reflective induction is not concerned with the 
development of rules. Reflective induction uses previous experiences to aid the 
decision making capabilities of the user and not to remove the user from the 
decision loop. The re-occurrence of similar event sequences may help the user to 
recognize and hence label those event sequences as a new concept. The 
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representation of commonly occurring event sequences may be capable of 
stimulating the creativity of the user. The dependability of these commonly 
occurring event sequences may be defined by the tests that the user employs to 
demonstrate the justification in using that particular inferred explanation. 
46. Another argument against the use of the RPM to translate a messy external 
object into a structured internal representation, is that the interpretation and 
incorporation of human behaviour into the process memory may present difficulties. 
As PLATT states, "human centred process modelling is not only context sensitive, it is 
also subject to the interpretation of the observer creating the model" [PLATT, 19951. 
PIDGEON notes, "this dilemma arises from a simultaneous commitment, on the one 
hand to realism and science (by claiming to reflect objectively the participants' 
accounts and perspectives) and, on the other hand, to construetionism through a 
recognition of the multiple perspectives and subjectivities inherent both in a symbolic 
interactionist world view and in the engagement of the researcher in the 
interpretative work ofgenerating new understandings and theory" [PIDGEON, 19961. 
However, this tension between the objective and subjective element of human 
centred process models represents both the strength and the weakness of generating 
a theory from available data. The notion of a grounded approach to theory 
generation is based upon three propositions, (i) plausible relationships operate 
within an open world; (ii) these relationships are reflected in unstructured 
interview data; (iii) and they can be teased out by using a grounded methodology 
[STRAUSS & CORBIN, 19941. The criticism above presupposes that the generated 
theory and hence any experiences derived from that theory are somehow fixed and 
represent some static empiricism or truth. The notions of truth and dependability 
have been addressed above and so will not be repeated. However, in the process of 
teasing out this theory, the knowledge engineer will have to "access their 
participants' lived experiences" [PIDGEON, 19961. The accessing of previous 
experiences forms part of the very creative tension of qualitative interpretation. 
This cannot be called static, involving as it does the dynamic and flexible movement 
between the expert, their testimony and the knowledge engineer. The use of a 
grounded methodology involving a repeated interaction between the knowledge 
engineer and the expert introduces an element of agreement into the elicitation of 
expert testimony. Therefore, while the methodology is grounded in data it is also 
grounded in agreement. This agreement may be defined by evidential support 
developed from a dialogue of conjecture and refutation [POPPER, 1972] between the 
knowledge engineer and expert witness. 
47. Another criticism, is the danger of inappropriate use. There is a danger 
that the grounded methodology could become a prescriptive technique, in which 
individuals look upon the methodology as guaranteeing truth [PIDGEON, 19961. It is 
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suggested by PIDGEON [1996], that the results of this inappropriate use will soon 
become apparent. The guaranteeing of truth presupposes a concern with the issues 
of rule generation and inductive reasoning. These issues have been addressed 
above. The notion of theory generation must be defined by justifiably dependability 
and by the tension between the understanding of the expert, the interview data and 
the conceptualization developed by the knowledge engineer. It has been argued 
that these generated explanations will be dependent upon, (i) the tests that the user 
employs to demonstrate the justification in using that particular inferred 
explanation; (ii) the knowledge engineer having a degree of subjectivity and 
objectivity from which they develop their analyses. 
48. To conclude; where is the justification in using a grounded methodology? It 
is argued that this is concerned with a criterion of dependability and not with 
guaranteeing truth. The value of a grounded methodology in knowledge elicitation 
will be in its ability to identify concepts and conceptual patterns from unstructured 
data. A dependability that is defined by the ability of the grounded theories to fit 
the data, while also being recognized, understood and hence agreed on by the 
participants of the process. This criterion of dependability is currently being used 
by the author in defining the appropriateness of the elicited case-histories of depth 
conversion projects in oil reservoir management. 
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4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
"A conceptual pattern is a representation used by an individual to express their 
understanding on an external process. A Process model explanation could be 
considered to be formal representation of that understanding. 
" The representational appropriateness of such a model depends upon the model 
being able to express not only the processes of the external object, but also the 
process-interactions that connect those processes. The structure of the model 
must be able to provide an explanation of the object in terms of an explanation of 
those processes and process-interactions. 
" It has been argued that a grounded methodology provides a formal explanation of 
the interactions and meanings as they relate to the content and context in which 
they occur. This analysis will result in the generation of an array of concepts, 
categories, their interacting processes and emergent properties. These 
interacting processes and emergent properties can be represented as Process 
Model explanations. 
" The Process model explanation is used to describe and explain an otherwise 
unstructured open world object in terms of a structured process representation. 
They represent the building blocks of the Reflective Process memory and are used 
by the Reflective Process memory to infer implicit events on the basis of 
previously encountered experiences. In this respect the Reflective Process 
Memory is not concerned with logical truth but with a dependability of 
representation, explanation and understanding. 
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5. FROM KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION TO PROCESS 
MODEL EXPLANATION 
5.1 OBJECTIVES 
" To discuss the nature of the form and vocabulary of these Process model 
explanation as defined through a grounded methodology. 
" To discuss how predictives may be defined by a Process model explanation of how, 
when, where and why a sequence of events occurred and who was responsible. 
" To explore how the Reflective Process Memory to use this knowledge to identify 
problems in similar experiences. 
5.2 INTRODUCTION 
1. In Chapter 3 it was hypothesized that the building of a decision may be 
modelled as a reflective process. This hypothesis was characterized as follows, (i) 
the decision develops from dynamic reflective interactions with the physical and 
social world, external to the decision maker; (ii) decision building is a pattern 
recognition and matching process; (iii) the patterns are metaphors, analogies or 
images that the decision maker uses and updates from previous experiences; (iv) 
the decision building process forms part of a reflective learning loop, in which the 
individual constantly re-calls, re-evaluates and modifies that experience; (v) the 
decision building process will produce emergent properties at many levels of 
definition of modelling of the open world; (vi) the effectiveness of the outcome from a 
decision building process, depends on the overall structure of the interactions 
between the individual, the cultural identity and the problem-solution 
environment. 
2. In Chapter 4 it was suggested that a machine-based Reflective Process 
Memory could make available to a decision maker a rich set of previous process 
attributes. These process attributes would be expressed as a Process model 
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explanation. However, the representational appropriateness of such a model is 
dependent upon it being possible to express in the model not only the processes of 
the external object, but also the interactions that connect those processes. The 
structure of the model must be able to describe the object in terms of an explanation 
of those interactions. 
3. As discussed in Chapter 4a grounded methodology provides a dependable 
explanation of the interactions and meanings as they relate to the content and 
context in which they occur. This analysis will result in the generation of an array 
of concepts, categories and their processes and emergent properties, which provide 
the building blocks of the reflective process memory. In the following sections an 
example of a grounded knowledge elicitation exercise and the representation of the 
emergent properties as a Process model explanation will be presented. The 
example, will focus on the way in which the reflective model enables links to be 
made between technical factors and the economic, environmental, cultural and 
social considerations of the decision building process. The process interactions of 
previous decisions will be described through a Process model algorithm [BLOCKLEY 
19971. This description, which is a representation of the understanding of a process 
by an individual, will include the current and desired states, initiating states, 
transforming states, scenario states and consequence states as well as the various 
roles and other attributes. The description will also include reference to any sub- 
processes on which the process depends. 
5.3 DEPTH CONVERSION: A GROUNDED IMPLEMENTATION 
4. In this section some of the practical aspects of grounded theory, particularly 
gathering, coding and the analysis of qualitative data associated with the depth 
conversion of seismic data in offshore oil exploration are discussed. The component 
processes of a grounded approach are shown in FIGURE 5.0 [PIDGEON & HENWOOD, 
1996]. FIGURE 5.0 represents each process of the grounded approach as discrete 
steps. However, in practice it is an activity, in which the knowledge engineer 
constantly compares the difference between current and previous steps, checking 
the validity of the emerging interpretations. As PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY 
note, the knowledge engineer should be prepared to return to the expert sources 
frequently as analysis proceeds, in order to check initial interpretations and 
emerging propositions, to resolve ambiguities, and to gather new information in 
response to the analysis [PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY, 1991]. 
5, In the remainder of this Chapter and in the following Chapters 6 and 7, a 
depth conversion case study will be used to illustrate, (i) how the knowledge 
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FIGURE 5.0 GROUNDED THEORY APPROACH [PIDGEON & HENWOOD, 1996] 








engineer generates a grounded explanation; (ii) how this forms part of a Process 
Model explanation of that domain expertise and; (iii) how the diagnostic use of that 
Process model explanation could lead to the identification of potential decision 
problems. To begin this exercise, an overview of the core issues of depth conversion 
(as part of a general geophysical interpretation) is presented below. 
5.3.1 DEPTH CONVERSION: AN OVERviLEW 
6. Seismic exploration is a "remote-sensing technique in which the aim is to 
record as detailed a picture as possible of subsurface geology" [MCQUILLIN, BACON & 
BARCLAY 19791. The results of this seismic exploration is a "geological model which 
can be described as the sum of a finite series of layers of varying thickness, physical 
properties (density and seismic velocity) and structural attitude" [MCQUILLIN, 
BACON & BARCLAY 1979]. The geophysical interpretation of this model is concerned 
with the preparation of reservoir depth contour maps of the "geological structure, 
lithological variation, stratigraphy and, in oil exploration, hydrocarbon 
prospectivity" [MCQUILLIN, BACON & BARCLAY 19791. The preparation of these 
maps falls into two stages. These are, (i) the construction of velocity maps and; (ii) 
the conversion of those maps into depths to particular geological layers and 
features. Processed data received from seismic surveys is used to construct a time 
map of the prospect. A seismic survey uses the property of the subsurface geology to 
reflect sound to discriminate between geological structures. A sound reflection 
occurs wherever there is a change in acoustic impedance (defined as the product of 
seismic velocity and density). The greater the impedance the stronger the 
reflection. These changes are normally associated with changes in the geological 
lithology. This data is processed and the product is a time contour map to each 
horizon. The time map is directly related to the seismic sections. The conversion of 
the time contour map to a depth map requires a velocity distribution of the 
prospect. The velocity distribution can be defined from well sonic logs on the one 
hand and seismic stacking velocities on the other. Each will be considered in turn. 
Note, it is possible "to estimate velocities by stacking the data assuming a constant 
velocity; strong events will tend to appear at those depths where the assumed velocity 
equals the true rms velocity, and by repeating the process for a suite of assumed 
velocities, a velocity profile can be prepared" [MCQUILLIN, BACON & BARCLAY 1979] 
7. Consider a prospect in which the seismic data is minimal or uncertain. Any 
velocities derived from that data will be undependable. To overcome these 
difficulties, it is normal to use the well velocity data. This information is provided 
by a sonic log and allows the geophysicist to deduce the average velocity in each 
formation through which the well passes. All that the geophysicist is required to do 
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is to contour this information for each formation. Unfortunately, unless the 
prospect has been extensively and uniformly drilled then the well velocities will 
have to be extrapolated into the deeper areas of the reservoir. (Note, this is unlikely, 
it is normal for the wells to be concentrated on the high areas within the reservoir 
trap. ) The variation of velocity with depth of burial can be used to form a 
correlation between velocity and depth. In some prospects a good correlation 
between velocity and depth can be defined. However, the occurrence of an uplift 
seriously affects that correlation. An uplift may be defined as the process by which 
older, deeper and hence denser geological formations have been pushed towards the 
surface. The movement of geology from its initial depth (at time of burial), to a 
depth that is unrelated to time of burial will result in scatter on the velocity-depth 
graph. In practice such scatter is very common. However, if no other geophysical 
interpretation is available then the best estimate of the depth gradient versus 
velocity will be used to extrapolate away from the wells. 
8. Fortunately, it is normal for stacking velocities to be available along the 
interpreted seismic lines. These are transformed into interval velocities for the 
various formations. An interval velocity may be defined as the seismic velocity 
through a particular formation layer. This velocity model is then tied to well 
velocity data as a means of instilling confidence in the interval velocities. 
Unfortunately. Data uncertainties in the velocity model will mean that such ties 
are normally unsatisfactory. However, if the differences remain constant over 
depth then some form of correlation factor may be incorporated and thus increase 
the agreement between the two sets of velocities. These differences are a 
consequence of, "the difference in geometry, namely, normal incidence for the check- 
shot and various angles of incidence for the CDP (Common Depth Point) gather. " 
[MCQUILLIN, BACON & BARCLAY 1979] They go on to state that "horizontal 
variations in interval velocity and also anisotropy will cause small differences 
between well and seismic velocity estimates. " [MCQUILLIN, BACON & BARCLAY 19791 
9. Having constructed time maps to various horizons and velocity maps of 
interval velocities between those formations then the multiplication of one by the 
other will produce a depth map of each formation. Each depth to formation is added 
together which builds a depth layer-cake [MCQUILLIN, BACON & BARCLAY 1979] of 
the prospect. Even if a large area is to be mapped on several horizons, such a 
method is easily computable. However, the problem of consistency still remains. 
The chosen depth conversion method must ensure that the values at line-ties and 
well-ties is consistent throughout the procedure. This can be achieved by 
representing the velocity data as a set of values on a grid. The grid size being 
defined by the complexity of the formation. At a point at which the depth is 
required, a grid is generated and the average velocity can be derived from an 
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interpolation of neighbouring grid points. This velocity is then used in the depth 
calculation. This method has the additional advantage of being able to include well 
velocities at grid points, which if correlated correctly allow lines within the vicinity 
of wells to be tied in exactly. 
5.3.2 THE GROUNDED APPROACH TO INTERVIEWING 
10. A series of six structured and three unstructured interviews of 
approximately 45 minutes in duration were undertaken with petroleum 
geophysicists. The level of expertise varied. For example, one of the interviewees 
had very little experience having just joined the company direct from university. 
The other three interviewees had many thousands of man-hours of geophysical 
interpretation with over twenty five years of experience. These interviews were 
conducted over a period of four months. The purpose was the generation of a set of 
case studies of the process [implementing time-depth conversion]. These case 
studies represent a collection of theoretical explanations of the decision tasks that 
made up that process. The intention was, (i) to demonstrate the use of the grounded 
methodology in the elicitation of the process interactions and their emergent 
properties during the [implementing time-depth conversion] decision problem; (ii) to 
provide a grounded explanation of the interactions and meanings of the emergent 
properties as they related to the content and context of the process [implementing 
time-depth conversion]; (iii) to generate a collection of concepts and categories of 
these emergent properties that would ultimately be represented in the Process 
Model explanation of the decision problem. 
11. During the knowledge elicitation exercise undertaken by the author, 
interviews were recorded and then later transcribed. These interviews 
concentrated on the human and organizational preconditions relating to failures (or 
near failures) of depth conversion projects in reservoir evaluation. Of the three 
collected case studies, two are retrospective case histories of depth conversion 
projects that have experienced decision problems and the third case study 
represents an on-going project. Each interview session was allocated a unique 
identifier. This included the date, reservoir identifier and source of information. 
TABLE 5.0 illustrates this process and represents an example taken from an 
interview with an geophysicist; G. For example, the case shown in TABLE 5.0 was 
given the name [TOM]. The other case studies were known as [DICK] and [HARRY]. 
TABLE 5.0 represents a section of an interview with senior geophysicists 
highlighting their failure to anticipate the effects of new software being unable to 
perform as required. 
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TABLE 5.0 EXAMPLE PARAGRAPHS FROM DEPTH CONVERSION INTERVIEWS 
Interview with G, March 17 1998, Field [TOM] 
Para 31 One of the reasons that there was a time delay and a cost overrun, was that the 
project team were trying a new software package. This new software wasn't 
(which management didn't realise at the time) capable of doing everything the 
project team need. The team had to revert back to the original software 
package. 
Para 32 We are co-developing new software package. This software is currently being 
pushed into market. The project team had pre-release version and decided to 
find out whether it could what was required by CASE TOM/J. Theoretically, it 
offered an easier path than some other methods, in that it integrated some of the 
techniques that currently require different software packages. However, it 
failed in several areas. There appears to be no pressure to use, but there was an 
interest and that interest stemmed from the fact that we have a financial stake in 
its development. 
12. Previous studies [PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY, 1991; PIDGEON & 
HENWOOD, 19961 indicated that the success of the grounded methodology will rely 
on the development of a rich rapport between the interviewer and the interviewee. 
This will lead to the generation of a rich set of emergent concepts. The experience of 
this author during the depth conversion exercise suggests that the interviewer 
should develop the interview along conversational lines and that the interviewer 
should follow an open-ended conversational style. It has been reported that a 
failure to establish any sort of rapport with the interviewee may result in thin data 
[PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY, 19911. They suggest that this will result in 
outcomes that "are unlikely to reflect the substantive issues involved. " FORSYTHE & 
BUCHANAN [19891 have highlighted a number of problems associated with the 
gathering of interview data of which "dominating the interview" and "asking leading 
questions" are the most frequent. PIDGEON & HENWOOD suggest that a commitment 
to the generation of rich stories relies on, "grounded theorists who use interviews to 
view them as a directed conversation. " [PIDGEON & HENWOOD, 19961 
13. The issues of to-direct or not-to-direct need to be considered. To address 
these concerns, it is suggested that questions of direction (such as when, how and 
when not) must run in parallel with questions associated with the explanations 
fitting the data, bias and world-view. A grounded knowledge elicitation exercise will 
involve some element of human judgement. Since, everyone will have a point of 
view, then the criticism of controlled direction or bias has to be addressed. What 
sets the grounded approach apart is the notion of agreement. At one level, this 
agreement may be between an individual expert and the knowledge engineer and is 
used to indicate the appropriateness of the grounded interpretation of a particular 
object or process. At another level, this agreement may be viewed as a shared or 
collective testing of the generated hypotheses. This agreement is part of a collective 
understanding of the scientific and technical rationale that lies behind the expertise 
of the expert. This highly tested agreement may act as a measure of dependability. 
For example, in the physical sciences, tests of dependability are defined by a set of 
rules that govern the way in which the physical world behaves and associated 
measures that represent that behaviour. However, in the social sciences tests of 
dependability are more difficult to define and hence the tendency for associated 
bias. The social world is more dynamic and more chaotic, hence the difficulty in 
obtaining total agreement. In this respect, a grounded approach tries to minimize 
the bias. It is a collective process, that generates concepts and concept definitions 
by agreement. This agreement can never be total and hence the generated concepts 
and concept definitions can never be true. But they can be dependable, a 
dependability that is governed by the degree of agreement that they excite. The 
modification of a well-known quotation; direction tends to corrupt and absolute 
direction corrupts absolutely [from "power tends to corrupt and absolute power 
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corrupts absolutely", ACTON, First Baron 1834-1902] may help to guide the 
knowledge engineer in the elicitation task. The knowledge engineer must be 
vigilant to the dangers of heavy-handed direction, whether accidental or deliberate. 
The result of such inattention will be a reduction in theoretical explanations and an 
increase in the use of leading questions. 
14. There will always be a tension between, on the one hand an explanation 
that requires direct questioning and on the other hand the dangers associated with 
the constraints imposed by such direct questions. Such a constraint may serve a 
specific purpose and hence be beneficial to the analysis. For example, while open- 
ended questions will allow the knowledge engineer to develop the general process 
explanation, direct questions can be used to elicit specific information concerning 
specific events and people. As CHARMAZ [19901 states, "loaded questions may prove 
to be useful, when suitable and when raised in logical sequence. " Unfortunately, 
such a constraint may also serve to bias the elicitation exercise and consequently 
the analysis of that elicitation exercise. 
15. There is another element of human judgement associated with this activity. 
A creative tension between the subjective creativity of the author and the objective 
creativity required by the analysis. PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY believe this 
creativity to be a necessary part of the analysis and state that, "the facets of the 
evidence collected will vary with the aims of the system being built and with the 
nature of the testimony offered by the domain expert, as well as being responsive in 
some degree to the individual perceptions of the investigator. " [PIDGEON, TURNER & 
BLOCKLEY, 1991] It is important to note here a distinction between a system and a 
system description or a meta-system language. The testimony of the domain expert 
represents their understanding of the problem domain. A grounded analysis of this 
testimony will represent the knowledge engineer's explanation of the expert's 
understanding of the problem domain. A grounded analysis represents a meta- 
explanation. It is a representation of an explanation of an explanation. As this 
representation moves away from the actuality of the domain, then this 
representation will become more abstract. In paragraph 13 above, the notion of bias 
was introduced as a measure of controlled direction. However, in this case bias is a 
function of the abstraction; in which individual perceptions of the investigator may 
begin to dominate the representation of an explanation of an explanation. The 
requirements of this abstraction may weaken the creative tension that exists 
between the subjective and the objective. If this occurs, then the subjective 
creativity of the investigator with all the associated bias begins to dominate. 
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5.3.3 THE GROUNDED APPROACH TO ANALYSIS 
16. The analysis began by labelling the interview transcriptions. This 
represents the first permanent data record and is shown in TABLE 5.0. During the 
analysis the author found it necessary to construct a second record or index. This 
index allowed the author to sort and re-represent the data as the analysis 
progressed and developed. The analysis progressed with the author developing and 
labelling concepts that he considered to be relevant to the problem-solution 
environment. It begins by asking, "what categories, concepts or labels do I need in 
order to account for the relevance of this section, paragraph or line? " [PIDGEON, 
TURNER & BLOCKLEY, 1991; PIDGEON & HENWOOD, 1996]. 
17. This indexing and labelling of concepts is the initial stage of a creative 
categorizing and characterizing activity. The succeeding analysis is reliant on these 
beginnings. Consequently, a rigours and conscientious approach will help to ensure 
that the generated explanations represent a unambiguous understanding of the 
knowledge stored within the testimony of the expert. The author found that 
because the generated label must be a recognizable description of the concept, then 
sometimes the labels produced during this categorizing and characterizing activity 
appeared long-winded. However, irrespective of its length, if the goodness-of-fit of 
the label is deemed to be unsuitable, then the knowledge engineer must refine the 
label until they are satisfied with its definition of explanation. This is most 
important since the initial goodness-of-fit controls and governs the successful 
outcome of following operations. As discussed above, this activity requires a 
dynamic and creative tension "between the data and the researcher's developing 
conceptualizations. " [PIDGEON & HENWOOD, 199611 This movement between data 
and knowledge engineer is a complex and difficult undertaking. Since this may 
result in the knowledge engineer developing a relationship between the expert, the 
text and himself, then subjective judgements may play a role in this labelling 
activity. Associated with these judgements is the distinct possibility that the point- 
of-view of the knowledge engineer may have an undue influence on this activity. As 
mentioned above, the knowledge engineer must be aware of this influence and act to 
reduce its effect. 
18. To demonstrate this labelling activity, consider the data represented in 
TABLE 5.0. For example (as shown in TABLE 5.1), in paragraph 31, the author 
identified the following significant concept; (i) Management unsure of new software 
capabilities. This category is a reflection of a specific conceptual level and 
represents an initial analysis of the expert's testimony. This initial analysis 
highlighted a poor management strategy that eventual lead to the delay of the 
project and serious financial overrun. The concepts identified in paragraph 32 were, 
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(i) Selective attention to technical rationale hides potential problems, (ii) Financial 
interest and (iii) Problems associated with using untested software ignored. The last 
two again highlight a serious shortcoming in management decision making while 
the first concept refers to a more theoretical viewpoint that had not been directly 
raised by the geophysicists. Selective attention to technical rationale obscures 
potential problems refers to a geophysicist having a narrow or displaced focus upon 
the supposed technical abilities of the new software package. Although it was 
admitted that it "was unwise to give the client a depth map produced using almost 
untested software", that is exactly what the geophysicist did with the result that 
project suffered a time delay and a cost overrun. 
19. The degree of abstraction surrounding these labels represents a vocabulary 
that reflects a measure of similarities, differences and connections that lie hidden 
within the interview data. What is required is a level of abstraction that results in 
the collection of features that point to significant concepts and their associations. 
The success of this operation depends upon choosing an appropriate level of 
abstraction for the concepts in question. For example, highly specific terms such as 
Management unsure of new software capabilities and Problems associated with 
using untested software ignored will fix the analysis to particular aspects of the case 
in question. However abstract terms such as Selective attention to technical 
rationale hides potential problems will allow the concept to be analysed at a higher 
level of generality. TABLE 5.2 illustrates a card for the concept Selective attention to 
technical rationale hides potential problems showing some of the entries that were 
made. This notion, of selective attention being given to technical rationale at the 
back of some management decisions is very interesting, especially as this almost 
lead to the project failure. This view emerged in a number of different forms, 
highlighted in TABLE 5.2. Following the advice in PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY 
[19911 and PIDGEON & HENWOOD [1996] TABLE 5.2 illustrates the different types of 
information that may be needed when indexing and cross referencing. For example, 
as well as the card label, the concept's title and a brief synopsis of the incident, 
TABLE 5.2 also includes a note of possible connections with other emergent concepts 
and earlier concept labels. 
20. In this example, Selective attention to technical rationale hides potential 
problems has been connected to CARD 24-FOCUS UPON EVIDENCE OF CASE 
SUCCESS. This is suggested by evidence of a narrow focus upon defining evidence of 
case success, in which the implications of such a concentrated view are not 
considered. Another potential connection, CARD 20-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL 
PROCESS CONSTRAINTS highlights the situation in which a potential hazard was 
anticipated but no preventative actions were initiated. PIDGEON, TURNER & 
BLOCKLEY [1991 ] and PIDGEON & HENWOOD [1996] state that "such links will be 
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TABLE 5.1 SIGNIFICANT CONCEPTS IDENTIFIED 
Para 31 Management unsure of new software capabilities 
Para 32 Selective attention to technical rationale hides potential problems 
Financial interest 
Problems associated with using untested software ignored 
TABLE 5.2 EXAMPLE OF CARD-28 [selective attention to technical rationale] 
CARD 28 SELECTIVE ATTENTION TO TECHNICAL RATIONALE HIDES POTENTIAL 
PROBLEMS 
Para 20 harmonised information manipulation may reduce data processing problems 
Para 32 management considered new software to be an advancement on previous 
packages, since it integrated techniques that required different packages and 
reduce data manipulation 
Para 38 project called for geo-statistical technique of Kriging at specific locations and the 
new software was expected to perform this operation 
Para 48 although software failed which resulted in delays and cost overruns it is still 
considered to be a technical advance on other methods 
Links with CARD 17-UNCERTAINTY IN SEISMIC VELOCITY ESTIMATION 
CARD 20-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL PROCESS CONSTRAINTS 
CARD 22-TECHNICAL ASPECTS CONSTRAIN PROJECT COMPLETION 
CARD 23-PROBLEMS WITH ENSURING QUALITY CONTROL 
CARD 24-FOCUS UPON EVIDENCE OF CASE SUCCESS 
CARD 26-SATISFYING CLIENT OR OWN TECHNICAL EXPERTISE 
(1) Data manipulation seen as problem 
(2) Technical expectation hides potential problems 
Notes Kriging, name (after D. G. Krige) for a suite of interpolation techniques that uses 
regionalised variable theory to incorporate information about the stochastic 
aspects of depth variation when estimating interpolation weights. [BU ROUGH & 
MCDONNELL, 1998] 
tentative" especially at the beginning of the analysis. However, during the later 
stages of the analysis particularly when "it becomes necessary to specify 
relationships among significant concepts" [PIDGEON & HENWOOD, 19961, then such 
links offer an additional information. 
21. The usefulness of the grounded approach depends upon the way in which 
concepts are refined, extended and related to each other as additional data is 
explored. Techniques such as memo writing and category splitting, writing 
definitions and category integration (see FIGURE 5.1) can be used to refine the initial 
analysis and improve the goodness-of-fit between concept categories and situation 
events. These techniques also ensure that category definitions are rigorously 
developed as the analysis progresses. For example, during the initial exercise, some 
of the chosen labels were not adequate representations of the events that they 
attempted to describe. As noted by PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY [19911 "this is 
often resolved by either redefining the concept to a more general or a more specific 
label, or, where two separate categories are suggested by the incidents on a single 
card, by converting one card into two, each with its own separate label". During the 
depth conversion exercise both methods were repeated a number of times during 
the analysis. This highlights the importance of flexibility. The knowledge engineer 
must be able to develop an open and relaxed attitude to the analysis. Consider the 
example card shown in TABLE 5.2 the first event harmonized information 
manipulation may reduce data processing problems had suggested the label Data 
manipulation seen as problem. As further events were added, then it appeared that 
a more general label was needed and Technical expectation hides potential problems 
was considered by the author to be more appropriate. However, this was finally re- 
worked into the present label Selective attention to technical rationale hides 
potential problems. 
22. As the analysis progressed the index of certain categories became full or 
saturated [GLASER & STRAUSS, 1968], in which the collection and analysis of 
additional data were unable to add to the information already stored. At this stage 
the author (as recommended by PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY [19911) began to 
summarize the information. This begins by writing an explanation of the meaning 
assigned to each label. This explanation must explicitly state which implicit 
qualities make up this label and category classification. PIDGEON, TURNER & 
BLOCKLEY [19911, consider this to be a "demanding task". However, it is "crucial to 
the analysis" and "often develops a deeper and more precise understanding of the 
nature of the phenomena being examined" [PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY, 1991]. 
23. This conceptual definition may be extended by the knowledge engineer into 
the writing of memos. For example, PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY [1991] stress, 
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"the process of producing definitions should run in parallel to, and often directly 
stimulates the writing of theoretical memos". Memos are used to "capture and 
externalise the thoughts of the analyst generated by close contact with the data 
whilst coding and producing definitions" [PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY, 1991]. 
This is activity forms the foundation of the grounded methodology. The knowledge 
engineer should record any thoughts ideas, etc, on "generalisations (particularly 
general categories and patterns describing the data), new cases, new categories, links 
between categories, or links with existing models" [PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY, 
19911. Note, these are just suggestions and the knowledge engineer should not be 
limited by them. For example, the author used the memos as an opportunity to 
develop questions for the domain expert. The questioning of the domain expert 
about these emerging processes helped the author to develop explanations of those 
processes and define the interactions that existed between them. It also helped the 
author to develop the necessary emergent-questions about the how, when, where and 
why of those processes. This became especially important during the analysis of 
those case studies that suffered from failure-conditions when the processes 
represented hazardous-event-sequences. In this respect the memo effectively 
becomes a failure-explanation. This will be demonstrated below. 
24. TABLE 5.3 illustrates a provisional definition produced by the author for the 
concept Selective attention to technical rationale hides potential problems, from 
which a memo, shown in TABLE 5.4 was produced. A closer examination of CARD 
28-SELECTIVE ATTENTION TO TECHNICAL RATIONALE HIDES POTENTIAL 
PROBLEMS (shown in TABLE 5.2) demonstrated that some of the recorded events 
may be re-categorized. This is shown in TABLE 5.5. 
25. TABLE 5.5 identifies several important features. Firstly, the re- 
categorization attempts to refine the distinction between the recorded events with 
events now identified as Stress escaping behaviour and Narrow point of view 
respectively. The categories are now separated and the interactions between each 
concept as well as possible suggestions to overcome these problems are noted. 
These interactions and suggestions will provide the initial process structure that 
represents the authors understanding in a graphical format (this will discussed in 
some length in the following section). Secondly, the memo in TABLE 5.5 refers to 
previous literature in an attempt to relate the emerging processes "to existing 
models and theories" [PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY, 19911. Thirdly, the memo 
identifies those questions that on reflection should have been asked at the time, but 
were not. 
26. The objective of this analysis is the integration of the emerging processes 
by the creation of interactions that connect these processes. The definitions of these 
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TABLE 5.3 PROVISIONAL DEFINITION OF [selective attention to technical rationale] 
CARD 28-SELECTIVE ATTENTION TO TECHNICAL RATIONALE HIDES POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
The quest for sophisticated technical solutions in the optimisation of processing seismic 
information has in this example hindered the process and indeed may increase the uncertainty 
within the process. The selective attention given to the theoretical aspects of data processing may 
generate hidden hazardous event sequences or negative process interactions that may have dire 
consequences on the outcome of the depth conversion project. The desire to integrate some of the 
techniques that currently require different software packages while understandable has on the 
development path become a focused and unquestioning objective. The needs of the software user 
and the abilities of the developed software have become separated. Whether this stems from the 
software developers changing the comparison methodology used in the data processing without 
informing the users, or from senior management being unclear as to the requirements of the user 
remain unclear and ill-defined. However, what is clear is that the users in their need for technical 
superiority in a competitive market accepted the anticipated technical advantages of the developed 
software without question. This technical confidence manifested itself, in that no attempt was 
made to run the new software in parallel with the old software. The consequences of such an 
action resulted in cost and time overruns and the possibility of a serious hazard of process failure 
occurring. However, it was still felt that the newer software offered potential benefits and that it 
was a technical advance on previous methods. 
See also: 
CARD 17-UNCERTAINTY IN SEISMIC VELOCITY ESTIMATION 
CARD 20-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL PROCESS CONSTRAINTS 
CARD 22-TECHNICAL ASPECTS CONSTRAIN PROJECT COMPLETION 
CARD 23-PROBLEMS WITH ENSURING QUALITY CONTROL 
CARD 24-FOCUS UPON EVIDENCE OF CASE SUCCESS 
CARD 26-SATISFYING CLIENT OR OWN TECHNICAL EXPERTISE 
TABLE 5.4 CARD-28 NOTES 
CARD 28 
A high technical rationale and quality software have been shown to be critical in successful project 
completion. However, a naive acceptance of unproved technical benefits of untested software can 
be catastrophic. A convergent or selective attention can blind the user and the unforeseen results 
of this blindness can result in hidden problems being generated later. 
EMERGENT-QUESTIONS 
Have you identified all the critical process constraints?, Are you allowing technical aspects to 
constrain the project completion?, Are there any problems with the quality control of the project?, 
Are you focusing to closely on evidence of case success?, Are you satisfying the client or your 
own technical expertise?, Are you sure that software is being used in an appropriate manner?, Is 
the data model inappropriate for software requirements? 
TABLE 5.5 MEMO ASSOCIATED WITH CARD-28 
CARD 28 
There are a number of different meanings associated with Selective attention to technical rationale 
hides potential problems. Firstly, it is often assumed that error recognition and recovery are built 
into any good decision process. However REASON [1990] has suggested that that is incorrect. He 
argues that in any stressful situations, many primeval instincts and physiological reactions come 
into play. For example such instincts and reactions could include (i) encystment, a stress escaping 
activity where the mind concentrates on one detail to the exclusion of others; (ii) a reduction in 
self reflection, coherent plans are reduced and a search for other decision paths is not undertaken, 
this results in a stereotypical response or default; (iii) fortification of an existing decision path 
occurs and the softening of objectives takes place. These instincts and reactions are evident within 
the incidents on CARD 28. For example, clearly a reduced number of possible decision paths were 
considered. Which combined with stressful situation in which the project team found themselves 
may have lead mastery at any price. This in turn may have lead to the ignoring of incorrect or 
incomplete knowledge, resulting in the encystment of the decision path. Secondly, the label 
Selective attention to technical rationale hides potential problems raises the notion of convergent 
and divergent [BLOCKLEY & ROBERTSON, 1983] decision makers. It is suggested that convergent 
thinkers are wary of uncertainty and develop one correct or relatively well determined solution to 
a problem. Whereas, divergent thinkers are more willing to accept uncertainty in conclusions and 
decisions. Consequently divergent decision makers normally avoid thinking with rigid categories. 
Since "engineers have to deal both with precise detailed logical argument (e. g. structural 
analysis) and with problem formulation using vague data (e. g. conceptual design) " [BLOCKLEY & 
ROBERTSON, 1983], then a mixture of both convergent and divergent thinking abilities is required. 
However, BLOCKLEY & ROBERTSON [1983], state that "the majority of engineers are probably 
convergers because the universities tend to select on the basis of performance in science and 
mathematical". They stress that this has significant implications for engineers when confronted 
with problems that have high levels of associated uncertainty. In such a situation having 
developed a convergent and well-determined solution, the engineer may be unable to consider 
alternative solutions to the problem. 
The above suggests that the concept Selective attention to technical rationale hides potential 
problems may now be divided into two separate and distinct labels; 
(i) Stress escaping behaviour (encystment) 
(ii) Narrow point of view (convergence) 
Some reflections on the notion of a selective attention to technical rationale hides potential 
problems; 
(i) Are you allowing technical aspects to constrain the project completion? 
(ii) Are you focusing to closely on evidence of case success? 
connections are a significant function of these emerging processes and hence are 
necessary for the coherence of the resultant process explanation. The result of such 
an analysis as been previously defined as a set of core primitives [PIDGEON, TURNER 
& BLOCKLEY, 19911. These primitives, or sub-processes may be represented 
graphically, thereby illustrating how the sub-processes are connected. The 
grounded methodology provides a documented record of this analysis and thereby 
allows others to trace the derivation of the emergent processes and their 
connections. This also acts as a quality audit, in which others are provided with the 
justification of the knowledge engineer that lies behind the way in which they 
formed the Process model explanation. This is a significant and necessary resource 
for future knowledge engineers. For example, in the depth conversion exercise, the 
domain experts were asked to comment upon the interpretation of the author. In 
the majority of cases the interpretation was deemed appropriate and only in a few 
process definitions and interactions was the emphasis felt to be inappropriate. In 
cases in which the interpretation was considered inappropriate, the concepts were 
re-defined. The author therefore feels, that the generated Process model 
explanations represent a very close goodness-of-fit and that consequently the 
process explanation is a very good description of the actuality of the domain expert's 
experience. 
27. In the example of the depth conversion, the analysis of the interview 
undertaken by the author identified the necessary process definitions and their 
interactions. This is the form of a rich explanation. The graphical representation of 
this form as a Process model explanation may be looked upon as the vocabulary of 
that rich explanation. In the follow sections the subsequent steps from the 
grounded analysis to the representation of the Process model explanation will be 
discussed. The form of the process events and their interactions will be expressed 
as a vocabulary. This vocabulary defined by a Process model algorithm will 
represent a Process model explanation of the decision path taken to resolve a 
particular problem. 
5.4 THE REPRESENTATION OF EMERGENT PROCESSES 
28. In this section, the vocabulary used to represent the emergent processes 
and process interactions (generated from a grounded analysis) will be presented. 
The vocabulary is expressed as a series of sub-processes, modelled using a 
hierarchical Process model algorithm [BLOCKLEY, 1997]. 
29. BALL, FOLEY & DAVIS [1996] have suggested that the representational 
appropriateness of a generated explanation may be defined by the ability of the 
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hierarchical process model in providing an "account of the relationships between 
different levels and an account of how observed hierarchies come to be formed: what 
generates the levels, what separates them and what links them. " One of the 
outcomes of a grounded analysis is the identification of a sequence of events that 
make up a particular process. Some events contribute to the failure of the process, 
while others contribute to the success of the process. These processes are 
"transformed by executing a series of events which contribute towards the state of 
some super-process" [BALL, FOLEY & DAVIS 1996]. BALL, FOLEY & DAvis [1996] have 
identified various component processes that are a necessary part of the PROCESS: 
[defining structure of the reservoir]. These component processes include 
[implementing time-depth conversion], [designing well program] and [analysing 
fluid samples] and are represented in FIGURE 5.1. These PROCESS definitions were 
presented at the first Juniper programme workshop, April 1996 in Bristol [JUNIPER 
DOCUMENT No 5-MR9501/05]. The ideas behind the process model for the 
determination of top structure and oil water contact were discussed. It was felt by 
the domain experts who attended the Workshop that the process model represented 
a dependable explanation of [defining structure of the reservoir]. BALL, FOLEY & 
DAVIS [1996] state that "process descriptions are hierarchical and therefore contain 
sub-processes. " For example, they identified a number of component processes of the 
[defining structure of the reservoir]. One of these sub-processes was [implementing 
time-depth conversion]. See FIGURE 5.1. This event operates as a SUB-PROCESS 
within the overall PROCESS: [defining structure of the reservoir]. However, at 
another level of the process model hierarchy, this event can also operate as a 
PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion]. Therefore, the PROCESS: 
[implementing time-depth conversion] will also be composed of component processes. 
See FIGURE 5.2. FIGURE 5.2 includes [establishing velocity model of the earth] and 
[combining velocity model, seismic time surfaces and well data]. 
30. The notion of event sequences represented by a Process model algorithm 
formed part of the work on the Event Sequence Diagram undertaken by STONE 
[1989). In his work on learning from structural failures, he uses the term event 
sequence diagram "to emphasise the concept of a sequence of discrete events related 
temporally (i. e. in time order) and occurring in a distinct sequence" [STONE, 1989]. 
Similarly a hierarchical Process model explanation also represents "a sequence of 
discrete" temporal events that a grounded analysis has shown to "occur in a distinct 
sequence. " That is, the grounded analysis provided the means by which the 
hierarchical Process model explanation is able to translate a textual account of an 
incident into a graphical representation. This graphical representation clarifies the 
component processes that occur during the completion of the process. The 
hierarchical Process model explanation may be viewed as a process graph. In which 
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overall process and the edges between the nodes represent, (i) the temporal 
connections and (ii) the manner of their interaction. The ideas behind a 
hierarchically organised diagnostic representation of the processes and process 
interactions of a Process model explanation will be discussed in Section 5.6. In the 
following sections, the basic premise of a Process model explanation and the 
algorithm for process building will be introduced. This discussion will conclude 
with a demonstration of how a hierarchical Process model explanation can be used 
to represent a complex chain of events surrounding the [PROCESS: implementing 
time-depth conversion: Tom]. 
5.4.1 THE PREPARATION OF HIERARCHICAL PROCESS MODEL EXPLANATION 
31. The hierarchical Process model explanation of the [PROCESS: implementing 
time-depth conversion: Tom] prepared for this section has certain features. These 
are, (i) the Process model explanation represents a process description and consists 
of nodes and edges; (ii) nodes may be classified as either super-processes, processes 
or sub-processes and each node may have associated attributes; (iii) process 
attributes are organised by a Process model algorithm; (iv) not all of the attributes 
defined by the algorithm will be necessary for a complete process description; (v) 
process attributes are generated from a grounded analysis of the expert testimony; 
(vi) process attributes form a language of commonalties; (vii) each node is connected 
to another node by an edge; (viii) an edge represents either a positive or negative 
interaction (note, this interaction may be viewed as a message that passes between 
nodes); (ix) time is positive towards the right. 
32. Process attributes are organised by a Process model algorithm. This 
algorithm represents a template and is shown in TABLE 5.6 and FIGURE 5.3. A 
PROCESS is defined as a collection of ATTRIBUTES in which INPUT-STATES are 
transformed into OUTPUT-STATES. The first attribute is the PROCESS NAME. 
BLOCKLEY [1997] argues that since this is an activity, then "always name a process 
using the present participle ending in 'ing' because it gives the feel of being active. " 
This activity will require a PROCESS OWNER. It is important to note that the major 
ROLE is always the PROCESS OWNER The PROCESS OWNER will always do two things. 
They will always initiate the PROCESS and they will always terminate the PROCESS. 
The PROCESS OWNER is responsible and accountable for the success of the PROCESS. 
Therefore a ROLE may be looked upon as a collection of RESPONSIBILITIES. 
33. Having defined the ROLES each ROLE is then given (if appropriate), a 
PURPOSE, RESPONSIBILITY, PLAYER and a POINT-OF-VIEW. For example, ROLE [A] could 
be [to establish velocity model of the earth] (see FIGURE 5.2). ROLE [A] may have a 
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TABLE 5.6 PROCESS MODEL ALGORITHM [BLOCKLEY, 1997] 
1. Name the PROCESS 
2. Name the ROLES. Define the overall PURPOSE (Vision) and define each role as a set of 
RESPONSIBILITIES; include the PROCESS OWNER role. For a product or artefact the role is its 
FUNCTION. 
3. Identify the PLAYER (Actor) for each role. Remember a player takes an active part in the 
process and can be a person with more than one role or an object with attributed roles 
(usually by the designer or user of the object). 
4. Identify the CLIENT and the STAKEHOLDERS. 
5. Be clear about the POINT OF VIEW of each player, stakeholder and client. 
6. Identify the BEGINNING and END of the process. 
7. Identify what is to be part of the model of the process and what is to be in the ENVIRONMENT 
(meta-system). 
8. Identify the CURRENT STATE description. 
9. Identify the OBJECTIVES which are to reach a DESIRED STATE description. 
10. Identify SUCCESS as reaching objectives and avoiding failure. 
11. Identify the INPUTS expected and the OUTPUTS required, the CONTROLS and CONSTRAINTS. 
12. Identify the MODEL that TRANSFORMS the current state to the desired state (i. e. to obtain 
success and avoid failure). 
13. Identify the various SCENARIOS that result from the model of those transformations and 
PREDICT the CONSEQUENCES. 
14. Identify the HAZARDS, consider the RISKS and the ROBUSTNESS (vulnerability) of the 
processes. 
15. Associate measures of EVIDENCE with 14. 
16. Identify RESOURCES required for the process. 
17. Identify the roles to be DELEGATED as SUB-PROCESSES in 2. 
18. Identify the transformations to be DETAILED as sub-processes in 12 and develop the next 
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PURPOSE and a collection of RESPONSIBILITIES associated with [to establish velocity 
model of the earth]. The PLAYER is the individual that occupies that ROLE. For 
example, if ROLE [to establish velocity model of the earth] is occupied by the PLAYER 
[petroleum engineer] then this may be represented as ATTRIBUTES: [ROLE: to 
establish velocity model of the earth, PLAYER: petroleum engineer]. This acts as a 
two-place marker. One is the ROLE and the other is the name of the PLAYER of that 
ROLE. Each PLAYER acts out each ROLE and takes an active part in the PROCESS and 
can be a person with more than one ROLE. A PLAYER can also be an object with 
attributed ROLES. BLOCKLEY [19971 states that "there are two types of players, those 
that have intention (i. e. people) and those that do not (i. e. artefacts and systems of 
artefacts). " He goes on to say that "intention is the feature by which states are 
directed at or are about players other than themselves. " and "designed artefacts have 
an intention ascribed to them by the players (designers and users). " In this sense, 
the intention ascribed to artefacts could be a restricted ROLE or a set of defined 
functions. BLOCKLEY [1997] suggests that "for a product or artefact the role is its 
function" and that this "functionality derives from the process in which the artefact 
is a player. " 
34. Further, one PROCESS may be responsible and accountable to another 
PROCESS. For example, a PROCESS OWNER may devolve responsibility to a SUB- 
PROCESS OWNER and the SUB-PROCESS OWNER will be held accountable to a PROCESS 
OWNER PROCESSES will pass information to another PROCESSES. Information could 
be defined as INPUT-STATES and OUTPUT-STATES. For example, the OUTPUT-STATE 
from one PROCESS may be the INPUT-STATE at another PROCESS. Note, in some 
situations the BEGIN STATES of the PROCESS may represent INPUT-STATES from 
another PROCESS. Consequently, these INPUT-STATES may be the END STATE of 
another PROCESS. 
35. The STATES are concerned with INPUTS, BEGIN STATES, OUTPUTS, END 
STATES, CURRENT STATES, SCENARIOS, TRANSFORMATIONS and OBJECTIVES in that 
they must reflect the STATE of the PROCESS. One test would be to ensure that the 
INPUTS, BEGIN STATES, OUTPUTS, END STATES, CURRENT STATES, SCENARIOS, 
TRANSFORMATIONS and OBJECTIVES of the PROCESS are all STATE descriptions. For 
example, [budget] and [time] may both have a STATE description. The BEGIN STATE 
description for [time] may be zero. As the PROCESS undergoes a TRANSFORMATION 
then that [time] value will also change. One of the OBJECTIVES may be that [time] at 
the END STATE does not overrun the INPUT-STATE description of [allowed-time]. 
36. For a PROCESS to achieve OBJECTIVES, then some STATES will need to 
undergo a TRANSFORMATION. BLOCKLEY [1997] states that the "success of the 
process is the controlled transformation of the input state (information) to the output 
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state (information) or required objectives. " At any point in time during the PROCESS 
a model of the transformation may be used to generate a set of alternative 
SCENARIOS for the future. See FIGURE 5.4. RISKS are the probability that a given 
SCENARIO will result in a given type of negative or harmful CONSEQUENCE. 
However, while some SCENARIOS may normally be considered to be RISKS leading to 
negative CONSEQUENCES some may be SCENARIOS leading to positive 
CONSEQUENCES. Positive CONSEQUENCES may be viewed as OPPORTUNITIES, 
whereas negative CONSEQUENCES may be viewed as FAILURES. Thus a distinction 
can be made between negative SCENARIOS and positive SCENARIOS and HAZARDS that 
are pre-conditions to a FAILURE. 
37. A PROCESS may have a sequence of events leading to a negative SCENARIO. 
In classical probability, a risk analysis will attempt to fit a probability on each event 
and thereby generating a total probability of a negative SCENARIO occurring. 
Therefore, RISKS can be defined as a product of the probability of occurrence and the 
consequence of that occurrence in a stated context. It may also be looked upon as 
identifying those events and predicting the negative CONSEQUENCES of those events. 
Consider the representation of the case history in FIGURE 5.4. Figure 5.4 represents 
a capacity of the project to fail. Through-out the history of this project, this capacity 
has grown and diminished until the project reached the present W. This past 
capacity may be viewed as EVIDENCE of proneness-to-failure and the future capacity 
may be defined as a predictions of HAZARDS and OPPORTUNITIES. Since the future 
remains unsure, then the potential OPPORTUNITIES or HAZARDS of the project are 
uncertain. In FIGURE 5.4 the project is matched against a memory of previous case- 
histories. This matching may generate one potential future or many potential 
futures. Associated with each of those potential futures are evidential measures of 
the proneness-to-failure (or HAZARD content) that each previous case history 
suffered. The success or failure (or somewhere in-between) of those futures are 
dependent upon the SUGGESTIONS of the management teams and the actions that 
resulted from those SUGGESTIONS. The outcome that results from using those 
potential futures may rely on initiating similar actions. 
38. Evidential measures of negative and positive CONSEQUENCES can be used 
to define the ROBUSTNESS of a project. ROBUSTNESS is concerned with the 
vulnerability of the system. ROBUSTNESS is concerned with the ability of a system 
to deal with damage. If the system fails in a manner disproportionate to the 
damage causing it, then it is vulnerable and not robust. It will have a low 
ROBUSTNESS measure. 
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5.5 BUILDING A HIERARCHICAL PROCESS MODEL EXPLANATION 
39. A Process model algorithm [BLOCKLEY, 19971 for defining a Process model 
explanation has been shown in TABLE 5.6 and FIGURE 5.3. This algorithm provides 
a descriptive vocabulary of a project organisation or experience. It attempts to 
transform the "swampy lowland" of "messy, confusing problems" [SCHON, 1987] and 
ill-defined into a formalised internal representation suitable for machine storage. 
The algorithm helps the knowledge engineer to build a representative Process model 
explanation by describing the processes and process-interactions generated from 
the grounded analysis. TABLE 5.7 shows a completed Process model explanation of 
the [PROCESS: implementing time-depth conversion: Tom]. FIGURE 5.5 shows such 
an explanation, represented as a hierarchical model of processes and process 
interactions with ROLES, PLAYERS and SCENARIOS. 
40. Row 1 in TABLE 5.7 assigns a name to the PROCESS, in this case [PROCESS: 
implementing time-depth conversion: Tom]. Row 2 associates a ROLE and PROCESS 
OWNER with the statement, 
[ROLE 1: <role definitionl>, PROCESS OWNER: <process owners name>, 
RESPONSIBILITY: <responsibility definition>, SUB-PROCESS 1: <namel>, SUB-PROCESS 
2: <name2>] 
41. This can be seen in the following, [ROLE 1: <to oversee PROCESS>, PROCESS 
OWNER: <principal geophysicist>, RESPONSIBILITY: <to receive INPUTS from CLIENTS 
& initiate PROCESS by sending INPUTS to PLAYER 1>; <to receive OUTPUTS from 
PLAYER 1& terminate PROCESS by sending OUTPUTS to CLIENTS>, SUB-PROCESS 1: 
<receiving INPUTS from CLIENTS & sending INPUTS to PLAYER 1>, SUB-PROCESS 9: 
<receiving OUTPUTS from PLAYER 1& sending OUTPUTS to CLIENTS>]. This 
statement makes it clear that, (i) the PROCESS OWNER is a [principal geophysicist]; 
(ii) the PROCESS OWNER manages the [PROCESS: implementing time-depth 
conversion: Tom] by ROLE 1; (iii) ROLE 1 is [to oversee PROCESS]; (iv) that the PROCESS 
OWNER has two RESPONSIBILITIES; (v) these are [to receive INPUTS from CLIENTS & 
initiate PROCESS by sending INPUTS to PLAYER 11 and [to receive OUTPUTS from 
PLAYER 1& terminate PROCESS by sending OUTPUTS to CLIENTS]; (vi) the PROCESS 
OWNER BEGINS and ENDS a PROCESS, then [SUB-PROCESS 1: receiving INPUTS from 
CLIENTS & sending INPUTS to PLAYER 1] initiates the [PROCESS: implementing time- 
depth conversion: Tom] and; (vii) [SUB-PROCESS 9: receiving OUTPUTS from PLAYER 1 
& sending OUTPUTS to CLIENTS] terminates the [PROCESS: implementing time-depth 
conversion: Tom]. This is represented in FIGURE 5.6. 
42. Row 3 associates a ROLE and PLAYER with the statement, 
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TABLE 5.7 PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM]. 
I. [PROCESS: implementing time-depth conversion: Tom] 
2. [ROLE 1: <to oversee PROCESS>, PROCESS OWNER: <principal geophysicist>, RESPONSIBILITY: 
<to receive INPUTS from CLIENTS & initiate PROCESS by sending INPUTS to PLAYER 1>; <to 
receive OUTPUTS from PLAYER 1& terminate PROCESS by sending OUTPUTS to CLIENTS>, SUB- 
PROCESS 1: <receiving INPUTS from CLIENTS & sending INPUTS to PLAYER 1>, SUB-PROCESS 9: 
<receiving OUTPUTS from PLAYER 1& sending OUTPUTS to CLIENTS>] 
3. [ROLE 2: <to receive INPUTS & send OUTPUTS>, PLAYER 1: <senior geophysicist>, SUB- 
PROCESS 2: <receiving INPUTS from PROCESS OWNER>, SUB-PROCESS 8: <sending OUTPUTS to 
PROCESS OWNER] 
[ROLE 3: <to load seismic data>, PLAYER 2: <geophysicist>, SUB-PROCESS 3: <loading seismic 
data>] 
[ROLE 4: <to establish geo-statistical model from stacking & interval velocities>, PLAYER 2: 
<geophysicist>, SUB-PROCESS 4: <establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking 
velocities>] 
[ROLE 4: <to establish geo-statistical model from stacking & interval velocities>, PLAYER 2: 
<geophysicist>, SUB-PROCESS 5: <establishing geo-statistical model for interval velocities>] 
[ROLE 5: <to define correlation between predicted seismic velocities & well velocities>, 
PLAYER 2: <geophysicist>, SUB-PROCESS 6: <using geo-statistical model to predict velocity at 
well location>] 
[ROLE 6: <to combine seismic interval velocity & well data>, PLAYER 2: <geophysicist>, SUB- 
PROCESS 7: <establishing velocity model>] 
[ROLE 7: <to define depth map of top reservoir>, PLAYER 2: <geophysicist>, SUB-PROCESS 8: 
<combining velocity model & time interpretation>] 
[ROLE 8: <to define reservoir volumetrics>, PLAYER 2: <senior geophysicist>, SUB-PROCESS 9: 
<producing depth map & volumetric calculations>] 
4. [CLIENTS: <senior management>] 
[STAKE-HOLDERS: <field owners>] 
5. [POINT OF VIEW: <proneness to failure>] 
6. [BEGIN STATE 1: <budget is known>] 
[BEGIN STATE 2: <completion date is known>] 
[BEGIN STATE 3: <time interpretations are known>] 
[BEGIN STATE 4: <well data is known> ] 
[END STATE 1: <PROCESS will undergo TRANSFORMATIONS>] 
[END STATE 3: PROCESS will meet all OBJECTIVES>] 
7. [INPUTS: <time interpretations are known, well data is known>] 
[OUTPUTS: <as defined by OBJECTIVES>] 
[CONTROLS: <as defined by TRANSFORMATIONS>] 
[CONSTRAINTS: <budget is known, completion date is known> ] 
8. [ENVIRONMENT: <CLIENTS, STAKE-HOLDERS>] 
9. [CURRENT STATES: <CLIENTS have OBJECTIVES>, OBJECTIVE 1: <generate best estimate of depth 
to reservoir>, OBJECTIVE 2: <ensure depth values are appropriate for defining structure of 
reservoir>, OBJECTIVE 3: <quantify uncertainty of depth map> ] 
10. [SUCCESS: <of CURRENT STATES is given by EVIDENCE>, EVIDENCE: <as defined by NECESSARY 
EVIDENCE & POSSIBLE EVIDENCE] 
11. [TRANSFORMATION: <BEGIN STATES to END STATES>, SUB-PROCESS 3: <loading seismic data>, 
SUB-PROCESS 4: <establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities>, SUB- 
PROCESS 5: <establishing geo-statistical model for interval velocity>, SUB-PROCESS 6: <using 
geo-statistical model to predict velocity at well location> , SUB-PROCESS 7: <establishing 
velocity model>, SUB-PROCESS 8: <combining velocity model & time interpretations>, SUB- 
PROCESS 9: <producing depth map & volumetric calculations>] 
12. [SCENARIO 1: <software unable to perform specific geo-statistical computations> , SUB- 
PROCESS 6: <using geo-statistical model to predict velocity at well location> , SUB-PROCESS 
7: 
<establishing velocity model>, CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOME 1: <project suffered time delay and 
cost overruns>, HAZARD 1: <selective attention to technical rationale hides potential 
problems>] 
13. [NECESSARY EVIDENCE: [] 
[POSSIBLE EVIDENCE: [] 
14. [PROCESS: <implementing time-depth conversion: Tom>, SUB-PROCESS 3: <loading seismic 
data>, SUB-PROCESS 4: <establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities>, 
SUB-PROCESS 5: <establishing geo-statistical model for interval velocity>, SUB-PROCESS 6: 
<using geo-statistical model to predict velocity at well location> , SUB-PROCESS 
7: 
<establishing velocity model>, SUB-PROCESS 8: <combining velocity model & time 
interpretations>, SUB-PROCESS 9: <producing depth map & volumetric calculations>] 
15. [EVIDENCE: <there is no indication that consequences of SCENARIO seriously damages 
PROCESS>, CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOME 1: <project suffered time delay & cost overruns>, 
HAZARD 1: <selective attention to technical rationale hides potential problems> , REFLECTION 
1: <a concentration on the technical benefits of software may compromise project> ] 
[REFLECTION 1: <a concentration on the technical benefits of software may compromise 
project>, SUGGESTION 1: <are the software requirements compatible with project 
requirements? >, SUGGESTION 2: <are you considering a `contrast and compare exercise' 
between original & new software? >] 
[SUGGESTION 1: <are the software requirements compatible with project requirements? >, NEW 
OUTCOME 1: <a closer understanding between software and project requirements may result in 
fewer problems>] 
[SUGGESTION 2: <are you considering a `contrast and compare exercise' between original & 


























































[ROLE 2: <role definition2>, PLAYER 1: <players namel>, RESPONSIBILITY: 
<responsibility definition>, SUB-PROCESS 1: <namel>, SUB-PROCESS 2: <name2>] 
43. For example, the statement [ROLE 2: <to receive INPUTS & send OUTPUTS>, 
PLAYER 1: <senior geophysicist>, RESPONSIBILITY: receiving INPUTS and sending 
OUTPUTS>, SUB-PROCESS 1: <receiving INPUTS from PROCESS OWNER>, SUB-PROCESS 
7: <sending OUTPUTS to PROCESS OWNER>] can be broken down as follows, (i) PLAYER 
1 is a [senior geophysicist]; (ii) PLAYER 1 is responsible for the [PROCESS: 
implementing time-depth conversion: Tom] with ROLE 2; (iii) ROLE 2 is [to receive 
INPUTS & send OUTPUTS]; (vi) SUB-PROCESS 2 and SUB-PROCESS 8 are assigned to 
PLAYER 1; (v) SUB-PROCESS 2 is [receiving INPUTS from PROCESS OWNER] and; (vi) 
SUB-PROCESS 8 is [sending OUTPUTS to PROCESS OWNER]. In this manner the basic 
outline of the process description is transformed into a Process model explanation of 
the situation. This is represented in FIGURE 5.7. 
44. Row 9 associates a CURRENT STATE and OBJECTIVES with the statement, 
[CURRENT STATE: <definition>, OBJECTIVE 1: <objectivel definition>, OBJECTIVE 2: 
<objective2 definition>, OBJECTIVE 3: <objective3 definition>] 
45. For example, the statement [CURRENT STATE: <CLIENTS have OBJECTIVES>, 
OBJECTIVE 1: <generate best estimate of depth to reservoir>, OBJECTIVE 2: <ensure 
depth values are appropriate for defining structure of reservoir>, OBJECTIVE 3: 
<quantify uncertainty of depth map>] may be defined as follows, (i) a CURRENT 
STATE is where the CLIENTS have the OBJECTIVES of the PROCESS; (ii) the PROCESS 
has three OBJECTIVES; (iii) these are [generate best estimate of depth to reservoir, 
ensure depth values are appropriate for defining structure of reservoir, quantify 
uncertainty of depth map]. Section 10 states that the SUCCESS of a PROCESS as 
defined by the CURRENT STATES is governed by NECESSARY EVIDENCE and POSSIBLE 
EVIDENCE. Section 11 identifies the SUB-PROCESSES needed for the 
TRANSFORMATION of the BEGIN STATES to the END STATES. 
46. Row 12 identifies a SCENARIO that can be assigned to the [PROCESS: 
implementing time-depth conversion: Tom], 
[SCENARIO 1: <scenariol definition>, SUB-PROCESS 5: <name5>, SUB-PROCESS 6: 
<name6>, CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOME 1: <consequential outcomel definition>, 
HAZARD 1: <hazard1 definition>] 
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specific geo-statistical computations>, SUB-PROCESS 5: <predicting velocity at well 
location using new software>, SUB-PROCESS 6: <establishing velocity model>, 
CONSEQUENCE OUTCOME 1: <project suffered time delay and cost overruns>, HAZARD 
1: selective attention to technical rationale hides potential problems] may be defined 
as follows, (i) SCENARIO 1 is classified as [new software unable to perform specific 
geo-statistical computations]; (ii) this SCENARIO acts between SUB-PROCESS 5 and 
SUB-PROCESS 6; (iii) the CONSEQUENCE of this SCENARIO is that [project suffered time 
delay and cost overruns] and; (iv) the identified HAZARD is [selective attention to 
technical rationale hides potential problems]. This is represented in the FIGURE 5.8. 
FIGURE 5.8 may be looked upon as the actuality window. The actuality window 
indicates a sequence of positive and negative interactions and their associated SUB- 
PROCESSES that contributed to the [PROCESS: implementing time-depth conversion: 
Tom]. In this example a sequence of negative interactions defines a negative 
SCENARIO that leads to a negative CONSEQUENCE. Behind this CONSEQUENCE is the 
HAZARD that the [PROCESS: implementing time-depth conversion: Tom] could suffer. 
48. Row 13 assigns a degree of evidential measure to the affects of 
[CONSEQUENCE 1: project suffered time delay and cost overrun] on the [PROCESS: 
implementing time-depth conversion: Tom] by the statements, [NECESSARY 
EVIDENCE: ] and [POSSIBLE EVIDENCE: ]. This is highlighted again in Row 15, in 
which REFLECTIONS on the [PROCESS: implementing time-depth conversion: Tom] are 
defined by the following, 
[EVIDENCE: <evidence definition>, CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOME 1: <consequential 
outcome1 definition>, HAZARD 1: <hazard1 definition>, REFLECTION 1: <reflectionl 
definition>] 
49. For example, the statement [EVIDENCE: <there is no indication that 
consequences of SCENARIO seriously damages PROCESS>, CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOME 
1: <project suffered time delay & cost overruns>, HAZARD 1: <selective attention to 
technical rationale hides potential problems>, reflection 1: <a concentration on the 
technical benefits of software may compromise project>], (i) associates a degree of 
EVIDENCE with a particular CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOME; (ii) links the CONSEQUENTIAL 
OUTCOME of the SCENARIO with the HAZARD [selective attention to technical rationale 
hides potential problems] and the potential REFLECTION; (iii) this REFLECTION is [a 
concentration on the technical benefits of software may compromise project]. This 
leads to the following statement, (i) [REFLECTION 1: a concentration on the technical 
benefits of software may compromise project, SUGGESTION 1: are the software 
requirements compatible with project requirements?, SUGGESTION 2: are you 
considering a `compare and contrast exercise' between original & new software? ]. 
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SUGGESTIONS as defined by the HAZARD. Also included is the short memo on the 
HAZARD: [selective attention to technical rational hides potential problems]. This is 
represented in FIGURE 5.9. 
50. FIGURE 5.9 represents the REFLECTION-WINDOW of the [process: 
implementing time-depth conversion: Tom]. This window highlights the 
REFLECTIONS, SUGGESTIONS and possible NEW OUTCOME of the modified PROCESS. 
Included in the REFLECTION-WINDOW are the notes and emergent questions that will 
need to be considered to successfully manage a similar negative SCENARIO away. 
The window indicates the possible NEW OUTCOMES as defined by the success of the 
SUGGESTIONS. 
51. In the [PROCESS: implementing time-depth conversion: Tom] a sequence of 
negative interactions have lead to a negative SCENARIO which in turn has lead to a 
negative CONSEQUENCE. Along with this CONSEQUENCE are the HAZARDS that the 
PROCESS could have suffered. For example, a HAZARD may be associated with a 
SCENARIO that interacts between SUB-PROCESS 5 and SUB-PROCESS 6. This is defined 
by the following two statements; (i) [SCENARIO 1: new software unable to perform 
specific geo-statistical computations, SUB-PROCESS 5: predicting velocity at well 
location using new software, SUB-PROCESS 6: establishing velocity model, 
CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOME 1: project suffered time delay and cost overruns] and, (ii) 
[SCENARIO 1: new software unable to perform specific geo-statistical computations, 
HAZARD 1: selective attention to technical rationale hides potential problems, 
reflection 1: a concentration on the technical benefits of software may compromise 
project]. These statements, link the HAZARD to SCENARIO, which in turn is defined 
by [SUB-PROCESS 5: predicting velocity at well location using new software] and 
[SUB-PROCESS 6: establishing velocity model] If these conditions can be recognised 
in another [PROCESS: implementing time-depth conversion: Dick], then the decision 
memory could indicate that a similar HAZARD may be approaching that PROCESS. 
5.6 ANTICIPATING FAILURES & PREDICTING OUTCOMES 
52. In Chapter 4 the problems associated with induction were discussed. It 
was concluded that since the result of an inductive inference cannot be proved 
logically true, then the truth could not be a criteria of appropriateness. Instead, 
inferences should be defined by their dependability [BLOCKLEY, 19801. It was 
suggested that this dependability is a function of the grounding of a proneness to 
failure (or the hazard content) associated with a particular experience. In this 
respect the Process model explanation is a description of why a particular failure 
condition has occurred. It is an explanation of what the PROCESS was trying to 
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FIGURE 5.9 REFLECTION WINDOW OF PROCESS: [TOM] 
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accomplish at the point of failure. In the Reflective Process memory this hazard 
capacity is stored within the Process model explanation of the case structure. The 
recognition of a similar explanation reminds the system of previous failure 
conditions. This reminding also recalls reflections on what should have been done 
to remove those failure conditions. This explanation-driven decision making may be 
viewed as prognostic. In which, the results of matching events from the potentiality 
of a process behaving normally to a sequence of failure events from the actuality of a 
process behaving abnormally, can be used to make decisions about the possible 
outcome of the normal process. 
53. The notion of recognising specific failure events from which an inference of 
a potential hazard can be produced is not new. This technique forms the foundation 
of current medical practice. For example, when a patient describes their condition, 
the medic will use that description to make some diagnosis. From that description 
the medic will select those aspects of the description that he/she considers 
predictive of the problem and from which a prognoses of a possible outcome will be 
developed. HAMMOND [1990] has proposed a similar methodology in which previous 
failures are used to anticipate possible solutions. However, HAMMOND'S 
methodology is based on the premise of "associating failures with the surface 
features predicting them" [HAMMOND, 19901. A distinction can be made between 
surface features based on data centric inputs and deep features based on process 
centric inputs. As WATSON [1997] has argued, case-based reasoning has been very 
successful in the domain of customer help desks. This success is based on the 
implementation of simple case representations [WATSON, 19971. These 
representations "will usually be flat file structures based on relational data-based 
technology" [WATSON, 1997]. This flat file format assigns a measure of case 
usefulness as defined by a degree of similarity [HAMMOND, 1989; KOLODNER & 
MARK, 1992; HENNESSY & HINKLE, 1992; PEARCE ET AL, 1992; WATSON & MARRIR, 
1994 and WATSON, 19971. This view of similarity is governed by the shared data 
attributes of that format. Thus similarity measures using surface features view 
input-states as data-driven and pre-determined. These data centric similarity 
measures can be seen as static inputs that sometimes generate non-relevant 
selections [DUTTA & BONISSONE, 1993]. This suggests that surface level features 
are only appropriate for the selection of simplistic, surface level representations. 
However, in the mess of uncertainty, problem solving or decisions making consists of 
knowledge that is of a more imprecise, fuzzy and ambiguous nature. In this respect 
uncertainty is not only a function of the uncertainty within the data, it is also a 
function of the uncertainty within the manner of its collection. Therefore, just as 
individuals within this domain construct complex and highly contextual 
explanations when deriving solutions [DUNCAN, 1987], then the case 
representations of that solution should be enhanced [BARR & MAGALDI, 1996]. BARR 
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& MAGALDI [1996] have suggested that this requires "a fundamentally new 
knowledge management technology infrastructure not currently met by conventional 
data-focused systems". 
54. A central premise of this thesis is that processes and process interactions 
are the media through which meaning and understanding are developed. These 
processes are active agents in constructing an experience of the past and present 
and may help in deciding about the future. It has been argued that a richer and 
hence deeper contextual explanation will be developed from interactive processes 
and emergent properties. Some of these emergent properties may represent the 
reasons behind a problem-solution failure and may be used in deriving explanations 
that are more relevant to the particular problem under consideration. 
55. It is hypothesised, (i) that the totality of the process attributes are 
necessary for the overall success of the process; (ii) whereas it is the manner of the 
connection between these process attributes that may well contribute to the failure 
of the process. This approach views the assessment of relevance as a function of 
interacting processes. These connections may have emergent failure-conditions 
that could be used by the Reflective Process memory to predict the possible failure of 
the process. These have previously been defined as incubating hazards [TURNER, 
1978: 19971 and pathogens [RASMUSSEN, 1983]. In this thesis they are defined as 
negative predictives. These pivotal connections could be used by the Reflective 
Process memory to recall an experience while not identical will have more relevance 
to the user. In this respect, the relevance of a solution may be defined by its ability 
in helping a decision maker to anticipate potential failures within the proposed 
decision path. Consequently, a similar-and-successful solution may be less useful to 
the decision maker, than a similar-but-failed solution. Especially, when a similar- 
but-failed solution can (i) explain how a similar solution suffered from that failure- 
condition and; (ii) provide reflections on the why, where and when aspects of that 
condition. This usefulness is a function of the failure-explanation and the emergent- 
question aspects of the similar-but-failed solution. 
56. A measure of usefulness based on knowledge of previous failure behaviour 
relies on representing the failure behaviour using an explicit process explanation of 
that behaviour. Explaining the reasons behind a previous failure condition, allows 
the identification of similar observable failure conditions. The possible outcome of 
the identified failure condition and the results of that outcome can be used to modify 
the current decision strategy. A case that has failed or nearly failed will have 
negative SCENARIOS, negative CONSEQUENCES and HAZARDS and associated 
emergent questions attached to it. It will also include REFLECTIONS and 
SUGGESTIONS on, (i) why the case failed; (ii) which questions needed to be initially 
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asked; (iii) what modification are necessary to manage that failure condition and 
(iv) how the failure event is indexed by process attributes. In some respects this 
knowledge represents a SWOT (Strengths, weakness, opportunities and Threats) 
analysis of that particular case. The SCENARIOS, CONSEQUENCES, HAZARDS, 
REFLECTIONS and SUGGESTIONS represent the Strengths and weakness of the case 
and the Threats that act upon the case. The use of this knowledge may be looked 
upon as an OPPORTUNITY 
57. At the diagnostic level, the Reflective Process memory will use a Process 
Model explanation to explain, how, when, where and why the failure condition 
occurred. It will also use the Process model explanation to explain what 
modifications were necessary to manage that failure condition and which questions 
should have been asked to minimise the occurrence of that failure condition. The 
Reflective Process memory will make use of Process model explanations it has for the 
problem to act as the reasons behind the how, when, where and why a failure has 
occurred. The Process model explanation would described, (i) the STATES that 
defined the failure; (ii) the PROCESS OWNER, PLAYERS and ROLES that initiated the 
failure; (iii) the CONTROLS and CONSTRAINTS that allowed the failure to be initiated. 
In some respects this explanation may be looked upon as answers to specific 
questions. Questions of why a particular failure has occurred. The answering of 
these questions in future projects could act as an indication of the dependability of 
the proposed decision path. The diagnostic use of these Process model explanations 
could lead to the anticipation of potential HAZARDS in future projects through the 
identification of relevant questions that perhaps should have been asked at the time 
but in fact were not. 
58. At the prognostic level, these reasons may be marked as negative- 
predictives. Note, these negative-predictives could be composed of predictive- 
processes and predictive-interactions. Predictive-processes may be looked upon as 
specific predictives associated with a specific failure-condition, whereas predictive- 
interactions may be specific process-interactions that are associated with a specific 
hazardous-event-sequence. At this level the Reflective Process memory could use the 
negative-predictives that result from a Process model explanation to predict the NEW 
OUTCOME of a modified Process model explanation. For example, if a SCENARIO is 
indexed by the negative-predictives that originally caused it, then when those 
negative-predictives are recognised in the current Process model explanation the 
Reflective Process memory can use those negative-predictives to identify that 
SCENARIO. Having identified the SCENARIO the Reflective Process memory could 
inform the user of the problem that is associated with the current Process model 
explanation. At this point the user could use the REFLECTIONS and SUGGESTIONS 
associated with the SCENARIO to re-define the Process model explanation of the 
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current situation and thereby manage the failure condition away. Attached to the 
REFLECTIONS and SUGGESTIONS is a NEW OUTCOME. Since this NEW OUTCOME is the 
result of a previous Process model explanation, then evidence of previous similar 
situations could be added to judgements about the present situation and future 
projections to form a measure of dependability associated with the NEW OUTCOME. 
59. In some respects, the Reflective Process memory parallels POPPER'S [1972] 
ideas on conjectures and the falsification of those conjectures. A current Process 
Model explanation may be viewed as a hypothesis surrounding a particular decision 
problem. The use of negative-predictives and emergent-questions in identifying 
problems within that hypothesis is an attempt to refute that hypothesis. This 
attempt at falsifying the hypothesis and the consequences of that falsification; 
namely the modification of that decision path may be used as a measure of 
justification and ultimately dependability in the NEW OUTCOME. 
60. The whole approach is built around the idea of a dynamic constantly 
evolving reflective learning process. The nature of reflection in decision making 
considers decision building a process that tests and rationalises the decision makers 
understanding of the external world. Decision failures (or near misses) enable a 
Reflective Process memory, through human reflection, to learn more about the 
causes of those failures (or near misses). Consequently, the Reflective Process 
Memory develops a better understanding of how to anticipate failures in the future. 
This model of decision building views learning as a reflective process that acts on 
the relationship between previous decisions, (i) an analysis of how those decisions 
actually performed and; (ii) the incorporation of new experiences into the decision 
memory. This approach attempts to qualitatively maximises the usefulness of the 
decision to the user, rather than quantitatively maximises the number of similar 
surface level input-states. 
61. However, this requires the decision memory, (i) to structure the 
relationships between cases and parts of cases as processes and process 
interactions; (ii) to be able to represent those processes and process interactions of 
the decision problem; (iii) to index those negative-predictives; (vi) to identify the 
process knowledge of experiences that are indexed by these negative-predictives. 
The structure and representation of those cases as Process model explanations have 
been discussed in this chapter. The indexing and identification of those Process 
Model explanations will be discussed in Chapter 6. Central to this discussion, is the 
idea that the Reflective Process Memory needs two kinds of knowledge. Firstly, an 
index of these negative-predictives and secondly, a process hierarchy that 
selectively discriminates between those negative-predictives. It is suggested that 
the Reflective Process memory could use a discrimination function as defined by a 
105 
connectivity measure. This connectivity measure will use the negative-predictives 
to discriminate through the CASE-MEMORY and decide the overall order of the 
competing decision paths. 
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5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
" The form and vocabulary of a case explanation have been outlined in this 
Chapter. The form (as defined through the grounded theory analysis), of the case 
explanation may be viewed as a Process model and represented as a series of 
processes and process-interactions. The vocabulary of the Process model 
explanation is defined by a Process model algorithm. 
"A grounded methodology generates a causal analysis of a problem and provides 
the means of defining those aspects of a situation that are responsible for causing 
a particular problem. These aspects may be categorised by a Reflective Process 
Memory as predictive of a problem. A Reflective Process Memory could create an 
index of predictives that are associated with previous failure conditions. The 
recognition of predictives in a Process model explanation of a current decision 
problem may help a Reflective Process memory to identify the occurrence of 
associated failure conditions. 
" Process model explanations that are recalled, (i) could provide the user with 
relevant reflections and actions on how, when, where and why a problem has 
previously occurred; (ii) could point out to the user which aspects are responsible 
for the problem; (iii) could suggest to the user relevant questions that were 
needed to be asked (but were not), during the initial decision building phase of 
the recalled process. 
" The user could use those recalled Process model explanation to modify the Process 
Model explanation of the current situation. 
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6. TOWARDS A CASE-BASED REFLECTIVE PROCESS 
MEMORY 
6.1 OBJECTIVES 
" To describe the methodology behind the concepts of discrimination and 
connectivity to be used in the retrieval of Process model explanations. 
" To present an example demonstrating the discrimination and connectivity 
methodology. 
" To explore the idea of case usefulness as the relevance of the case history to the 
user. 
6.2 INTRODUCTION 
1. The reflective Process Memory (RPM) may be conceived as a formal language. 
Formalisation requires a definition of the form or arrangement. Form is a generic 
principle holding together the elements of the RPM. These elements consist of a 
vocabulary and a grammar. In Chapter 5, the vocabulary of the RPM was expressed 
as a Process Model explanations (PMX). In this Chapter the issue of the grammar or 
organisational structure of the RPM will be addressed. The organisational structure 
of the RPM is closely related to (i) the indexing of; (ii) the matching of and; (iii) the 
comparison and selection of relevant Process model explanations. 
2. In Chapter 4, the idea that Process model explanations, defined as a series of 
emergent processes and process-interactions, generated from a grounded analysis 
was introduced. It was hypothesised that some of these processes and process 
interactions have a benign effect on the outcome of the decision path and some of 
these processes and process interactions have a malign effect on the outcome of the 
decision path. It is proposed that most-relevant may be defined by the usefulness 
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of the RPM in helping the decision-maker to recognise and understand how previous 
malignant process-interactions affected the outcome of similar decision problems. 
3. In section 6.3, it is suggested that a RPM can use an index of those malignant 
processes and process-interactions to identify those attributes of the problem input 
that have a proneness to failure and hence retrieve from the CASE-MEMORY the 
most-relevant Process model explanation. In section 6.4, a formal methodology that 
discriminates between stored Process model explanations, as defined by a measure 
of connectivity that exists between those malignant attributes is introduced. In 
section 6.5 an example of the discrimination and connectivity methodology will be 
presented. 
6.3 RETRIEVAL AS A FUNCTION OF DISCRIMINATION 
4. The organisational structure of a Reflective Process Memory must ensure that 
relevant Process model explanations are found and selected for a given problem. 
The efficient retrieval of relevant Process model explanations is related to the 
indexing, matching and selection of those Process model explanations. The 
retrieval mechanism is responsible for, (i) generating the necessary search details 
from the problem INPUT-STATES; (ii) searching the CASE-MEMORY for relevant 
patterns; (iii) ranking the returned Process model explanations as being more or 
less relevant for the given problem. 
6.3.1 INDEXING AS IDENTIFYING 
5. An index may be viewed as a list or guide. In this respect, indices may be 
viewed as pointers that assist the RPM in comparing Process model explanations and 
guide the RPM in choosing the most-relevant Process model explanation. 
Consequently, the retrieval of relevant Process model explanations are dependent 
upon the effectiveness of the chosen indices. It is hypothesised that for retrieval to 
result in the identification of relevant Process model explanations and for selection 
to result in the identification of the most-relevant Process model explanation, then 
the indices must represent the process-interactions and their emergent processes. 
In Chapter 5, the idea that a grounded methodology could provide the means for 
identifying those emergent processes and process-interactions was proposed. An 
example, demonstrating how the language of the process model explanation may be 
defined through this analysis was presented in Chapter 5. 
109 
6. It is assumed that the totality of these emergent processes and process- 
interactions represents the potential success of a decision path. However, some 
emergent processes and process-interactions are malign and can be associated with 
failure-conditions. These malignant processes and process-interactions represent 
the potential failures that lie in wait for the decision path. In Chapter 5, emergent 
processes and process-interactions associated with failure-conditions were defined 
as negative-predictives and were divided into predictive processes and predictive- 
interactions. Since these negative-predictives are processes and process 
interactions that are associated with previous failure-conditions, then the RPM can 
use an index of those predictives to discriminate between the processes and 
process-interactions of a new Process model explanation and identify those 
processes and process-interactions that have a proneness to failure. This 
discrimination can be defined as a measure of connectivity that exists between the 
negative-predictives. In section 6.3.2 the notion of discrimination as a function of 
connectivity is introduced. 
6.3.2 FINDING AS MATCHING 
7. The concept of pattern matching plays a fundamental role in knowledge and 
learning. Measures of similarity represent objects as points in some form of event 
space, in which the observed similarities between objects correspond to a similarity 
metric between their respective points. This event space is conventionally static. 
Conventional machine-based similarity measures are defined using a nearest- 
neighbour or induction metric as a function of the shared attributes of the flat file 
format [HAMMOND, 1989; KOLODNER & MARK, 1992; HENNESSY & HINKLE, 1992; 
PEARCE ET AL, 1992; WATSON & MARRIR; 1994; WATSON, 19971. DUTTA & 
BONISSONE [1992] has argued that when, "determining which case to retrieve from 
the case library, it is important to get not just the most similar case, but the most 
relevant case. " In domains of uncertain knowledge, case usefulness may not be 
defined by measures of similarity, instead usefulness may be defined as being the 
most-relevant to the particular decision problem. But were is the difference 
between measures of similarity and measures of relevance? In addressing those 
concerns, it will be appropriate to first consider conventional approaches to 
similarity. Conventional data-centric approaches generate a belief that two 
concepts are similar, by comparing the properties that are commonly shared by the 
two concepts. In this respect, similarity measures as defined by a data centric view 
of knowledge are concerned with the content of the decision problem. Similarity is 
concerned with the assessment of shared data attributes. SMITH & MEDIN (1981), 
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suggest that each of the component properties of a concept are individual and 
independent. This view is reflected in conventional similarity measures. In which 
each property is an independent and discrete data entity and the more of these 
independent and discrete data entities two concepts share the closer the similarity. 
8. Similarity as defined by a data centric approach may be viewed as an 
agreement. This stems from individuals, who over a long period of time test a 
statement about the defined meaning of a particular object. For example, one 
universal and defining agreement of the object [planet earth] is that it {orbits the 
sun}. However some agreements may not be universal accepted. For example, the 
property {causes cancer} is not universal accepted as being a defining property of 
[smoking cigarettes]. In Chapter 5, the discussion considered the agreement over 
what is the defined meaning of the object [games]? It was concluded that the 
agreement cannot be a {competition between teams}, or even a agreement that there 
must be {at least two individuals involved), since [solitaire] is a [game] that has 
neither property. Similarly, a [game] cannot be defined solely by the need to have a 
{winner}. Since the child's [game] [ring-a-ring-a-rosy] has no such property. The 
discussion consider a more abstract property, in which anything is a [game] if it 
provides {amusement}. However, if {amusement} is a singularly necessary property 
of [game], then [whistling] could also be considered a [game]. In this respect the 
acceptance of a defined meaning can be seen as a flexible and a subjective 
agreement between individuals. An agreement defined by the point-of-view of the 
individuals concerned. 
9. It has been previously argued that concepts are governed by a point-of-view, 
indexed by processes and process-interactions, defined by the role-requirements of 
the process explanation (applicable to the current situation) and distinguished by 
the connectivity of these processes and process interactions. These represent the 
contextual constraints of a concept. The usefulness of the concept definition is not 
a function of similarity as defined by properties of a concept, but by the nature of 
the processes and process interactions between two or more concepts. Therefore, if 
a concept pair is consider to be a set of processes, then the relevance of using one 
concept to identify another concept can be considered to be part of a consensus over 
the process connectivity of that concept pair. 
10. Consider two process [playing football] and [playing solitaire]. Is 
[PROCESS: playing football] the same as [PROCESS: playing solitaire]? The 
individual could use the [POINT-OF-VIEW: game] to identify the indices of processes 
and process-interactions associated with [PROCESS: playing football] and the 
[PROCESS: playing solitaire]. The selection of these indices could be governed by the 
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ROLE requirements of the two process [playing football] and [playing solitaire]. For 
example, let the ROLE requirements for [PROCESS: playing football] and [PROCESS: 
playing solitaire] be [an organised activity using rules]. The RESPONSIBILITIES of 
the [PROCESS: playing football] could be [to score goals using an inflated ball] and 
the PLAYERS could be defined as [competing teams] Therefore, the process 
explanation of [PROCESS: playing football] may be represented as follows; [ROLE: an 
organised activity using rules, RESPONSIBILITIES: to score goals using an inflated 
ball, PLAYERS: competing teams, POINT-OF-VIEW: game]. Whereas, the 
RESPONSIBILITIES of the [PROCESS: playing solitaire] could be [to entertain in a 
pleasant manner using a deck of cards] and the PLAYERS could be defined as [a 
single individual] Therefore, the process explanation of [PROCESS: playing 
solitaire] may be represented as follows; [ROLE: an organised activity using rules, 
RESPONSIBILITIES: to entertain in a pleasant manner using a deck of cards, 
PLAYERS: a single individual, POINT-OF-VIEW: game]. 
11. Consider the question asked above, is [PROCESS: playing football] the same 
as [PROCESS: playing solitaire]? The individual could discriminate between the 
different processes and process-interactions as defined by their connectivity. For 
example, if [PROCESS: playing football] and [PROCESS: playing solitaire] are a 
concept pair as defined by the [POINT-OF-VIEW: game] and the concept pair can be 
considered to be a set of processes and process-interactions governed by the [ROLE: 
an organised activity using rules], then a distinction can be made by the 
connectivity of that concept pair. A discrimination measure as defined by the 
connectivity of the processes and process-interactions of the ROLE requirement [an 
organised activity using rules] will suggest that, (i) since [PROCESS: playing 
football] and [PROCESS: playing solitaire] are [an organised activity using rules], 
then [PROCESS: playing football] and [PROCESS: playing solitaire] ARE-A [game]; (ii) 
since [PROCESS: playing football] has the [RESPONSIBILITIES: to score goals using an 
inflated ball] using [PLAYERS: competing teams], then [PROCESS: playing football] 
and [PROCESS: playing solitaire] ARE-NOT-THE-SAME [game] and consequently; (iii) 
[PROCESS: playing football] IS-NOT [PROCESS: playing solitaire]. 
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6.3.3 SELECTING AS RANKING 
12. Various selection algorithms have been proposed. For example SMYTH & 
KEANE [1993], suggest that it may be appropriate to select cases by their ability to 
be modified, as opposed to their ability to match a set of current OBJECTIVES. 
However, recent studies [RIESBECK, 1996; MARK, SIMOUDS & HINKLE, 1996; 
HENNESSY & HINKLE, 19921 suggest that, (i) since case-modification techniques are 
rule-based, they are brittle and quick to break; (ii) it was unwise to restrict human 
involvement at the modification stage. It is proposed that selection may be defined 
by ranking the usefulness of Process model explanations in helping the decision- 
maker reach a decision (or solve a problem). 
13. Usefulness as defined by as THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT 
ENGLISH [1964] is the ability to produce "or able to produce good results". In this 
context and after constructing a Process model explanation, (i) governed by a point- 
of-view; (ii) indexed by malignant processes and process-interactions; (iii) defined 
by the role-requirements of the process and; (iv) distinguished by the connectivity 
of these processes and process-interactions, then what is a good result. For 
example, a good result could be defined by the ability of the selected Process model 
explanation to provide the user with explanations of how a Process model 
explanation suffered from a failure condition and provide explanations, questions 
and suggestions on the why, where and when aspect of that failure condition. 
However, it is proposed that a good result will rely on the relevance of those 
explanations and the relevance of the supplied questions and suggestions. Two 
processes may have a superficial similarity. However, if the manner of the 
connectivity of the component sub-processes are dissimilar, then the explanations, 
questions and suggestions provided may have no relevance to the user. For 
example, the basic components of plastics are hydrogen and carbon, however 
variations of their connectivity produce differing physical properties. 
Consequently, expectations and explanations of these properties and questions and 
suggestions on their use will also differ. 
14. The notion of which Process model explanation is the most-relevant is 
dependent upon the overall process structure of the Process model explanation as 
defined by the problem context. It is assumed, that the overall process structure, 
arrangement and interaction of the component processes and emergent properties 
are there to meet specific process objectives. A selecting-as-ranking procedure 
could use the totality of new case attributes as a means of selecting the most- 
relevant Process model explanation. For example, (i) indices of malignant process 
interactions and their emergent properties help the RPM to identify those Process 
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Model explanations that are useful and hence relevant to the user; (ii) the RPM 
could then use the totality of new case to interrogate the already identified useful 
Process model explanations and order the usefulness of those Process model 
explanations into a ranking of the most-relevant Process model explanations. A 
selecting-as-ranking algorithm is introduced in Chapter 7. 
6.4 DISCRIMINATION AND INTERACTION 
15. In this section a similarity measure based on discrimination and 
connectivity will be presented. Unlike approaches to similarity that generate a 
belief in similarity by comparing properties, this approach suggests that it might be 
more advantageous to define similarity by how much individuals make a 
distinction between processes. Below, the arguments, definitions and properties of 
the discrimination space and connectivity measures are discussed in detail. Some 
of the important properties of the discrimination and connectivity measures are 
introduced and the implications of this idea are highlighted with an example. 
16. Discrimination and interaction are associated with the work undertaken 
by NORRIS, PILSWORTH & BALDWIN [19871 on medical diagnosis from patient 
records. They classified discrimination and connectivity as a pattern searching 
methodology and used a pattern search of data within a numerical tabular 
knowledge base. However, this approach focuses on finding patterns in the 
processes and process interactions of process knowledge. 
17. The explanation of the methodology behind this type of analysis is based 
upon the process graphs first introduced in Chapter 5. Let the symmetrical graph 
FIGURE 6.0 represent a hierarchical process, composed of the sub-processes [A], [B], 
[C], [D] and [E]. FIGURE 6.0 has a defined terminology and is as follows, (i) the 
process model represents a process explanation and consists of nodes and edges; (ii) 
nodes may be classified as either super-processes, processes or sub-processes and 
each node may have associated attributes; (iii) process attributes are organised by a 
process model algorithm; (iv) not all of the attributes defined by the algorithm will 
be necessary for a complete process explanation; (v) process attributes are 
generated from a grounded analysis of the expert testimony; (vi) process attributes 
form a language of commonalties; (vii) each node is connected to another node by 
an edge and each node is connected to itself; (viii) an edge represents either a 
positive or negative symmetrical interaction; (ix) time is positive towards the right. 
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FIGURE 6.0 HIERARCHICAL PROCESS 
ROLE 1 PLAYER 1 
AE 
ROLE 2 PLAYER 2 BD 
C 
ROLE 3 PLAYER 2 
18. It is hypothesised that an agreement between any two processes is a 
function of the discrimination between process attributes and the way in which 
those attributes are connected. Therefore, 
" Let any PROCESS p, be a combination of attributes which can be expressed as, 
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... X} px=card{ax, a x, aga 
(1) 
where card {A} represents the cardinality of the set {A} and x is the PROCESS 
identifier and aR are the ROLES, PLAYERS, OBJECTIVES or SUB-PROCESSES of 
that PROCESS For example, ag'may represent ROLE, axe may represent PLAYER 
etc. Cardinality may be viewed as a criteria for comparing the size of any set. 
" Let a discrimination between any two processes pX and py be expressed as (pX - 
p), where this may be represented as a set inequality, 
(AR - py) _ (p. u py) - (p. n py) (2) 
" Let a measure of discrimination d, y 
be defined as, 
- (3) d (px, p., ) _ 
(PX Py) 
(Px u py) 
So that, 
d. 
y(px, Py) = 
(px u py) - (px n py) (4) 
(px u py) 
" Let conditions on the discrimination measure be defined as, 
0sd., (p., py) S1 (5) 
dXy(PX, py) =0 if P. = P3, (6) 
d. 
, 
(pp., p, ) = d,. (p,,, p1) (7) 





dXy(PXý Pyý (px u Py) (px u py) 
(8) 
(PX f py) dXy(PX, Py) =1- (px u py) 
(9) 
" Let a measure of connectivity between any two processes pX and py be defined by 
the inverse of the discrimination between pX and py, Where the connectivity cxy is 
expressed as follows, 
CXy(Pxq Py) _r 
(PX n Py) 
(px u p9) 
Therefore, 
c, (px, p) =1-d, (p., p) 
" Let conditions on the connectivity measure be defined as, 
05c, 
ry(nx, py) S1 
cX,. (Px, p,. ) =1 if d, (p, Py) =0 
cxy(Pxf Py) = c,, X(p , PR) 
" If we assume total dependency, then 
p(X r, yS = min 
[pX, pyl 
p(. U,, ) = max[px, pyl 
" Therefore, the connectivity between pX and py may be expressed as follows, 











19. Equation (17) represents a measure of discrimination between process 
based on their connectivity. However, equation (17) also represents a condition of 
classical probability theory, namely that all probabilities on the sample space must 
sum to unity (only if xuy represents the sample space). This condition defines the 
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sample space as a closed world model. Since only those attributes of the sample 
space are included in the model, then only combinations of those attributes are 
allowed. Closed world models may be defined as either, (i) Type I problems, in 
which all the consequences are known; (ii) Type II problems, in which all the 
consequences are identified, but only the probabilities of occurrence are known or; 
(iii) Type III problems, in which all the consequences are approximately identified, 
but only the probabilities of ill-defined occurrences are known. 
20. In an ideal world, all information should remain consistent. Therefore, the 
information obtained during a grounded analysis and represented in a process 
model explanation should not be in conflict. However, this expectation as 
represented by the closed world models I, II and III and expressed in equation (17) 
is often at odds with open world realities. It cannot be assumed that an agreement 
on whether [a] IS-A [b] implies anything about whether [a] IS-NOT-A [b]. To 
overcome these difficulties with inconsistent information requires an open world 
theory. DAVIS, BLOCKLEY, DROMGOOLE & FLETCHER [1996] state that "an open 
world theory allows inconsistent information to be modelled and hence reasons for 
that inconsistency to be explored, understood and therefore, possibly, the structure of 
the model to be changed". 
21. Since interval probability theory [C ui & BLOCKLEY, 1990] is an open world 
model, then it would seem appropriate to use interval probability theory for 
modelling the uncertainty in the discrimination process. Interval probability 
theory as developed by Cui & BLOCKLEY [1990] can be used for modelling decisions 
made up of sparse, incomplete and inconsistent information. An interval number 
may be used to represent a measure of discrimination between processes. 
" Let P, Y 
be a measure of connectivity between PROCESS pX and PROCESS py, where 
P.,, = [co(x, y), cp(x, Y)] (18) 
22. c(x, y) is a measure of support for the belief of the necessary connectivity 
between PROCESS pX and PROCESS py and the opposite -icn(x, y) represents a 
measure of the necessary non-connectivity between PROCESS px and PROCESS py. 
However, as stated above, it cannot be assumed that evidence about a measure of 
connectivity between PROCESS pX and PROCESS py implies anything about the non- 
connectivity between PROCESS pX and PROCESS py. Consequently, a measure of the 
necessary non-connectivity is expressed by, 
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1- cp(x, y) = -, cn(x, y) (19) 
cp(x, y) =1- is (x, y) (20) 
0 
23. Where cn(x, y) represents the measure of support for the belief of the 
possible connectivity between PROCESS pX and PROCESS py. Following CUi & 
BLOCKLEY [19901 then the value cp(x, y) - cn(x, y) represents the uncertainty 
associated with the measure of discrimination between PROCESS pt and PROCESS 
py. This is shown below. 
Cll(xl %) Cp(X, y) - Cn(X, Y) 1-Cp(X, Y) 
24. Please note, that the smaller the discrimination measure, then the greater 
the connection between PROCESS pX and PROCESS py. Some examples may help to 
demonstrate the meaning of a necessary measure of connectivity and a possible 
measure of connectivity. 
" PXy [c. (x, y), cp(x, y] [0,0] since both connectivity values are zero, then there 
is total discrimination between PROCESS px and PROCESS py and zero belief in 
the connectivity of PROCESS pX and PROCESS py. 
1-cp(x, y) = --iCn(X, y) 
0 1 
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0 Pxy, = [c. (x, y), cp(x, y] = [1,1] since both connectivity values are unity, then there 
is zero discrimination between PROCESS p, and PROCESS p,, and a total belief in 
the connectivity of PROCESS ph and PROCESS p\.. 
cri(x, y) 
01 
" Pxy = [cjx, y), cp(x, y] = [0,1] a necessary connectivity measure of zero and a 
possible connectivity measure of unity indicates total uncertainty. Therefore, 
while there is zero connectivity between PROCESS pX and PROCESS py, there is 
also zero agreement. 
cp(x, y) - cn(x, y) 
01 
6.4.1 PROPERTIES OF DISCRIMINATION AND INTERACTION 
" Let S(p, ) denote a relation between akX and (x',,. Where, {a` X} and 
{a'X} are 
attributes of the PROCESS px. 
S(pX) = Sfa1X, a2., ... a". 
} (21) 
" Let the process interactions be thought of as a set of intentional links that 
specify the relationships that exist between and within the attributes of a 
PROCESS ph. For each relationship from {attribute} akY to {attribute} a'h there 
exists a corresponding relationship from {attribute} a'X to {attribute} (x'x. That is, 
if {attribute} a'`, {is-connected-to} a'x then {attribute} a'X {is-connected-by} akX See 
FIGURES 6.1(a), (b) & (c). 
S(akx, (x'. ) =1 if {attribute} (X x 
{is-connected-to} a`x (22) 
S(c , a'x) =0 
if {attribute} a'`. {is-not-connected-to} W. (23) 
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S(akg, (x'X) =1 if {attribute} a'x {is-connected-by} akx (24) 
S(( x'., a'. ) =0 if {attribute} a. {is-not-connected-by} akx (25) 
" Assuming total dependency, then 
Sk(x n y) = min[Sk(x), 
Sk(y)] (26) 
Sk(x u y) = max[Sk(x), Sk(y)} (27) 
"A distinction between any two PROCESSES pX and p, has been expressed as the 
difference between pX and py. Therefore, any increase in the relation S(p,, - py) 
will increase the discrimination dXY (ps, py) and any decrease in the relation S(cx - 
cy), will decrease the discrimination dXy (pg, py). From equation (3), 
dxy(px, p) _ 
(p" ~ py) 
(therefore, lx U py) 
d, (px, p, ) S S(p. - pr, ) (28) 
" Therefore, if a relationship exists between the discrimination dxy and the 
connectivity c. Y, 
(such that the smaller the distinction between two PROCESSES 
pX and py, then the greater the connectivity), and given that, 
c,,. tp., p) =1-d, (p., p) (29) 
then, 
Cxy(Pxf Py) G 
S(P. 
- P) (30) 
" For a given PROCESS pX and a group of PROCESSES (pr, pz) having equivalent 
process attributes, then the discrimination d between pX and any member of the 
group is equivalent to the connectivity c. Therefore, letting SppY) = S(p. ) then, 
dx,. (p, p, ) < dZ(p, PZ) = S(Px u p,. ) > S(px u pZ) = cy(p., Py) > cxz(pxg PZ) X31) 
0 For a given PROCESS px and two reference PROCESSES py and p, when S(px u py) 
and S(pX u p) are near enough to each other such that the corresponding 
connectivity's c (p,, p`. ) and cXZ(px, p) are similar, then the larger connectivity will 
ensure a smaller discrimination. If, 
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S(P. up. ) > S(pX up, ) (32) 
then, 
d.. (px, p) < dx, (p., p) (33) 
when 
C.. (P., P) > C. y(Px, P,, 
) (34) 
6.5 AN EXAMPLE 
25. To illustrate the methodology, consider the examples represented in 
FIGURES 6.1 and FIGURES 6.2(a) and (b). FIGURE 6.1 represents a new case IC1 and 
FIGURES 6.2(a) and (b) represent two stored cases SC1 and SC2. The new case and 
the stored cases represent complete PROCESSES, composed from a set of SUB- 
PROCESSES. It is proposed that the connectivity measure defined from the totality 
of these SUB-PROCESSES and represented by the {attribute} {is-connected-to} 
connectivity matrix will discriminate between the stored cases. The {attribute} {is- 
connected-to} matrix as defined by equations (21), (22), (23) and (24) is represented 
in FIGURE 6.1 and FIGURES 6.2(a) and (b). 
26. Cardinality measures of the connectivity of IC1 and SCI, representing 
min(IC1, SC) and max(ICI, SC) are built from the connectivity matrix representing 
IC1 and the connectivity matrix representing SC1 using the matrix operator from 
equations (25) and (26). This can be seen in FIGURE 6.3 (a) which represents the 
connectivity-measure for [IC1 n SC1] and [IC1 u SC1] and takes into account the 
interactions or connectivity that may exist between the sub-processes. 
27. The measure of connectivity as defined by the discrimination function 
[attribute: SUB-PROCESSES {A, B, C, D, F}, is-connected-to: SUB-PROCESSES {A, B, C, D, F}] 
returns the following, 
Cn [IC, SC, ] 
(PIC, 
PSC, 
)= (IC1 nSC1) 8 
(IC1 vSCl) 18 
=0.44 
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FIGURE 6.1 NEW-CASE (ICI) 
new case IC1 
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IC) 1 1 1 0 0 
ID) 0 1 1 1 0 
IF] 0 0 1 1 1 
[GI 0 0 0 1 1 
and for, 
ýn [IC, SCz] 
(PIC1 
PSCZ 
) (IC1 nSC2) 8 
(IC1 vSC2) 16 
=0.50 
28. This results represent the necessary support for a belief in the connectivity 
between process IC1 and processes SC, and SC2. However, what is now required is a 
measure of the necessary support for a belief in the non-connectivity or -ic". As 
mentioned above this not the inverse, but an actual measure. For example, 
consider the connectivity matrix of IC1. This is composed of five sub-processes [A], 
[B], [C], [D], [F] and their associated process-interactions. However, SC1 does not 
include the sub-process [D] and its associated process-interactions within its 
component sub-processes. See FIGURES 6.1 and 6.2(a) respectively. This may be 
viewed as evidence of non-connectivity between process IC1 and process SC1. This is 
represented by the bold boxes in FIGURES 6.3(a) & 6.3(b). 
29. The measure of connectivity as defined by the discrimination function 
[attribute: SUB-PROCESS {D}, is-connected-to: SUB-PROCESS {D}] returns the following, 





-'Cn [IC, SCZ ] 
(PIC, 
PSC2 = 
(IC1 n 5C1 
_5 =0.28 (IC 
1u SC 1) 18 
(IC, nSC2) 5 
=0.31 (IC1 uSC2) 16 
30. Therefore a measure of connectivity between IC1 and SCI, SC2 may be 
represented by the interval, 
PKY = [cn(x, Y), cp(x, Y)l (18) 
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[A] [B] [C] [D] [E] [F] 
[A] l l 0 0 0 0 
[B] l l 1 0 0 0 
[C] 0 > > 0 0 0 
[D] 0 0 0 0 0 0 
[E] 0 0 0 0 0 0 





[A] [B] [Cl [DI [E] [F] 
[A] 1 1 0 0 0 0 
[B] 1 l 1 0 0 0 
[C] 0 1 1 1 1 0 
[D] 0 0 1 1 0 1 
[E] 0 0 1 0 1 1 
[F] 0 0 0 1 1 1 





[A] [B] [C] [D] [F] [G] 
[A] 1 0 0 0 0 0 
[B] 0 0 0 0 0 0 
[C] 0 0 1 1 0 0 
[D] 0 0 1 1 1 0 
[F] 0 0 0 1 1 0 
[G] 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(attribute) 
(connected-to) 
(ICMax SC2] [Al [B] [C] [D] [F] [G] 
[A] 1 1 0 0 0 0 
[B] 1 1 1 0 0 0 
[C] 0 1 1 1 0 0 
[Dl 0 0 1 1 1 0 
[F] 0 0 0 1 1 1 
[G] 0 0 0 0 1 1 
where, 
P1, c,, c,, = 
[c. (ICSC, ), cp(IC,, SC, )] = [0.44,1-0.281 = [0.44,0.72] 
0.44 0.28 0.28 
Cri $s3' Cp(X, y) - Cn(X, Y) 1-c (x, y) = -icn(X, y) 
0 
Pc1 SC21 = 
[c. (iC,, SC2), cp(IC,, SC2)] = [0.50,1-0.31] = [0.50,0.69] 
1 
0.50 0.19 0.31 
Cn(x y) 1-cn(x, y) = -icn(X, y) 
0 
31. It has been demonstrated that the measure of discrimination must lie 
1 
between unity and zero, as represented by 0< dxV(pX, p) > 1. Since the measure of 
connectivity is represented by the inverse of the discrimination, then the greater 
the discrimination measure the smaller the degree of connectivity between 
processes. The measures of connectivity associated with the values of, P(lcl s(l) = 
[0.44,0.72] and P(lc1sc2) = [0.50,0.69] as shown above, illustrate various points. For 
example, (i) there is no complete match; (ii) both stored case SC1 and stored case SC. 9 
are partially matched with new case IC1; (iii) SC. 9 may 
have a slight advantage, since 
the measure of connectivity is greater than that of SC1, while the level of associated 
uncertainty is lower and; (iv) while SC1 has a lower measure of non-connectivity, it 
has a greater level of associated uncertainty. 
32. In this Chapter, the discussion has focused on a demonstration of the 
discrimination and connectivity methodology. In the following Chapter, it is 
proposed that a discrimination function defined by the connectivity measure 
[attributes: negative-predictive-processes, is-connected-to: negative-predictive- 
processes] could be used to initiate a search routine defined by a proneness to 
failure. This follows the suggestion in section 6.3.1, in which predictive processes 
and the interaction of those processes could be used by the system to create an 
index of attributes associated with previous failure conditions. It was hypothesised 
that by recognising those predictives the system will be able to anticipate similar 
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problems in other cases. The use of indices defined by a proneness to failure would 
help the system to identify those cases that have failure conditions attached. 
33. In Chapter 7, a series of case studies of a frequent petroleum engineering 
problem [implementing time-depth conversion] will be used to demonstrate how 
indices of NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES could be used by a Reflective Process Memory to 
discriminate between Process model explanations and identify those Process model 
explanations that are useful to the user. A comparison algorithm that uses the 
indices of NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES and the totality of the problem's component SUB- 
PROCESSES to compare the selection of useful Process model explanations and 
identify the most-relevant Process model explanation will be introduced. 
34. These case studies represent decision problems in the field of reservoir 
evaluation and examples of a grounded analysis (see Appendices A and B) of these 
case studies will demonstrate how the building of a Process model explanation 
produces emergent processes and process-interactions. These case studies 
illustrate the effectiveness of reflective decision building (accessing, explaining 
decisions, modifying previous decisions, re-evaluating, integrating and monitoring 
the performance of a new decision path; as represented by a Reflective Process 
Memory), in creating an appropriate problem-solution environment between the 
user and the system. 
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6.6 CONCLUSIONS 
" Emergent processes and their process interactions that have a malignant affect 
on the outcome of the decision path could be used by the Reflective Process 
Memory to identify those attributes of a new case that have a proneness to 
failure. 
" The notion of a finding-as-discrimination was introduced and a formal 
methodology that discriminates between stored Process model explanations, as 
defined by a measure of connectivity that exists between those malignant 
attributes was presented. 
" The problems behind the condition of classical probability theory were discussed 
and the use of interval probability theory in modelling the uncertainty in the 
discrimination process was introduced. 
+ An example demonstrating how a measure of connectivity as defined by the 
discrimination function [attribute: SUB-PROCESSES, is-connected-to: SUB- 
PROCESS] could be used by the Reflective Process Memory to discriminate 
between Process model explanations was presented. 
" The idea that usefulness is a function of the ability of the Reflective Process 
Memory in helping a decision maker to recognise and understand how some 
malignant emergent process interactions may affect the outcome of similar 
decision problems was proposed. 
" Usefulness was defined as a measure of the relevance of supplied explanations 
and the ability of the Reflective Process Memory in supplying relevant questions 
and suggestions. 
" The notion of a selecting-as-ranking procedure was introduced and it was 
hypothesised that the totality of the new case attributes could be used to 
interrogate the retrieved Process model explanations and generate a ranking of 
the most-relevant explanations. 
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7. USING FAILURE CONDITIONS TO COMPARE CASE 
HISTORIES 
7.1 OBJECTIVES 
" To introduce a comparison algorithm and to demonstrate how this algorithm 
uses the indices of NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES and the totality of the problem's 
component SUB-PROCESSES to compare the selection of Relevant Process model 
explanations and identify the most-relevant Process model explanation. 
" To demonstrate the effectiveness of reflective decision building in creating an 
appropriate problem-solution environment between the user and the system. 
" To demonstrate how the appropriateness of a problem-solution environment is 
governed by the notion of case relevance. 
7.2 INTRODUCTION 
1. In Chapter 6a methodology was introduced to discriminate between a 
simplified Process model explanation using a defined connectivity measure between 
processes and process-interactions. It was hypothesised that a methodology that 
actively discriminates in this way might be more beneficial than approaches to 
similarity which compares data properties. In this Chapter a comparison algorithm 
(using the connectivity that exists between processes and process interactions), is 
proposed. The algorithm uses an index of attributes associated with previous 
failure conditions to compare a new case with a CASE-MEMORY of stored cases. The 
algorithm is composed of five step-wise procedures, which are as follows, (i) 
problem identification; (ii) case selection; (iii) re-evaluation and acceptance; (iv) 
modification and; (v) integration and monitoring. The case selection stage is 
composed of two discrimination functions. These are, (i) a discrimination function 
defined by a connectivity measure [attributes: NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVE-PROCESSES, is- 
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connected-to: NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVE-PROCESSES] identifies those cases that have a 
proneness to failure and; (ii) a discrimination function defined by a connectivity 
measure of the totality of the component SUB-PROCESSES which selects relevant 
cases from those cases with a proneness to failure. This connectivity measure may 
be defined as [attributes: SUB-PROCESSES, is-connected-to: SUB-PROCESSES]. 
2. In this chapter, three case studies of a frequent petroleum engineering 
problem [implementing time-depth conversion] will be used to demonstrate the 
methodology behind this comparison algorithm. The PROCESS: [implementing time- 
depth conversion] has already been introduced in Chapter 5 and a description of the 
process will not be repeated here. However, in Appendices [A] and [B], examples of 
the knowledge elicitation exercise undertaken by the author are presented. These 
examples taken from interviews with an expert geophysicists will show, (i) how a 
grounded analysis of the data helped the knowledge engineer to identify the 
necessary process definitions, emergent processes and process-interactions and; (ii) 
how the focus of the knowledge elicitation exercise concentrated on the human and 
organisational preconditions relating to failures (or near failures). Regarding the 
three case studies, two are retrospective case histories of depth conversion projects 
that have experienced decision problems and the third case study represents an on- 
going project. The two retrospective case studies were assigned the identifiers 
[implementing time-depth conversion: TOM] and [implementing time-depth 
conversion: DICK], the on-going project was given the identifier [implementing time- 
depth conversion: HARRY]. Examples of the grounded analysis of the PROCESS: 
[implementing time-depth conversion] and the subsequent representation by a 
Process model algorithm of the three case-studies can be found in Appendices A and 
B. 
3. In section 7.3 an index of NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES are used to rank the 
relevance of the two retrospective case studies and in section 7.4, the Process model 
explanations are used to modify the Process model explanation of the on-going 
project PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: HARRY]. It will be shown 
how the usefulness of the recalled Process model explanations is a function of, (i) 
relevant REFLECTIONS on how and why a problem occurred; (ii) SUGGESTIONS to 
return project to within acceptable limits; (iii) any EMERGENT-QUESTIONS that 
should have been asked (but were not) during the initial decision building phase of 
the project. Section 7.4 will conclude the chapter with a discussion on the proposed 
methodology. 
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7.3 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & CASE SELECTION 
4. To demonstrate the methodology behind this comparison algorithm consider 
a new-case (IC) as represented in FIGURE 7.1(a). Let the new-case (IC1be a Process 
Model explanation of the decision problem [implementing time-depth conversion: 
HARRY]. To simplify the demonstration let the Process Model explanation be 
composed from a set of five SUB-PROCESSES. These are [A], [B], [C], [D] and [F]. It is 
assumed that the user wishes to compare the new-case (IC1) with cases in the CASE- 
MEMORY and select the most-relevant case history. Let the CASE-MEMORY consists 
of only two cases; SC1 [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM] and SC2 
[implementing time-depth conversion: DICK]. See FIGURES 7.1(b) and 7.1(c). 
5. A new case may be looked upon as decision problem and is represented in 
the INPUT-MEMORY as a Process model explanation. The comparison of a new case 
in the INPUT-MEMORY with cases in the CASE-MEMORY begins by the RPM using a 
PREDICTIVE-INDEX of negative-predictives to identify potential hazardous event 
sequences that may exist in the new case. See FIGURE 7.2. 
7.3.1 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
Step 1: PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
RPM will use an index of negative-predictives to identify hazardous event sequences 
that may exist within a new-case. See FIGURE 7.2. 
"A new-case is added to the INPUT-MEMORY as a Process model explanation. 
" RPM uses index of predictives stored in PREDICTIVE-INDEX to identify hazardous 
event sequences of new-case. 
" If the RPM is unable to recognise any hazardous event sequences, then RPM 
moves to Step 2: CASE SELECTION. 
" RPM classifies identified hazardous event sequences as NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES. 
" RPM moves to Step 2: CASE SELECTION. 
6. The INPUT-MEMORY is organised as a predictive function using a 
PREDICTIVE -INDEX of hazardous event sequences that 
have been shown in previous 
cases to develop into failure conditions. The RPM will use this PREDICTIVE-INDEX to 
interrogate the new case and identify those events that have (in previous cases) a 
proneness to failure. Identified hazardous event sequences are processed as 
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FIGURE 7.1(a) CONNECTIVITY MEASURES FOR IC1 
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FIGURE 7.1(b) CONNECTIVITY MEASURES FOR SC1 
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FIGURE 7.1(c) CONNECTIVITY MEASURES FOR SCZ 
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FIGURE 7.2 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
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t 
NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES. These NEGATIVE-PREDICTNES may be sub-divided into 
negative predictive processes and negative predictive interactions. Negative 
predictive processes are specific events that have been shown to initiate a specific 
failure condition, whereas negative predictive interactions are specific interactions 
of those events that initiate a specific failure condition. If the RPM is unable to 
identify any hazardous event sequences and mark them as NEGATIVE -PREDI CTIVES, 
then the RPM would move directly to Step 2: Case selection. 
7. The PREDICTIVE-INDEX may be looked upon as dynamic and constantly 
evolving memory. During the integration and monitoring phase of the algorithm 
new cases will be integrated into the CASE-MEMORY. At this time and as part of the 
monitoring of completed case histories, additional predictive indices may well be 
added to the PREDICTIVE-INDEX. It is hypothesised that evidential measures of the 
effectiveness of the indices in predicting HAZARDS could also be added. These 
measures would be based on the experiential knowledge of the outcome of a new 
case and forms part of the integration and monitoring stage of the RPM. 
8. The new-case (IC1represent a decision problem that the user wishes to 
match with case histories in the CASE-MEMORY. The initial input to the INPUT- 
MEMORY is a Process model explanation of the decision problem. This will have 
been generated from a Process model algorithm (see Chapter 5). In this example, 
the Process model explanation consists of a set of five SUB-PROCESSES. See FIGURE 
7.1(a). The PREDICTIVE-INDEX will highlight those negative-predictives that have 
been shown in previous cases to contribute to potential HAZARDS. For example, let 
some previous cases indicate that SUB-PROCESS [C] has contributed to a 
CONSEQUENTIAL HAZARD. Let the PREDICTIVE-INDEX highlight the SUB-PROCESS [C] 
as a negative predictive process. The PREDICTIVE-INDEX searches for SUB-PROCESS 
[C] in the Process model explanation. If found, the index marks that SUB-PROCESS 
as a NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVE. Further, let some previous case histories indicate that 
the combination of SUB-PROCESSES [B & C] and [C & DI have also contributed to a 
CONSEQUENTIAL HAZARD. Let the PREDICTIVE-INDEX highlight the interaction of 
the SUB-PROCESSES [B-C], [C-D] as negative predictive interactions. The 
PREDICTIVE-INDEX searches for a combination of SUB-PROCESSES [B & C] and [C & 
D] in the Process Model explanation. If found the index will mark those SUB- 
PROCESSES as NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES. These are shown with dashed lines in 
FIGURE 7.1(a). Having identified any hazardous events and marked them as 
NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES, the Reflective Process Memory moves to Step 2: Case 
Selection. 
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7.3.2 CASE SELECTION 
Step 2: CASE SELECTION 
RPM uses the negative-predictives as selection indices. See FIGURE 7.3. 
" RPM uses the identified negative-predictives of the new-case (IC1) as 
discriminators in connectivity measure [attributes: NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES, is- 
connected-to: NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES] to select case(s) in CASE-MEMORY 
(FAILURES) that respond to the negative-predictives of the new-case (IC). 
RPM re-classifies selected case(s) as failed-case(s) and sends failed-case(s) to 
ACTUALITY-MEMORY. 
" RPM uses totality of process-interactions of the new-case (IC1) as discriminators in 
connectivity measure [attributes: SUB-PROCESSES, is-connected-to: SUB- 
PROCESSES] to rank failed-case(s) in ACTUALITY-MEMORY that respond to the 
process-interactions of the new-case (IC1). 
" RPM re-classifies ranked failed-case(s) held in ACTUALITY-MEMORY as relevant- 
case(s). 
" If RPM unable to identify any case(s) in CASE-MEMORY (FAILURES) that respond to 
the negative-predictives, then RPM use designated NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES to 
interrogate CASE-MEMORY (NON-FAILURES). 
" RPM uses the identified negative-predictives of the new-case (IC) as 
discriminators in connectivity measure [attributes: NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES, is- 
connected-to: NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES] to select case(s) in CASE-MEMORY (NON- 
FAILURES) that respond to the negative-predictives of the new-case (ICl). 
" RPM re-classifies selected case(s) as failing-case(s) and sends failing-case(s) to 
ACTUALITY-MEMORY. 
RPM uses totality of process-interactions of the new-case (IC) as discriminators in 
connectivity measure [attributes: SUB-PROCESSES, is-connected-to: SUB- 
PROCESSES] to rank failing-case(s) in ACTUALITY-MEMORY that respond to those 
process-interactions of the new-case (ICl). 
" RPM re-classifies ranked failing-case(s) held in ACTUALITY-MEMORY as relevant- 
case(s). 
" RPM moves to Step 3: MODIFICATION. 
9. Case Selection functions at two levels. At the first level, the RPM uses those 
SUB-PROCESSES of the new-case (IC1) that have been designated NEGATIVE- 
PREDICTPVES as a template. This template interrogates the CASE-MEMORY 
(FAILURES). The CASE-MEMORY (FAILURES) holds those case-histories that have 
suffered a complete process failure, these are termed failed-case(s). The 
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FIGURE 7.3 CASE SELECTION 
new-case (Ic1) 
NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES of new-case used to interrogate 
CASE-MEMORY (FAILURES) and identify failed-case(s). 
CASE-MEMORY (FAILURES) 
0 
If unsuccessful, then RPM uses NEGATIYE- 
PREDICTIVES of new-case (IC1) to 
interrogate CASE-MEMORY (NON- 
FAILURES) and discriminates between 
cases on the basis of the connectivity 
measure. 
+ CASE-MEMORY (NON-FAILURES) 
&------------------------ ----------------- ----------- ---------------- ------------. 
EZI 









Those cases that are selected using the discrimination function are 
classified as failing-case(s). The failing-case(s) are stored in the 




Totality of processes and process interactions of new-case (icl) used to discriminate between those failed- 




From CASE-MEMORY (FAILURES) 
interrogation attempts to identify those failed-case(s) in the CASE-MEMORY 
(FAILURES) that have similar failure conditions to the predicted failure conditions of 
the new-case (IC1) in the INPUT-MEMORY. It identifies those failed-case(s) that have 
similar failure conditions to those of the new-case (IC) on the basis of the 
connectivity-measure as defined by [attributes: NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES, is- 
connected-to: NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES]. Those failed-case(s) that are identified as 
having similar failure conditions are sent to ACTUALITY-MEMORY. The ACTUALITY- 
MEMORY holds the complete life-history of each of the failed-case(s) as an 
ACTUALITY-WINDOW. 
10. At the second level, those selected failed-case(s) that have similar failure 
conditions to the predicted failure conditions of the new-case (IC) (having been 
moved to the ACTUALITY-MEMORY) are now ranked. Having identified failed-case(s) 
as a function of the predicted failure conditions of the new-case (ICl ), the ranking 
procedure now uses the totality of the overall structure and arrangement of the 
SUB-PROCESSES of the new-case (IC) to interrogate the failed-case(s) in the 
ACTUALITY-MEMORY. The RPM discriminates between the failed-case(s) held in the 
ACTUALITY-MEMORY and ranks those failed-case(s) on the basis of the connectivity 
measure as defined by [attributes: SUB-PROCESSES, is-connected-to: SUB- 
PROCESSES]. The RPM re-orders the failed-case(s) as defined by this connectivity 
measure and re-classifies those ranked failed-case(s) as relevant-case(s). 
11. However, if the RPM is unable to identify any case(s) in the CASE-MEMORY 
(FAILURES), then the RPM uses the designated NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES to 
interrogate the CASE-MEMORY (NON-FAILURES). See FIGURE 7.2(b). The CASE- 
MEMORY (NON-FAILURES) holds those case-histories that although they have 
potential failure conditions, they have successfully met all case objectives. As 
before, the RPM uses the identified NEGATIVE -PREDICTIVE S of the new-case (IC) as a 
template and interrogates the CASE-MEMORY (NON-FAILURES). However, this time, 
those cases that are selected using the discrimination function are now classified by 
the RPM as failing-case(s). The failing-case(s) are stored in the ACTUALITY- 
MEMORY. As before, the ACTUALITY-MEMORY holds the complete life-history of each 
of the failing-case(s) as an ACTUALITY-WINDOW. As previously stated the 
ACTUALITY-MEMORY ranks the order of the failing-case(s) as defined by connectivity 
measure [attributes: SUB-PROCESSES, is-connected-to: SUB-PROCESSES] and re- 
classifies them as relevant-case(s). In Chapter 1, it was suggested that the 
relevance of a solution may be defined by its ability in helping a decision maker to 
anticipate potential failures within the proposed decision path. In this respect a 
similar-and-successful solution may be less useful to the decision maker, than a 
similar-but-failed solution. Especially when a similar-but-failed solution can (i) 
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explain how a similar solution failed and; (ii) provide reflections on the why, where 
and when of that failure. In Chapter 5, it was argued that, (i) the use of a 
grounded methodology; (ii) the representation of emergent contextual properties 
within a Process model explanation and; (iii) the subsequent selection, will yield 
explanations of the how, why, where and when of a failure-condition. Therefore, 
case selection (as defined by process-interactions and failure-conditions) is a 
function of the representational structure of the problem domain. 
12. An example will illustrate the selection methodology. To simplify the 
description of the selection process, it has been assumed that no cases in the CASE- 
MEMORY (FAILURES) match the identified negative-predictives of the new-case (IC, ) 
and the selection procedure has moved to CASE-MEMORY (NON-FAILURES). Let the 
PREDICTIVE-INDEX highlight SUB-PROCESS [C] and the interaction of the SUB- 
PROCESSES [B-C], [C-D] as negative predictives. These are shown as dashed lines in 
FIGURE 7.1(a). The negative predictives are used as a selection template in an 
attempt to match the new-case (IC1) with the failing-case(s) in the CASE-MEMORY 
(NON-FAILURES). The negative predictives are used as discriminators in the 
connectivity measure [attributes: NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES, is-connected-to: 
NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES] which selects from the failing-case(s) those cases that 
respond to those negative predictives of the new-case (IC1). See matrix of 
connectivity measure [attributes: NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES, is-connected-to: 
NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES] in FIGURE 7.1(a). 
13. Let the CASE-MEMORY (NON-FAILURES) contain the failing-case (SC) and 
failing-case (SC2). See FIGURES 7.1(b) and 7.1(c). Using the methodology 
introduced in section 6.3, a connectivity measure [attributes: NEGATIVE- 
PREDICTIVES {B, C, D}, is-connected-to: NEGATIVE-PREDICTNES {B, C, D}1 defined by 
the predicted failure conditions of the new-case (IC1) returns the following, 










(IC1 rSC1) 7 
=1.0 (IC1 u SCI) 7 
(IC 1n SC 2) 4 =0.57 ('Cl uSC2) 7 
14. This represents the necessary support for a belief in the connectivity 
between process IC1 and processes SC1 and SC2. Note SC2 does not include the sub- 
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process [B] and its associated process-interactions within its component sub- 
processes. See Figures 7.1(a) and 7.1(c) respectively. This may be viewed as 
evidence of non-connectivity between process IC1 and process SC2. The measure of 
connectivity as defined by the discrimination function [attribute: SUB-PROCESS {B}, 
is-connected-to: SUB-PROCESS {B}] returns the following, 
(IC 1n SC I) 0 
--lcn[Icsc, ] 





(IC1 nSC2) ý-=1 I 
=0.14 ('Cl USC2) 7 
15. Therefore a measure of connectivity between ICl and SC1, SC, may be 
represented by the interval, 
P.,, = [c"(x, Y), cp(x, Y)l X18) 
where, 
P[, C, Sc, ] = 
[c. (IC,, SC, ), cp(ICSC, )] = [1.0,1-0.0] = [1.0,1.0] 
0 1 
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P,, c, yc. 2, = 
[c. (IC,, SC), cp(IC,, SC2)] = [0.57,1-0.14] = [0.57,0.86] 
0.57 0.29 0.14 
0 1 
16. Since there is no distinction between IC1 and SCI, then IC1 and SC1 may be 
considered a perfect match. Note, SC,, does not include SUB-PROCESS [B] within its 
component SUB-PROCESSES and since it cannot be included in the negative 
predictive interactions [B & C] and [C & DI of IC,, then this results in a partial 
match with IC1. Both SC1 and SCz are moved to the ACTUALITY-MEMORY and a 
totality of process interactions can now be used to rank the relevance of SC1 and Sc. ., 
The process interactions are used as discriminators in the connectivity measure 
[attributes: SUB-PROCESSES {A, B, C, D , F}, 
is-connected-to: SUB-PROCESSES {A, B, C, D, 
F}] which is then used to rank the failing-case(s). Matrices of the connectivity 
measure [attributes: SUB-PROCESSES, is-connected-to: SUB-PROCESSES] for IC1, SC1 
and SC2 are shown in FIGURES 7.1(a), 7.1(b) and 7.1(c) respectively. This 
discrimination function returns the following, 
(IC1 n SC1 ) d[ic, sc, ] Pic, Psc, 
) 
-1- IC u SC 
=0.37 
and for, 
(IC1 n SC2 d[ iclsCZ ] 
(Plc, Psc) =1 r IC v SC 
=0.74 
1 2) 
17. These results indicate that SC1 is the most-relevant-case and SC, as the next- 
most-relevant-case. In these simple examples this can be seen by inspection. For 
example, (i) SC, consists of the negative predictive sub-process [C] and the negative 
predictive interactions [B & C] and [C & DI; (ii) out of the five component SUB- 
PROCESSES that make up IC1, SC1 has four of them (these are [A], [B], [C] and [D]); 
(iii) the manner of their arrangement within the overall process structure closely 
mirrors that of IC1. On the basis of this level of connectivity, it is hypothesised that 
the quality of the Process model explanation of SC1 and the usefulness of the 
emergent questions will have more relevance to the management team of new-case 
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(IC) then that provided by SC2. Note, in a manner similar to the measure of 
connectivity, the user may assign a degree of uncertainty across this selection 
process. 
18. In this section, indices of NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES have been used to 
demonstrate the ranking procedure. In the next section, the Process Model 
explanations of SC1 (representing PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: 
TOM]) and of SC2 (representing PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: 
DICK] will be used in the modification of PROCESS: [implementing time-depth 
conversion: HARRY] and the subsequent re-evaluation & acceptance, integration & 
monitoring steps of the comparison algorithm. 
7.4 MODIFICATION, RE-EVALUATION & ACCEPTANCE, INTEGRATION 
& MONITORING 
19. SMYTH & KEANE [1993] have argued that case appropriateness is a function 
of case modification and that the automated modification of retrieved cases may be 
looked upon as one the last remaining problems of case-based reasoning. However, 
RIESBECK [1996]; MARK, SIMOUDS & HINKLE [1996]; HENNESSY & HINKLE [1992] 
take a different view and suggest that modification should be left to the user. For 
example, RIESBECK states that modification methodologies "are hard to generalise, 
hard to implement, and quick to break", further these "adaptation techniques haue 
to be far more robust than they currently are, far easier to define and support, and of 
far greater value to the system as a whole" [RIESBECK, 1996]. In a similar vein the 
work by MARK, SIMOUDIS & HINKLE on CLAVIER (Lockheed), indicated that 
"automated adaptation of cases was not feasible" [MARK, SIMOUDS & HINKLE, 
1996]. The justification for using previous experience is based upon evidence of it 
having worked before, any "ad hoc automated adaptation invalidates this 
justification" [MARK, SIMOUDS & HINKLE, 1996] since there is no well-founded 
explanation to support that adaptation. 
20. To overcome these problems, the Reflective Process memory explicitly 
includes the user within the reflective learning loop as represented by the following 
stages, (i) modification; (ii) re-evaluation & acceptance and; (iii) integration & 
monitoring. It is felt that the ability of the Reflective Process Memory to present 
failures (or near misses) within the context of the reason for that failure (or near 
miss) and to provide explanations of that failure (or near miss) would be of more 
benefit in helping the user to modify the current case than some ad hoc automated 
135 
adaptation procedure. The success or otherwise of a Reflective Process Memory will 
rely on its ability to create an appropriate problem-solution environment between 
itself and the user. This forms part of a consensus on the dependability of the 
proposed solution and the interaction between the user and the Reflective Process 
Memory. In this section, the interaction between the user and the reflective process 
memory will be discussed with respect to the modification, the re-evaluation & 
acceptance and the integration & monitoring of the new-case (IC) as represented by 
PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: HARRY]. 
7.4.1 MODIFICATION 
21. Each of the cases in the ACTUALITY-MEMORY has an ACTUALITY-WINDOW 
attached. See FIGURE 7.4(a). FIGURE 7.4(a) represents the ACTUALITY-WINDOW OF 
PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM]. Each ACTUALITY-WINDOW 
displays the structure and arrangement of the component SUB-PROCESSES and the 
associated SCENARIOS and CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOMES. Associated with each 
SCENARIO is a REFLECTION-WINDOW. See FIGURE 7.4(b). FIGURE 7.4(b) represents 
the REFLECTION-WINDOW of PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM]. 
The REFLECTION-WINDOW takes account of the hazardous event sequences and the 
SCENARIOS and CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOMES of those hazardous event sequences as 
detailed in the ACTUALITY-WINDOW. It also includes, (i) REFLECTIONS on how the 
case history could have been re-structured to account for these hazardous event 
sequences; (ii) SUGGESTION on actions that may be deemed necessary to return the 
project to a normal state; (iii) EMERGENT-QUESTIONS that should have been asked 
at the project inception. The user interrogates the ACTUALITY-WINDOW of the most- 
relevant-case and decides (on the basis of this interrogation) whether the case 
selected by the RPM (defined by the discrimination functions as being the most- 
relevant) can be applied to the decision problem (as defined by the new case). If the 
most-relevant-case can be applied to the decision problem, then the user 
interrogates the REFLECTION-WINDOW of the most-relevant-case and attempts to 
modify the new case (held in the INPUT-MEMORY) in line with the suggestions of the 
REFLECTION-WINDOW. After updating the new case, the RPM re-classifies the new 
case as a modified-new-case and assigns the modified-new-case to the 
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FIGURE 7.4(b) REFLECTION WINDOW OF PROCESS [TOM] 
SCENARIOS searnaro i: [BewsRwanuabe to 
peNnim aprcii 
a-ýcat t, 1 computanon 
CONSEQUENTIAL 
CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOMES 
(W[COME 1: [project 
suffered time delay & 
Cost overruns] 
EVIDENCE [them is no [ndlcatlo 
EVIDENCE that consequences of scENARto 
seriously damages enoc: E9s] 
HAZARD I. [selective 
HAZARDS attention to technical 
rationale hides potential 
problems] 
A high technical rationale and quality software have been shown to be critical In successful project 
completion. However, a naive acceptance of unproved technical benefits of untested software can be 
catastrophic. A convergent or selective attention can blind the user and the unforeseen results of this 
blindness can result in hidden problems being generated later. 
EMERGENT-QUEsTIOCS 
Have you identified all the critical proem constraints?, Are you allowing technical aspects to constrain tl 
project completion?, Are there any problems with the quality control of the project?, Are you focusing to 
closely on evidence of case success?, Are you satisfying the dient or your own technical expertise? 
NOTES 
REFLECTION1: [a REFLECTION t: [a 
concentration on the concentration on the technical 
REFLECTIONS technical benefits of software benefits of software may 
may compromise project] compromise project] 
StGG FSTION2: [are you 
sUC GEST1oN 1: [are 
con `contrast & a 
SUGGESTIONS 
software requirements compare exercise' 
compatible with project between original software 
requirements? ] & new software? ] 
NEW 0U000ME1: [a closer NEW OU[COME2: [project 
understanding between software team may have greater 
NEW OUTCOMES & project requirements may confidence in abWtyof 
result In fewer problems] software] 
FIGURE 7.5 MODIFICATION 
The ACTUALITY-WINDOW displays REFLECTIONS, ACTIONS & NEW OUTCOMES of each case. The user interrogates 
ACTUALITY-WINDOW of most-relevant-case(s) and decides whether the case selected by RPM as being the most-refevant- 
case(s) can be applied to the decision problem. 
t ACTUALITY-WINDOW 
I 
If most-relevant-case can be applied to the decision 
problem, then the REFLECTION-WINDOW of the most- 
relevant-case is accessed and the user modifies the 




RPM stores the modified new-case (ICS. ) as a modified- 
new-case (NIIC1) in POTENTIALITY-MEMORY and 
moves to RE-EVALUATION & ACCEPTANCE. 
i 
I 
If most-relevant-case CANNOT be applied to the 
decision problem, then the next-most-relevant-case is 
interrogated and so on. 
I 
If none of the relevant-case(s) can be applied, then the 
RPM stores the new-case (ICi) as unmodified-new-case 
(UIC1) in the POTENTIALITY-MEMORY and moves to 
INTEGRATION & MONITORING. 
POTENTIALITY-MEMORY 
............................................................................................................................. 
Step 3: MODIFICATION 
On the basis of the Step 1: PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION, user selects what they 
consider to be most appropriate decision strategy from relevant-case(s) identified in 
Step 2: CASE SELECTION. If none of the relevant-case(s) can be applied, then the 
RPM stores the new case as a unmodified-new-case in the POTENTIALITY-MEMORY 
and moves to Step 5: INTEGRATION & MONITORING. 
" RPM ranks cases in ACTUALITY-MEMORY in order of the most-relevant-case(s). 
The ranking procedure is a function of combined connectivity measures, (i) 
[attributes: NEGATIVE -PREDICTIVES, is-connected-to: NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES] and; 
(ii) [attributes: SUB-PROCESSES, is-connected-to: SUB-PROCESSES]. 
" The user interrogates ACTUALITY-WINDOW of most-relevant-case and decides 
whether the case selected by RPM as being the most-relevant-case can be applied 
to decision problem. 
" If most-relevant-case can be applied to the decision problem, then user 
interrogates REFLECTION-WINDOW of the most-relevant-case and modifies new- 
case (IC) as defined by suggestions of REFLECTION-WINDOW. 
" When modification of new-case (IC) is complete, the RPM re-classifies the new- 
case (IC) as a modified-new-case (MIC), assigns the modified-new-case (MIC) to 
the POTENTIALITY-MEMORY and moves to step 4: RE-EVALUATION & MONITORING. 
" If none of the relevant-case held in ACTUALITY-MEMORY can be applied to 
decision problem, then RPM stores new-case (IC1) as a unmodified-new-case (UiCI) 
in POTENTIALITY-MEMORY and moves to Step 5: INTEGRATION & MONITORING. 
22. Consider the new-case (IC) as represented in FIGURE 7.6. FIGURE 7.6 
expresses the decision problem of the PROCESS: [implementing time-depth 
conversion: HARRY] as part of a hierarchical graphical Process model explanation 
and represents the initial problem input. From the modification phase of the above 
algorithm, the user interrogates the ACTUALITY-WINDOW of the most-relevant-case 
and decides whether the Process Model explanation selected by the Reflective 
Process Memory as being the most-relevant can be applied to the decision problem. 
If the most-relevant-case cannot be applied, or if the user wishes to consider 
alternatives, then the next-most-relevant-case is interrogated by the user. In 
section 7.3, it was noted that SC, (PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: 
TOM]) was the most-relevant-case and SC2 (PROCESS: [implementing time-depth 
conversion: DICK]) was the next-most-relevant-case. The ACTUALITY-WINDOWS and 
REFLECTION-WINDOWS of PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: DICK] are 
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FIGURE 7.7(b) REFLECTION WINDOW of PROCESS: [DICK] 
SCENARIOS 
r-`ý- 
FNARIO 1: [project 
from data caW ratkm 
ps utýEestýc} 
COySEQLtvTw, OITCmL: 1: 
1probiems with data resulted in 
CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOMES project team having a direct 
contact with company's original 
report 
EVIDENCE: I there is no indication 
EVIDENCE that consequences of scE\: sRio 
seriously damages PROCESS 
%''RYi 1: direct contact may HAZARDS threaten independence of 
assessment) 
Since this particular project was a series of sequential processes constrained by time (there was no way of 
paralleling) any unexpected data calibration problems could have series implications. (It was expected that 
Principle Geophysicist could interpret data directly. ) When difficulties arose, It was felt that direct contract 
and the use of similar experiences would help to overcome these problems. This could raise questions over 
the requirements of an independent assessment and the appropriateness of the results of such an 
assessment. 
EMERGE %T QUESTIONS: 
Is the data supplied compatible with the processing methodology?; Why are data calibration problems so 
unexpected?; What steps could you take to minimise the unexpected nature of the problem?; How much 
influence will data problems have on the success or failure of the process?; How could you resolve these 
problems without compromising the process independence?; How could you justify your solution?; In this 
NOTES respect, how would you define measures for success & failure?; What evidence can you use to support 
those measures?; Is a focus on defining evidence for process success Ignoring evidence of failure?; How 
would you answer the claim that you are biased towards defining process success? 
Some concerns were raised over direct contact influencing independence of assessment. While there was a 
belief that the outcome was still compatible with the need for independence as defined by specific objectives 
of the project (See PROCESS OBJEC'rtVES. ), it may be appropriate to develop some measures of evidence 
that show outcome of process still compatible with specific objectives. 
EMERGENT QUESTIONS: 
How would you define a completely independent assessment?; Using that definition, Is your assessment 
Independent?; What evidence do you have that indicates assessment is compatible with objectives?; It 
available, will you use company's previous work, to confirm your assessment?; Would you be conditioned 
by the project constraints to look for similarities?; How does the quality control of the project ensure 
independence of assessment? 
REELECTION 1: jalthough direct 
contact with data source was 
REFLECTIONS 
beneficial questions of 
independence need to he 
considered) 
SUGGESTION 1: 1 will the development of 
measures of EVIDENCE demonstrating 
outcome of process still compatible with 
SUGGESTIONS OBJECrnWes help to address these 
concerns? I 
NEW OETCO: VIE 1: evidential 
demonstration of independence may 
NEW OUTCOMES Increase CLlFXrS confidence in 
predicted reservoir voiumetricsi 
23. In this example, the user could interrogate the ACTUALITY-WINDOWS of 
PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM] and PROCESS: [implementing 
time-depth conversion: DICK]. After this interrogation, the user may decide that 
while PROCESS: [TOM] has more relevance to the current problem; PROCESS: 
[HARRY], (as defined by the connectivity measure; see section 7.3) there are certain 
attributes of PROCESS: [DICK] that could also be considered. For example, PROCESS: 
[HARRY] is composed of SUB-PROCESS 6: [using geo-statistical model to predict 
velocity at well location] and SUB-PROCESS 7: [establishing velocity model]. In 
PROCESS: [TOM] these SUB-PROCESS have been associated with a SCENARIO: [new 
software unable to perform specific geo-statistical computations]. Further, PROCESS: 
[HARRY] is also composed of SUB-PROCESS 3: [loading seismic data] and SUB- 
PROCESS 4: [establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities]. Which 
along with SUB-PROCESS 7: [establishing velocity model] has been associated with a 
SCENARIO: [project suffers from data calibration problems] in PROCESS: [DICK]. 
24. Having decided that there are attributes of both PROCESS: [TOM] and 
PROCESS: [DICK] that may prove useful to the outcome of PROCESS: [HARRY], the 
user then accesses the REFLECTION-WINDOWS. The REFLECTION-WINDOWS of 
PROCESS: [TOM] and PROCESS: [DICK] represent the CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOMES and 
HAZARDS, NOTES, REFLECTIONS, SUGGESTIONS and NEW OUTCOMES for a particular 
SCENARIO. For example, the REFLECTION-WINDOW of PROCESS: [TOM] identifies the 
CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOME: [project suffered time delay & cost overruns]. See 
FIGURE 7.4(b). The HAZARD of this is [selective attention to technical rationale hides 
potential problems]. A REFLECTION [a concentration on the technical benefits of 
software may compromise project] is proposed from which SUGGESTION 1: [are the 
software requirements compatible with project requirements? ] is developed. The 
user could use this and the information provided in the NOTES to modify PROCESS: 
[HARRY]. This modification stage can be continued using the REFLECTION- 
WINDOWS, until the user is satisfied with the re-engineered decision path for 
PROCESS: [HARRY]. 
25. For example, the user after consulting the REFLECTION-WINDOWS of both 
PROCESS: [TOM] and PROCESS: [DICK] may decided to include the following sub- 
processes in PROCESS: [HARRY]; (i) [ensuring software output requirements are 
compatible with project requirements] and; (ii) [developing evidential measures 
demonstrating outcome of process still compatible with objectives]. This can be seen 
in FIGURE 7.8. FIGURE 7.8 represents the ACTUALITY-WINDOW of the MODIFIED- 
PROCESS: [HARRY]. At this point the user can ask the Reflective Process Memory to 
store PROCESS: [HARRY] in the POTENTIALITY-MEMORY. In this example, since it is 
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classifies it as MODIFIED-PROCESS: [HARRY]. However, in FIGURE 7.5 the generic 
terms are used. That is, since a new-case (IC1) has been modified, then it is 
classified as a modified-new-case (MIC). 
7.4.2 RE-EVALUATION & ACCEPTANCE 
26. At this point, the user can either accept the MODIFIED-PROCESS: [HARRY] and 
let the RPM proceed to Integration & Monitoring, or the user could send the 
MODIFIED-PROCESS: [HARRY] back to Problem Identification to be re-evaluated. See 
FIGURE 7.9 The procedure begins again with the RPM using the PREDICTIVE-INDEX 
of NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES to identify potential hazardous event sequences that may 
exist in the MODIFIED-PROCESS: [HARRY]. This feedback loop attempts to ensure 
that any modifications undertaken at the suggestion of the REFLECTION-WINDOWS 
of the most-relevant-case(s) (PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM] 
and PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: DICK]) have not produced some 
additional and spurious hazardous event sequences. If the MODIFIED-PROCESS: 
[HARRY] is accepted by the user, then the RPM stores the MODIFIED-PROCESS: 
[HARRY] as a POTENTIALITY-WINDOW: [HARRY] in the POTENTIALITY-MEMORY and 
moves to Integration & Monitoring. 
Step 4: RE-EVALUATION & ACCEPTANCE 
User can either accept the modified-new-case and let the RPM proceed to Step 5: 
INTEGRATION & MONITORING, or the user could send the modified-new-case back to 
Step 1: PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION to be re-evaluated. 
" If the modified-new-case (MIC, ) is accepted by the user, then the RPM represents 
modified-new-case as a POTENTIALITY-WINDOW in the POTENTIALITY-MEMORY 
and then moves to Step 5: INTEGRATION & MONITORING. 
" Otherwise RPM sends modified-new-case (MICI) back to Step 1: PROBLEM 
IDENTIFICATION to be re-evaluated. 
7.4.3 INTEGRATION & MONITORING 
27. At the completion of the project, the user can compare the ACTUALITY- 
WINDOWS of PROCESS: [TOM] and PROCESS: [DICK] with the MODIFIED-PROCESS: 
[HARRY] in the POTENTIALITY-WINDOW: [HARRY]. See FIGURE 7.10. Those 
hazardous event sequences originally marked as NEGATIVE-PREDICTNES, along 
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FIGURE 7.9 RE-EVALUATION & ACCEPTANCE 
At this stage, If the user can accept the modified-new-case, then the RPM represents the 
modified-new-case as a POTENTIALITY-WINDOW in the POTENTIALITY-MEMORY and move to 
INTEGRATION & MONITORING. Or the user could send the modified-new-case back to PROBLEM 
IDENTIFICATION to be re-evaluated. 
INPUT-MEMORY I PREDICTIVE-INDEX 
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FIGURE 7.10 INTEGRATION & MONITORING 
At project completion user compares ACTUALITY-WINDOW of selected relevant-case(s) with 
POTENTIALITY-WINDOW of either modified-new-case, or unmodified-new-case. 
$ POTENTIALITY-WINDOW ACTUALITY-WINDOW 
I On the basis of this re-evaluation, user updates POTENTIALITY-WINDOW and assigns 
{unique-identifier) to the case represented by that window. RPM re-class fies POTENTIALITY- 
WINDOW as ACTUALITY-WINDOW. RPM re-classifies case held in ACTuALrrY-WINDOW and sends 




RPM then deletes (i) all case(s) in INPUT-MEMORY; (ii) all case(s) in ACTUALITY-MEMORY; (iii) all 
case(s) in POTENTIALITY-MEMORY; (iv) processing ends. 
with the SUGGESTIONS and NEW OUTCOMES of PROCESS: [TOM] and PROCESS: [DICK] 
are compared against the outcome of MODIFIED-PROCESS: [HARRY]. Consequently, 
in the light of that examination those SUB-PROCESSES originally marked as 
NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES may need to be updated. For example, actions undertaken 
by the user at the suggestion of the REFLECTION-WINDOW: [DICK] may have reduced 
the HAZARD associated with the possible occurrence of SCENARIO 1: [problems with 
data resulted in project team having a direct contact with company's original 
report]. However, another SCENARIO associated with SUB-PROCESS 3: [loading 
seismic data] and SUB-PROCESS 4: [establishing interval velocities from seismic 
stacking velocities] may have developed instead. In which case, a REFLECTION- 
WINDOW for PROCESS: [HARRY] is required. The REFLECTION-WINDOW: [HARRY] 
would include the CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOMES and HAZARDS, NOTES, SUGGESTIONS 
and NEW OUTCOMES for that particular SCENARIO. 
Step 5: INTEGRATION & MONITORING 
At project completion, user compares ACTUALITY-WINDOW of selected relevant- 
case(s) with POTENTIALITY-WINDOW of either unmodified-new-case, or modified- 
new-case. 
" User compares the ACTUALITY-WINDOW with POTENTIALITY-WINDOW. 
" User re-evaluates hazardous event sequences originally marked as NEGATIVE- 
PREDICTIVES, along with SUGGESTIONS & NEW OUTCOMES. 
" On the basis of this re-evaluation user updates POTENTIALITY-WINDOW and 
creates REFLECTION-WINDOW for case. 
" RPM re-classifies POTENTIALITY-WINDOW as ACTUALITY-WINDOW. 
" Either user or RPM re-classifies case as CASE {unique_identifier} and sends CASE 
{unique-identifier} to specified CASE-MEMORY. 
" RPM deletes (i) all case(s) in INPUT-MEMORY; (ii) all case(s) in ACTUALITY- 
MEMORY; (iii) all case(s) in POTENTIALITY-MEMORY 
" Processing ends. 
28. On the basis of this evaluation the user updates the POTENTIALITY-WINDOW: 
[HARRY]. After updating the POTENTIALITY-WINDOW: [HARRY] the user specifies 
whether the case displayed in the POTENTIALITY-WINDOW: [HARRY] is a failed-case 
[stored in CASE-MEMORY (FAILURES)] or a failing-case [stored in CASE-MEMORY 
(NON-FAILURES)]. Note, the CASE-MEMORY (FAILURES) holds those case-histories 
that have suffered a complete process failure and the CASE-MEMORY (NON- 
FAILURES) holds those case-histories that although they have potential failure 
conditions, they have successfully met all case objectives. The RPM re-classifies the 
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POTENTIALITY-WINDOW: [HARRY] as the ACTUALITY-WINDOW: [HARRY] and sends the 
PROCESS: [HARRY] to the specified CASE-MEMORY. The RPM deletes (i) all case(s) in 
INPUT-MEMORY; (ii) all case(s) in the ACTUALITY-MEMORY; (iii) all case(s) in the 
POTENTIALITY-MEMORY and (iv) processing ends. 
7.5 DISCUSSION 
29. Consider the Process model explanation of a case as represented by the 
hierarchical Process Model in the ACTUALITY-WINDOWS. In section 6.4, the Process 
Model was defined as, (i) representing a process explanation and consisting of 
events and connections; (ii) these events may be classified as either super- 
processes, processes or sub-processes and each event may have associated 
attributes; (iii) process attributes are organised by a process model algorithm; (iv) 
however not all of the attributes defined by the algorithm will be necessary for a 
complete process explanation; (v) process attributes are generated from a grounded 
analysis of the expert testimony; (vi) process attributes form a language of 
commonalties; (vii) each event is connected to another event and each event is 
connected to itself; (viii) a connection represents either a positive or negative 
symmetrical interaction; (ix) time is positive towards the right. This can be seen in 
FIGURES 7.4 (a), 7.6 & 7.7(a) and represents a process flow. 
30. However, there are other attributes of the ACTUALITY-WINDOW that also 
need consideration. Firstly, by inspection, some of the sub-processes are shadowed. 
See FIGURE 7.4(a). This indicates that the SUB-PROCESS has underlying sub-sub- 
processes. For example, while [loading seismic data] is a SUB-PROCESS of PROCESS: 
[implementing time-depth conversion: TOM], it is also a PROCESS: [loading seismic 
data: TOM] with sub-processes of its own. This forms the basis of the hierarchical 
Process model explanation. The user could activate the SUB-PROCESS 3: [loading 
seismic data] at the PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM] level and 
then drop to the next level; PROCESS: [loading seismic data: TOM]. Secondly, the 
user could activate the ROLE boxes. These will form a hypertext link with the 
documented analysis of PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM]. This 
link to the documented analysis as represented in the Appendices [A] and [B] allows 
the user to browse through the expert testimony and the subsequent analysis 
behind the development of the Process model explanation. Lastly, the SCENARIO is 
also shadowed. However, in this case it is a reverse shadow, indicating that the 
SCENARIO is associated with the surrounding sub-processes and that by activating 
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the SCENARIO the user develops a link between the ACTUALITY-WINDOW and the 
REFLECTION-WINDOW of the PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM]. 
31. Consideration must also be given to the ACTUALITY-WINDOW of the 
MODIFIED-PROCESS: [HARRY] as represented by FIGURE 7.8. It can be seen by 
inspection that the additional SUB-PROCESS A: [developing evidential measures 
demonstrating outcome of process still compatible with objectives] and SUB-PROCESS 
B: [ensuring software output requirements are compatible with project requirements] 
are not shadowed. This indicates that these sub-processes are (i) additions to the 
original process description and; (ii) that they are linked to the REFLECTION- 
WINDOWS of the respective SCENARIOS from which the suggested actions were 
taken. 
32. The REFLECTION-WINDOW represents the engineer's understanding and 
response to the SCENARIO and will include, (i) CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOME; (ii) any 
associated EVIDENCE of possible damage suffered by the PROCESS; (iii) HAZARDS 
that may be associated with the SCENARIO; (iv) SUGGESTIONS made by the project 
team; (v) REFLECTIONS; (vi) the NEW OUTCOMES associated with those REFLECTIONS 
and; (vii) NOTES that explain the problem, including any EMERGENT-QUESTIONS 
that should have been asked at the time, but were not. Each of the boxes are 
hypertext links to the appropriate passage in the analysis of the expert testimony. 
The user could activate a particular attribute of interest and see how the attribute 
was defined and developed during the analysis. 
33. The above represents a discussion on the physical aspects of the Reflective 
Process Memory. The following discussion concentrates on the notion of the 
decision developing from a dynamic reflective interaction between the physical 
aspects of the proposed system and the social world of the user. BRECHTEL [19901, 
has argued that solving problems and the way in which the problem solving task is 
performed appear to be dependent upon the nature of the problem and the way in 
which the individual understands the problem. This implies that the problem- 
solution process could be influenced both by the type of information given and the 
form of its presentation. Unfortunately, conventional decision support tools tend to 
present information as quantitative data rather than process flow. Clearly, the 
solution to a decision problem depends on the information models available to the 
decision maker. Quantitative data based decision tools are by their very nature 
limited since the models on which they are based are necessarily reduced versions 
of reality. Questions of the dependability, the usefulness and the sufficiency of 
these models in the situations in which they are actual used can be raised 
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34. To address these issues, it is suggested that models must help engineering 
practitioners articulate and reflect upon the processes and their interactions and 
the assumptions that can be derived from those interactions. Processes and their 
interactions, both within and between processes are the means through which 
individual and collective senses of reality are constructed. The representation of 
these processes are active agents in constructing process model explanations of the 
past and present and are instrumental in helping the user to decide about the 
future. The manipulation of these process and the interactions generated from that 
manipulation are the core activities of a Reflective Process Memory. 
35. It is hypothesised that the proposed reflective process memory will help a 
decision maker identify incubating failure conditions that have occurred in 
previous case histories and the questions that need to be asked in order to manage 
those conditions away and to generate new opportunities. The key idea is that in 
any particular decision problem the questions that are raised by the stakeholders 
within the process are crucial to attaining eventual success and these can be 
facilitated by access to similar previous case histories. 
36. The proposed reflective process memory will make available to a decision 
maker a rich set of the attributes of previous similar processes including the event 
sequences that have lead to previous failures or near misses. Thus dependable 
evidence of previous similar situations could be added to judgements about the 
present situation (say through an audit) and future projections (from engineering 
scientific predictions and judgements about future scenarios). This tool would be 
especially valuable if the diagnostic use of these event sequences could lead to the 
anticipation of potential problems in future engineering projects through the 
identifying of relevant questions that perhaps should have been asked at the time 
but in fact were not. The results of such a diagnoses presented as interactive 
graphical explanations of the decision paths will help in creating a dynamic 
problem-solution environment. This will encourage the user to make use of those 
explanations in testing the assumptions behind their initial decision path and 
thereby help the individual to falsify those assumptions. 
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7.6 CONCLUSIONS 
" It has been shown how indices of NEGATIVE-PREDICTIVES can be used by a 
Reflective Process memory to discriminate between Process model explanations 
and identify those Process model explanations that are useful to the user. 
+ It has been further shown how the totality of the processes and process- 
interactions (as defined by the SUB-PROCESSES of the problem) can be used by a 
Reflective Process Memory to discriminate between the useful Process model 
explanations and identify those Process model explanations that are relevant to 
the problem-solution environment as defined by the user. 
"A comparison algorithm has been introduced that uses the indices of NEGATIVE- 
PREDICTIVES and the totality of the problem's component SUB-PROCESSES to 
compare Process model explanations and identify the most-relevant Process 
Model explanation. 
It is hypothesised that a Reflective Process memory aids the creation of an 
appropriate problem-solution environment between the user and the system by 
making available to the user a rich set of alternative and relevant Process model 
explanations. These explanations will include the emergent processes that have 
led to previous failures or near misses. 
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CONCLUSIONS: 
CAPTURING CASE HISTORIES FOR CORPORATE 
MEMORY IN DECISION MAKING 
OBJECTIVES 
" To summarise how emergent properties of previous decisions are represented. 
" To critique the representational appropriateness of this formal methodology and 
identify the challenges that the case-based Reflective Process memory will face. 
" To present some ideas on further work, particularly the use of a Reflective Process 
Memory in capturing corporate experiences and how this may aid organisational 
decision making. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions of this thesis are; 
" Conceptual patterns are descriptive, explanatory and predictive processes and 
are used by individuals to understand and thus generate an analysis of the 
problem-solution environment. A set of interacting hierarchical conceptual 
patterns may be viewed as the associative nature of knowledge. 
" The categorisation of a problem-solution environment is a function of its 
emergent properties. Some of these emergent properties will be culturally, 
contextual and content driven and so will emerge from the point-of-view of the 
individual. Others may emerge from the individuals understanding of the role- 
requirements of the problem-solution environment. 
" When an individual uses a conceptual pattern to reason about an external object, 
he/she are testing the hypotheses about the meaning-values and dependence- 
conditions associated with the emergent properties of the object environment. 
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This testing is reflective and is a function of the individual using past knowledge 
in deciding if he/she has or has not seen this object environment before. 
" Reflection is defined as, (i) accessing previous decision experiences; (ii) explaining 
those experiences; (iii) re-evaluating those experiences; (iv) defining the possible 
consequences of pursuing various courses of action; (v) evaluating the merits of 
those various courses of action and then; (vi) monitoring the performance of the 
selected decision. 
" Reflection could be considered to be part of a learning loop, in which the 
individual uses their experiential memory to identify pivotal events of the 
current situation. Having constructed the conceptual pattern the individual will 
then attempt to select a set of alternative decision paths (as defined by the 
experiential memory of the individual), from which a response will be chosen. 
" After selecting a decision path, the individual will then monitor that decision and 
compare the potentiality of the chosen decision with the actuality of that decision 
in the external world. This will contribute to the confidence that is assigned to 
the appropriateness of the selected decision. 
9A conceptual pattern is a representation used by an individual to express their 
understanding of an external object. A formalised understanding is required for 
a machine-based representation. A Process model explanation could be a formal 
representation of that understanding. 
" The representational appropriateness of such a model depends upon the model 
being able to express not only the emergent properties of the external object, but 
also the interacting processes that connect those emergent properties. The 
structure of the model must be able to provide an description of the object in 
terms of an explanation of those emergent properties and process-interactions. 
"A grounded theory analysis results in the generation of an array of conceptual 
patterns, their emergent properties and process-interactions. It provides the 
methodology for defining those aspects of a situation that are responsible for 
causing a particular problem. These conceptual patterns are represented (using a 
Process model algorithm), as a Process model explanation and provide the 
building blocks of the Reflective Process memory. 
" Aspects that are considered responsible for causing a problem may be categorised 
by a Reflective Process memory as predictive of a problem. A Reflective Process 
Memory could create an index of predictives that are associated with previous 
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failure conditions. The recognition of predictives in a Process model explanation 
may help a Reflective Process memory to identified the occurrence of associated 
failure conditions. 
" Process model explanations that are selected could, (i) provide the user with 
relevant reflections and actions on how, when, where and why a problem has 
previously occurred; (ii) point out to the user which aspects are responsible for 
the problem and; (iii) suggest to the user relevant questions that were needed to 
be asked (but were not), during the initial decision path. 
" The proposed Reflective Process memory could make available to the user a rich 
set of alternative Process model explanations and will include the emergent 
processes that have led to previous failures or near misses. Thus dependable 
evidence of failure surrounding similar situations can be added (by the user) to 
judgements about the present situation (through an audit) and future projections 
(from judgements about future opportunities). 
COMMENTS ON RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
1. It has been proposed that if case-based systems are to help human decision 
makers question the effectiveness of the proposed solution, then these systems must 
include a representational structure that can capture, identify and then recognise 
emergent processes in other case-histories. It was suggested that this 
representational structure must present to the user multiple explanations. Thereby 
encouraging the user to make use of those explanations, (i) to test the existing 
assumptions and preconceptions of their current decision path and; (ii) attempt to 
falsify those assumptions rather then confirm. 
2. The approach taken by the author represents a new way of recognising and 
describing processes in case-histories of engineering projects and concentrates on 
three issues. Firstly the development of a graphical model for identifying and 
representing processes and hazardous event sequences. Secondly, the development 
of a diagnostic process model for generating the necessary action through which 
those hazardous event sequences can be managed. Lastly, the development of a 
reflective learning model that may be able to anticipate the occurrence of these 
hazardous event sequences. These models form part of the Reflective Process 
Memory. 
3. It is hypothesised that the appropriateness of the Reflective Process memory 
is a function of its ability to create a dynamic problem-solution environment 
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between the user and the system. An environment supported by a reflective loop 
between a Process model explanation of previous decision solutions and the current 
decision problem. This environment may be characterised as follows, (i) the 
decision develops from dynamic interactions within the physical and social world, 
external to the decision maker; (ii) the decision building process begins as a pattern 
recognition and matching activity, whether the patterns are metaphors, analogies 
or images that the decision maker uses and updates from previous experiences; (iii) 
the decision building process forms part of a reflective learning loop, in which the 
individual constantly tests the dependability of existing assumptions and 
preconceptions of their current decision path and; (iv) in an attempt to falsify those 
assumptions, the individual accesses, re-evaluates and modifies those experiences; 
(v) the decision building process will produce emergent properties at many levels of 
definition; (vi) the effectiveness of the decision building process (accessing previous 
explanations, re-evaluating those previous explanations, modifying those 
explanations and monitoring the performance of the new decision path), depends on 
the overall structure of the interactions between the individual, their cultural 
identity and the problem-solution environment; (vii) the decision building process is 
composed of emergent properties and it is interactions within and between these 
emergent properties that act as a media through which individual and a collected 
sense of a decision are constructed; (viii) these emergent properties are active 
agents in constructing and explaining the experiences of the past and the present 
and are instrumental in helping the decision maker to decide about the future and; 
(ix) the questions that are raised by individuals within the decision building process 
are crucial in attaining the success of that process. 
4. These questions are facilitated by the reflective aspects of the Process model 
explanation. The model behind the Reflective Process Memory is one in which 
decision building, (i) is represented as a reflective process that acts on the 
relationship between previous decisions; (ii) an analysis of how those decisions 
actually performed and; (iii) the incorporation of new experiences. The nature of 
the Reflective Process memory in decision making views decision building as an 
activity that questions and tests the users understanding of the external problem. 
Consequently, this interaction between the user and the Reflective Process memory 
allows the Reflective Process memory to develop a better understanding of how to 
avoid similar failures in the future. This model of decision making views learning 
as a questioning activity that reflects on the relationship between previous 
decisions, an analysis of how those decisions actually performed and the integration 
of new experiences. By using a series of negative-predictives and emergent- 
questions in an attempt to refute the Process model explanation, the Reflective 
Process Memory is encouraging the user to engage in an activity of hypothesis 
testing. When the current process model explanation is found wanting, then the 
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Reflective Process memory displays alternative decision paths. The use of 
alternatives encourages the user to engage in an activity of reflective induction. In 
which the individual begins to question, (i) his/her understanding of the current 
decision path, (ii) the way in which it relates to the current decision problem and; 
(iii) the inferred outcome of that decision path. This hypothesis testing and 
reflective induction may be viewed as a process of justification. 
COMMENTS ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5. One of the criticisms, that is often aimed at knowledge elicitation exercises 
is that of controlled direction or bias. Since, knowledge elicitation will involve some 
element of human judgement, then a tension between the subjective of the 
knowledge engineer and the objectivity required by the analysis will exist. As noted 
by PIDGEON, TURNER & BLOCKLEY [1991], "the facets of the evidence collected will 
vary with the aims of the system being built and with the nature of the testimony 
offered by the domain expert, as well as being responsive in some degree to the 
individual perceptions of the investigator. " However, there is a distinction between a 
system and a system description. The testimony of the domain expert represents 
their understanding of the problem domain. An analysis of this testimony will 
represent the knowledge engineer's explanation of the expert's understanding of the 
problem domain. Consequently, this analysis represents a meta-explanation. It is a 
representation of an explanation of an explanation and as this representation 
moves away from the actuality of the domain, then this representation will become 
more abstract. 
6. In this respect, bias is a function of the abstraction; in which perceptions of 
the investigator may begin to dominate the representation of an explanation of an 
explanation. Everyone will have a point of view. However, it is the notion of 
agreement that sets the grounded approach apart. This stems from individuals, 
who over a long period of time test a statement about the defined meaning of a 
particular object. 
7. There may be universal agreements. For example, one defining agreement 
of the object [planet earth] is that it {orbits the sun}. This universal agreement may 
be defined as a truth. However some agreements may not be universally accepted. 
For example, the argument {causes cancer} is not universally accepted as being a 
defining agreement of [smoking cigarettes]. In this example, an agreement may be 
more appropriately viewed as being dependable. In this respect, an agreement may 
be looked upon as a shared or collective responsibility in which there is a collective 
understanding associated with a particular object or process. This agreement may 
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act as a measure of dependability. For example, tests of dependability are defined 
by a set of rules that govern the way in which the object behaves. Measures of 
dependability governed by a collective agreement represent that behaviour. 
However, when an analysis of some testimony represents a knowledge engineer's 
explanation of the expert's understanding of a problem domain, then tests of 
dependability are more difficult to define and hence the tendency for associated 
bias. The tension between the subjective and the objectivity is dynamic and hence 
the difficulty in obtaining total agreement. In this respect, a grounded approach 
tries to minimise the bias. It is a collective process, that generates concepts and 
concept definitions by agreement between the knowledge engineer and the domain 
expert. This agreement can never be total and hence the generated concepts and 
concept definitions can never be true. But they can be dependable, a dependability 
that is governed by the degree of agreement that they excite. 
8. Another criticism stems from an engineering perspective and is concerned 
with processes. During the author's use of the grounded approach during the 
development of a process model explanation he interviewed three geophysicists. 
Before beginning each case study the author discussed with the geophysicists the 
ideas behind the process centric view. This was very valuable, since it highlighted a 
universal confusion in the geophysicists between data and processes. For example, 
they had difficulty in understanding the distinction between data and processes and 
that while data is one of set of attributes of a process it also derives from a process. 
They focused almost exclusively on data and either misunderstood or ignored that 
the emphasis of processes is on managing a changing data set. A similar 
misunderstanding occurred with the definitions of dependability and success. For 
example, information was considered dependable if it could be relied upon. This 
suggested that dependability has an implicit meaning, defined as it is by the notion 
of responsibility. If success may be looked upon as a satisfying criteria, then 
consequently the criteria for success will be explicitly stated. However, in the 
process centric view dependability and success are inter-linked. Evidence is a 
measure in the dependability of a process to successfully achieve the objectives of 
the process. Evidence is a measure of the dependability of the process to reach the 
success event. The objectives of the process are the statements of the success event. 
Until these views are clearly represented, understood and demonstrated, then the 
engineering community will continue to view with suspicion the notion of processes 
and continue to confuse process with data transformation. 
9. Finally, the fundamental question; how good is the model presented in this 
thesis? The model as presented is a hypothetical construct and is not yet in a 
testable form. It is suggested that the proposed methodology and model and the 
system that has been designed to implement and test that model represents a new 
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and novel way of representing the emergent properties and process interactions of 
previous decision. However, the representational appropriateness of this 
methodology and the dependability of the model will not be known empirically until 
the system can be tested. 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
10. The quality of decision making in organisations would be improved if there 
was a formal way of capturing and using the corporate memory of previous 
experiences and case histories. Such a memory currently exists informally in the 
paper and electronic files of the organisation and in the minds of past and present 
employees. A formal corporate memory would be at the heart of organisational 
learning. Clearly, the solution to a decision problem depends on the information 
models available to the decision maker. However, conventional data-focused 
systems may not meet the requirements of future corporate decision making. For 
example, quantitative data based decision tools are by their very nature limited 
since the models on which they are based are necessarily reduced versions of reality. 
So how do we represent the dependability of these models and their usefulness? 
How far do they fall short of sufficiency and can they be improved? Is the answer to 
obtain more data or develop improved methods for identifying, explaining and 
displaying the processes (and their associated data structures) that underlie the 
decision path? How can previous experience of decisions problems be captured to 
provide a corporate memory? 
11. From the perspective of the work undertaken by the author at the 
University of Bristol, it is suggested that at a corporate level and in a manner 
similar, but also slightly different to that at the individual level, this organisational 
knowledge may also be composed of event sequences, in which processes and 
interactions between those processes are the media through which meaning and 
understanding are bestowed to the corporate body. These processes are active 
agents in constructing an experience of the past and present and may be 
instrumental in helping the organisation to decide about the future. 
12. The key idea is to help practitioners articulate and reflect upon the 
processes and relations and the assumptions that they make. The manipulation 
(whether mental or physical) of the images of these processes are the core activities 
of a reflective memory. A corporate Reflective Process memory will enable the 
organisation to learn from previous corporate experiences and distribute that 
expertise across the organisation. However, while these experiences become much 
more global, dynamic and even virtual, they will also become much more social and 
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involve large numbers of individuals across an organisation. The properties of such 
experiences will emerge from the interactions of its parts. For example, complex 
properties such as corporate identity and culture are built on corporate memory. At 
present that memory lies in the minds of the members and files of the organisation. 
Such memories are not easily accessible. A intranet-based corporate Reflective 
Process memory will make the corporate memory more accessible, available and 
hence potentially of much greater usefulness and influence. It is important that 
this is done in a way that is organised for the corporate benefit. The Reflective 
Process memory suggested here is the basis of one such way of doing that. It is 
hypothesised that the reflective process model will enable links to be made between 
technical factors and economic, environmental, cultural and social considerations of 
the decision building process. It is at this interface where so many difficulties tend 
to be found. 
13. Clearly, this is a very complex area of development about which current 
ideas and benefits to be accrued are just emerging. For example, if corporate 
memory adds value to an organisation, then creating and sharing that knowledge 
will add more value. If corporate memory generates innovation, then creative 
solutions can lead to greater efficiencies. If corporate memory of the external 
environment can be used to spot organisational strengths and weakness, then it can 
also be used to spot opportunities and threats. However, there is one aspect of a 
corporate memory that may prove a limitation. For example, is hypothesised that a 
reflective corporate memory may be able to provide organisations with 
organisational knowledge and to distribute that expertise across the organisation. 
However, such knowledge changes over time. It will have a temporal dimension; 
new experiences are amassed and less relevant ones are forgotten. Consequently, 
as the organisation changes, so does the Reflective Process Memory. In a sense it 
acquires a corporate identity. The Reflective Process memory becomes the 
organisation. In that situation, how will such a memory deal with a business 
environment that is characterised by a non-linear dynamic instability and 
uncertainty such as that seen in deterministic chaotic systems? 
152 
REFERENCES 
ALLWOOD, J., ANDERSSON, L., & DAHL, 0., [197711. Logic in linguistics, (Cambridge) 
Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge textbooks in linguistics), Translation and 
revision of, 'Logik for lingvister'. (Lund), Studentlitteratur, 1971. ISBN: 0-521- 
21496-3 
BALL, L. D., FOLEY, L., & DAVIS, J. P., [1996]. Process models and evidential support 
theory applied to reservoir top structure and oil water contact, Juniper document No 
5-MR9501/05, published by The Petroleum Science & Technology Institute. 
BANNISTER, D., & FARNSELLA, F. [1971). Inquiring man: The theory of personal 
constructs, Penguin. 
BARR, J. M., & MAGALGI, R. V., [1996]. Corporate knowledge management for the 
millennium, EWCBR '96 (Workshop : 1996: Lausanne) Advances in case-based 
reasoning : Third European Workshop, EWCBR-96, Lausanne, Switzerland, 
November 14-16,1996, selected papers, edited by I. Smith, B. Faltings (Berlin) 
Springer, cl 996. (Lecture notes in computer science ; 1168. Lecture notes in 
artificial intelligence) 3rd European Workshop on Case-Based Reasoning. - Spine title: EWCBR-96. ISBN: 3-540-61955-0 
BLOCKLEY, D. I., & ROBERTSON, C. I., [19831. An analysis of the characteristics of a 
good civil engineer, Proceedings of the institute of Civil Engineers, Part 2, pp. 77-94. 
BLOCKLEY, D. I. [1 980]. The nature of structural design and safety. (Chichester) : 
Ellis Horwood, (Ellis Horwood series in engineering science). ISBN: 0-85312-179-6 
BLOCKLEY, D. I. [19921. Engineering from reflective practice, in Research in 
Engineering Design, Vol. 4, pp. 13-22. 
BLOCKLEY, D. I., [19971. Process Model Algorithm, unpublished document, Civil 
Engineering Dept, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK. 
BOUD, D., ET AL [19851. Reflection : turning experience into learning, edited by David 
Boud, Rosemary Keogh and David Walker, published by Kogan Page, ISBN: 0- 
85038-864-3. 
BoYD, E. M., & FALEs, A. W, [1983]. Reflective learning: Key to learning from 
experience, in Journal of Humanistic Psychology, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 99-117. 
BRAINE, M. D. S., & O'BRIEN, D. P. [1991 IA theory of if- A lexical entry, reasoning 
program and pragmatic principles, Psychological Review, Vol. 98, pp. 182-203. 
BRECHTEL, W. [1990]. Connectionism & the philosophy of mind: An overview, in 
Mind & Cognition: A Reader, edited by W. G. Lycan, published by Basil Blackwell 
Ltd, ISBN: 0-631-16763-3 
BREHMER, B. [1986]. In one word: Not from experience, pp. 705-719, in Judgement & 
Decision Making, edited by H. R. Arkes., & K. R. Hammond, published by 
Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 0-521-32617-6. 
153 
BURROUGH, P. A., & MCDONNELL, R. A., [1998]. Principles of geographical 
information systems, 2nd ed. (Oxford) Oxford University Press, (Spatial information 
systems) Previous edition published as: Principles of geographical information 
systems for land resources assessment. 1986. ISBN: 0-19-823366-3. 
CAMERER, C. F., & JOHNSON, E. J. [19911. The process-performance paradox in expert 
judgement. (How can experts know so much & predict so badly? ), pp. 195-217, in 
Toward a General theory of Expertise, edited by K. A. Ericson & J. Smith, published 
by The Cambridge University Press. 
CARLEY, M., [19821. Analytic rationality, in Decision making : approaches and 
analysis: A reader, pp. 60-66, edited by Anthony G. McGrew and M. J. Wilson, 
published by (Manchester) : Manchester University Press in association with the 
Open University, ISBN: 0-7190-0890-5. 
CHARMAZ, C., [19901. Discovering chronic illness: Using grounded theory, in Social 
science & medicine, Vol 30, pp. 1161-1172, published by Exeter : Pergamon 
Journals, ISBN: 0277-9536. School for Policy Studies 
CHOMSKY, N. [1967]. The formal nature of language, pp. 397-442, in Biological 
Foundations of Language, edited by E. H. Lenneberg, published by John Wiley & 
Sons, ISBN: 0-471-52626-6. 
CLARK, A. [19931. Associative engines: Connectionism, concepts & representational 
change, published by The MIT Press, ISBN: 0-262-03210-4. 
COMERFORD, J. D., & BLOCKLEY, D. I., [1993]. Managing safety and hazard through 
dependability, Structural Safety, Vol. 12, pp. 21-33. 
CONWAY, T., & WILSON, M. [19881, Psychological studies of knowledge representation, 
pp. 117-160, in Approaches To Knowledge Representation, edited by G. A. Ringland 
& D. A. Duce, published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. ISBN: 0-86380-080-7. 
COOKE, N. M., & MCDONALD, J. E., [19871. The application of psychological scaling 
techniques to knowledge elicitation for knowledge-based systems, in International 
journal of man-machine studies, Vol. 26, pp. 533-550, published by London : 
Academic Press, ISBN: 0020-7373. 
CUI5 W., & BLOCKLEY, D. I., [1990]. Interval probability theory for evidential 
support, International Journal of Intelligent Systems, Vol. 5, pp. 183-192. 
DAVIS, J., BLOCKLEY, D. I., DROMGOOLE, P., & FLETCHER, A., [19961. Modelling 
uncertainty, Juniper document No 4-MR9501/04, published by The Petroleum 
Science & Technology Institute. 
DAWES, R. M., & CORRIGAN, B., [19741. Linear models in decision making. 
Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 81, pp. 95-106. 
DAY, J. M., [19931. Plato [Meno. English] Plato's Meno in focus, edited by J. M. Day, 
published by (London): Routledge, (In focus series). ISBN: 0-415-00297-4 
DE KLEER & BROWN., [19831. Assumptions & ambiguities in mechanistic mental 
models, in Mental models, pp. 155-190, edited by D. Gentner., & A. L. Stevens, 
154 
published by (Hillsdale, N. J. ) Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, (Cognitive science), 
ISBN: 0-89859-242-9. 
DEWEY, J. [19331. How we think :a restatement of the relation of reflective thinking 
to the educative process, 2nd ed, published by D. C. Heath, (First published 1909), 
ISBN: x-30-063553-1. 
DIAS, W. P. S. & BLOCKLEY, D. I. [1995]. Reflective practice in engineering design. 
Proceedings of the Institute of Civil Engineers, Civil Engineering, Vol. 108, Nov., pp. 
160-168. 
DREYFUS, H. L., & DREYFUS, S. E., [1986]. Mind over Machine: The Power of Human 
Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer, published by New York: The 
Free Press. Queens QA76.9. C66 DRE 
DUNCAN, K. [19871. Reflections on fault diagnostic expertise, in, New Technology and 
Human Error, edited by, J. Rasmussen., K. Duncan & J. Leplat., published by Wiley, 
ISBN: 0-471-91044-9. 
DUTTA, S., & BONISSONE, P. P., [1992). Intergrating Case- and Rule-Based 
Reasoning, International Journal of Aprroximate Reasoning, Vol. 8, pp. 163-203, 
Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 
ERICSSON, K. A., & SIMON, H. A., [19931. Protocol analysis : verbal reports as data, 
Rev. Ed, published by Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ISBN: 0-262-05047-1. A&S 
BF455 ERI 
EVANS, J. ST. B. T. [19891. Bias in human reasoning: Causes & consequences, 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, ISBN: 0-86377-106-8. 
EvANs, J. ST. P. T. [19911. Theories of human reasoning: The fragmented state of the 
art, Theory & Psychology, Vol. 1, pp. 83-105. 
FODOR, J. A., [1981], Representations: Philosophical essays on the foundations of 
cognitive science, published by The MIT Press, ISBN: 0-85527-977. 
FODOR, J. A., [1990]. Why there still has to be a language of thought, in NEnd & 
Cognition, edited by W. G. Lycan, published by Basil Blackwell Ltd, ISBN: 0-631- 
16763-3. 
FORSYTHE, D. E., & BUCHANAN. B. G., [1989). Knowledge acquisition for expert 
systems: some pitfalls and suggestions, in IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and 
Cybernetics, VOL. SMC-19, pp. 435-442. 
GAINES, B. R., & SHAW, M. L. G., [1980]. New directions in the analysis and 
interactive elicitation of personal construct systems, in International journal of man- 
machine studies, Vol. 13, pp. 81-116, published by London : Academic Press, ISBN: 
0020-7373. 
GALOTTI, K. M., BARON, J., & SABINI, J. P. [19861. Individual differences in 
syllogistic reasoning: Deduction rules or mental models? Journal of Experimental 
Psycholgy: General, Vol. 115, No. 1, pp. 16-25. 
155 
GARNER, W. R. [1978]. Aspects of a stimulus: Features, dimensions & configurations, 
in Cognition & Categorisation, pp. 99-131, edited by E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd, 
published by published by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd, ISBN: 0-470-26377-6. 
GLASER, B. G., & STRAUSS, A. L., [19681. The discovery of grounded theory : 
strategies for qualitative research, edited by B. G. Glaser and A. L. Strauss. London : 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, (Reprint of the ed. published Chicago: Aldine, 1967. ), 
ISBN: 0-297-76318-0. 
HALL, P., [19871. Aproaching the problem, in Decision Making: Approaches & 
Analysis, pp. 41-47, edited by A. G. McGrew & M. J. Wilson, published by 
manchester University Press (in association with the Open University), ISBN: 0- 
7190-0890-5. 
HAMMOND, K. J., [1989]. Case-Based Planning: Viewing Planning as a Memory 
Task, Academic Press, Inc. ISBN: 0-12-322060-2. 
HAMMONO, K. J., [19901. Case-based planning: A framework for planning from 
experience, Cognitive Science, Vol, 14, pp. 385-443. 
HAMPTON, J. A. [1987]. Inheritance of attributes in natural concept conjunctions, in 
Memory & Cognition, Vol. 15, pp. 55-71. 
HAMPTON, J., & DUBOIS, D. [1993]. Psychological models of concepts: Introduction, in 
Categories & Concepts: Theoretical Views & Inductive Data, pp. 11-33, edited by I. 
van Mechelen., J. A. Hampton., R. Michalski., & P. Theons, published by Academic 
Press, ISBN: 0-12-714175-8. 
HENNESSY, D., & HINKLE, D., [1992). Applying Case-Based Reasoning to Autoclave 
Loading, IEEE Expert, October, pp. 21-26. 
HUME, D., [1711-76]. A treatise of human nature, edited with an introduction by E. 
C. Mossner. (Harmondsworth): Penguin, 1969. (Penguin classics) This ed. previously 
published as a Pelican book, 1969, ISBN: 0-14-043244-2. 
JAKES, J., [1982]. Individual decision making, in Decision making : approaches and 
analysis: A reader, pp. 53-59, edited by Anthony G. McGrew and M. J. Wilson, 
published by (Manchester) : Manchester University Press in association with the 
Open University, ISBN: 0-7190-0890-5. 
JANIS, I. L., & MANN, L., [19771. Decision making :a psychological analysis of 
conflict, choice, and commitment. (New York) The Free Press, ISBN: 0-02-916160-6. 
JONASSEN, D. H., BEISSNER, K., & YACCi, M., [19931. Structural Knowledge: 
Techniques for Representing, Conveying and Acquiring Structural Knowledge, 
published by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates., ISBN: 0-8058-1009-9. 
JOHNSON-LAIRD, P N. [19831. Mental Models, published by Cambridge University 
Press. 
JOHNSON-LAIRD, P. N., & BYRNE, R. M. J. [19911. Deduction, published by Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates Ltd, ISBN: 0-86377-148-3. 
156 
JOHNSON-LAIRD, P. N., SCHAEKEN, W, & BYRNE, R. M. J. [1992]. Propositional 
Reasoning by Model, Psychological Review, Vol. 99, No. 3, pp. 418-439. 
KOESTLER, A. [19671. The ghost in the machine, published by Hutchinson, ISBN: 0- 
09-127130-4. 
KOLODNER, J. K., & MARK, M., [19921. Case-Based Reasoning, IEEE Expert, 
October, pp. 5-6. 
KRAUSE, P., & CLARK, D. [19931. Representing Uncertain Knowledge, published by 
Oxford: Intellect Books, ISBN: 1-871516-17-x. 
LARSON, R. K. [19901. Semantics, in An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Vol. 1, pp. 
23-42, edited by D. N. Osherson., & H. Lasnik, published by The MIT Press, ISBN: 
0-262-65033-9 NJ). 
LEVINE, J., MUSHENO, M., & PALUMBOM, D., [1975]. The limits of rational choice in 
evaluating criminal justice policy, in Policy studies and the social sciences, edited by 
Stuart S. Nagel., published by (Lexington, Mass). : D. C. Heath, Based on symposia 
co-ordinated by the Policy Studies Organisation. ISBN: 0-669-99531-2. 
LINDBLOM, C., [19821. Still muddling, not yet through, in Decision making : 
approaches and analysis: A reader, pp. 125-138, edited by Anthony G. McGrew and 
M. J. Wilson, published by (Manchester) : Manchester University Press in 
association with the Open University, ISBN: 0-7190-0890-5. 
LYCAN, W. G., [1990]. Mind and Cognition: A reader, edited by W. G. Lycan, 
published by Basil Blackwell Ltd, ISBN: 0-631-16763-3. 
MCGREW, A. G., & WILSON, M. J., [1982]., Understanding decision making, in 
Decision making : approaches and analysis: A reader, pp. 13-15, edited by Anthony 
G. McGrew and M. J. Wilson, published by (Manchester) : Manchester University 
Press in association with the Open University. ISBN: 0-7190-0890-5. 
MCQUILLIN, R., BACON. M., & BARCLAY, W., [19791. A Introduction to Seismic 
Interpretation, published by Graham & Trotman Ltd, London, ISBN: 0-86010-111- 
8. 
MACKENZIE, W. J., [1982]. Choice and decision, in Decision making : approaches 
and analysis: A reader, pp. 16-18, edited by Anthony G. McGrew and M. J. Wilson, 
published by (Manchester) : Manchester University Press in association with the 
Open University. ISBN: 0-7190-0890-5. 
MAGEE, B., [1 982]. Popper, [1st ed. ] with revised postscript and bibliography, 
(London), Fontana Press, (Fantana modern masters), ISBN: 0-00-686008-7 
MARK, W., SIMOUDS, E., & HINKLE. D., [1996]. Case-based reasoning: Expectations 
and results, in Case-based reasoning: Experiences, lessons and future directions, pp. 
269-294, edited by D. B. Leake, published by AAAI Press/The MIT Press, ISBN: 0- 
262-62110-x 
MURPHY, G. L. [19881. Comprehending complex concepts, in Cognitive Science, Vol. 
12, pp. 529-562. 
157 
NEWELL, A., & SIMON, H. A., [1972]. Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, ISBN: 0-13-445403-0. 
NORMAN, D. A. [19831. Some observations on mental models, in Mental Models, pp. 
7-14, edited by D. Gentner, & A. L. Stevens, published by Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, ISBN: 0-89859-242-9. 
NORMAN, D. A., [1985]. Twelve Issues for Cognitive Science, in Issues in Cognitive 
Modelling. A reader edited by A. M. Aitkenhead & J. M. Slack, published by (Hove) 
: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates in association with the Open University. ISBN: 0- 
86377-030-4. 
NORRIS, D., PILSWORTH, B. W, & BALDWIN, J. F., [19871. Medical diagnosis from 
patient records: A method using fuzzy discrimination and connectivity analyses, 
Fuzzy Sets & Systems, Vol. 23, pp. 73-87. 
OSHERSON, D. N., & SMITH, E. E. [1981]. On the adequacy of prototype theory as a 
theory of concepts, in Cognition, Vol. 9, pp. 35-58. 
PALMER, S. E. [1978], Fundamental aspects of cognitive representation, in Cognition 
& Categorisation, edited by E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd, published by Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates Ltd, ISBN: 0-470-26377-6. 
PASCOE, E., & PIDGEON, N., [1995). Risk orientation in dynamic decision making, 
Decision Making, pp. 301-321. 
PEARCE, M., GOEL, A. K., KOLODNER, J. L., ZIMRING, C., SENTOSA, L., & BILLINGTON, 
R., [1992]. Case-Based Design Support, IEEE Expert, October, pp. 14-20. 
PENNINGTON & HASTIE., [1993]. Reasoning in explanation-based decision making, 
in Cognition, Vol. 49, pp. 123-163. 
PIDGEON, N., [1996]. Grounded theory: theoretical background, in Handbook of 
Qualitative Research: Methods for Psychology and the Social Sciences, pp. 75-85, 
edited by J. T. E. Richardson, published by British Psychological Society Books, 
Leicester, ISBN: 1-85433-204-x. 
PIDGEON, N., & HENWOOD, K., [1994]. Grounded theory: practical implementation, 
in Handbook of Qualitative Research: Methods for Psychology and the Social 
Sciences, pp. 86-101, edited by J. T. E. Richardson, published by British 
Psychological Society Books, Leicester, ISBN: 1-85433-204-x. 
PIDGEON, N. F., TURNER, B. A., & BLOCKLEY, D. I., [19911. The use of Grounded 
Theory for conceptual analysis in knowledge elicitation, in Int. Journal Man- 
Machine Studies, Vol. 35, pp. 151-173. 
PLATT, D. G., [1995]. Process modelling and process support envionments for design 
management, Thesis (Ph. D. ) - University of Bristol, 1995. 
POPPER, K. R., [1972]. Conjectures and refutations : the growth of scientific 
knowledge, (5th ed. ). London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, ISBN: x-10-300632-9. 
158 
RASMUSSEN, J. [1983]. Skills, rules, knowledge; signals, signs, & symbols, & other 
distinctions in human performance models, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man & 
Cybernetics, Vol. SMC-13, No. 3, pp. 257-267. 
RASMUSSEN, J. [19871. Cognitive control & human error mechanisms, in New 
Technology & Human Error, edited by, J. Rasmussen, K. Duncan & J. Leplat, 
published by Wiley, ISBN: 0-471-91044-9. 
REASON, J. [19871. Generic error-modelling system (GEMS): A cognitive framework 
for locating common human error forms, in New Technology and Human Error, 
edited by, J. Rasmussen, K. Duncan & J. Leplat, published by Wiley, ISBN: 0-471- 
91044-9. 
REASON, J. T., [1990]. Human error. (Cambridge) : Cambridge University Press, 
ISBN: 0-521-30669-8 
RICH, E., [19911. Artificial Intelligence, 2nd ed. Edited by E, Rich., &K Knight, 
published (New York), McGraw-Hill, 1 st ed. by Elaine Rich. ISBN: 0-07-052263-4. 
RIESBECK. C., [1996]. What next? The future of case-based reasoning in post- 
modern Al, pp. 371-388, in Case-based reasoning: Experiences, lessons and future 
directions, pp. 269-294, edited by D. B. Leake, published by AAAI Press/The MIT 
Press, ISBN: 0-262-62110-x 
RIPS, L. J. [1983]. Cognitive processes in propositional reasoning, Psychological 
Review, Vol. 90, pp. 38-71. 
ROBERTS, M. J. [19931. Human reasoning: Deduction rules or mental models, or both, 
The quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, Vol. 46A, No. 4, pp. 569-589. 
ROSCH, E. [1977]. Classification of real-world objects: Origins & representations in 
cognition, pp. 212-222, in Thinking: Readings in cognitive science, edited by P. N. 
Johnson-Laird & P. C. Wason, published by Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 0- 
521-29267-0. 
RÖSCH, E. [1978], Principles of categorisation, pp. 28-46, in Cognition & 
Categorisation, edited by E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd, published by Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates Ltd, ISBN: 0-470-26377-6. 
BOSCH, E. H., MERVIS, C. B., GRAVY, W. D., JOHNSON, D. M., & BOYES-BRAEM, P. 
[1976]. Basic objects in natural categories, Cognitive Psychology, Vol. 8, pp. 382-439. 
ROUSE, W. B., & MORRIS, N. M. [1986]. On looking into the black box: Prospects & 
limits in the search for mental models, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 100, No. 3, pp. 
349-363. 
RUMELHART, D. E., & NORMAN, D. A. [1985], Representation of knowledge, in Issues 
In Cognitive Modelling, pp. 15-62, edited by A. M. Aitkenhead & J. M. Slack, 
published by Lawrence Eribaum Associates Ltd, ISBN: 0-86377-030-4. 
SAMUELSON, P., [1982]. Problems of economic organisation, in Decision making : 
approaches and analysis: A reader, pp67-86, edited by Anthony G. McGrew and M. J. 
159 
Wilson, published by (Manchester) : Manchester University Press in association 
with the Open University, ISBN: 0-7190-0890-5. 
SCHANK, R. C., [19751. The structure of episodes in memory, in Representation and 
understanding : studies in cognitive science, pp. 237-272, edited by Daniel G. 
Bobrow and Allan Collins. New York : Academic Press, 1975. (Language, thought 
and culture advances in the study of cognition). ISBN: 0-12-108550-3. 
SCHANK, R. C. [19851. Reminding and Memory Organisation, in Issues in Cognitive 
Modelling, pp. 229-249, edited by A. M. Aitkenhead & J. M. Slack, published by 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd, (An Open University set book), ISBN: 0-86377- 
030-4 
SCHON, D. A., [19871. Educating the reflective practioner, (San Francisco, Calif. ), 
Jossey-Bass, (Jossey-Bass higher education series), ISBN: 1-55542-025-7. 
SCHON, D. A. [1983]. The reflective practitioner. how professionals think in action, 
(Aldershot), Arena, Originally published 1983; paperback ed. originally published: 
(Aldershot), Avebury, 1991, ISBN: 1-85742-319-4. 
SHADIER, P., PIERSON, L., LANG, S., [19741. Converging evidence for the functional 
significance of imagery in problem solving, Cognition, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 359-375. 
SHAW, M. L. G., & GAINES, B. R., [1987]. KITTEN: Knowledge initiation and 
transfer tools for experts and novices, in International journal of man-machine 
studies, Vol. 27, pp. 251 -280, published by London : Academic Press, ISBN: 0020- 
7373. 
SHORTLIFFE, E. H., [19851. Rule-based expert systems : the MYCIN experiments of 
the Stanford Heuristic Programming Project, edited by Bruce G. Buchanan, & 
Edward H. Shortliffe, published by Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, cl 984, (The 
Addison-Wesley series in artificial intelligence) Reprinted with corrections, ISBN: 0- 
201-10172-6. 
SIMON, H. A., [1982]. From substantive to procedural rationality, in Decision 
making : approaches and analysis: A reader, pp. 87-96, edited by Anthony G. 
McGrew and M. J. Wilson, published by (Manchester) : Manchester University Press 
in association with the Open University, ISBN: 0-7190-0890-5. 
SIMON, H., [1987]. Rationality in psychology and economics, in Rational choice : the 
contrast between economics and psychology, pp. 116-124, edited by Robin M. 
Hogarth and Melvin W Reder, published in (Chicago) : University of Chicago Press, 
1987. Previously published as, The Behavioral foundations of economic theory. 1986 
- Originally published in the supplement to the Oct. 1986 issue of The Journal of 
Business (59: 4,2). ISBN: 0-226-34857-1. 
SMITH, E. E., & MEDIN, D. L., [19811. Categories and concepts, published by 
(Cambrige), Mass. : Harvard University Press, (Cognitive science series ; 4). ISBN: 
0-674-10275-4 
SMITH, G., & MAY, D., [19821. The artificial debate between rationalist and 
incremental models of decision making, in Decision making : approaches and 
analysis. A reader edited by Anthony G. McGrew and M. J. Wilson, published by 
160 
(Manchester) : Manchester University Press in association with the Open 
University, ISBN: 0-7190-0890-5. 
SMYTH, B., & KEANE, M., [1993]. Retrieving adaptable cases, in EWCBR 93 
(Workshop : 1993 : Kaiserslautern, Germany) Topics in case-based reasoning : First European Workshop, EWCBR-93, Kaiserslautern, Germany, November 1-5,1993, 
pp. 209-220, edited by Stefan Wess, Klaus-Dieter Althoff, Michael M. Richter, 
published by (Berlin) Springer, (Lecture notes in computer science ; 837. Lecture 
notes in artificial intelligence)1 st European Workshop on Case-Based Reasoning. 
Spine title: EWCBR-93. ISBN: 0-387-58330-0. 
STONE, J., [19891. Expert system learning from structural failures, unpublished 
thesis, University of Bristol 
STRAUSS, A., & CORBIN, J., [1994]. Grounded Theory Methodology: An Overview, in 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, edited by N. K. Dengin & Y. S. Lincoln, 
published by Thousand Oaks, California, ISBN: 
TAKAGI, T. [1994]. Context sensitive knowledge processing based on conceptual fuzzy 
sets, in Fuzzy sets, neural networks & soft computing, pp. 331-344, edited by R. R. 
Yager & L. A. Zadeh, published by Van Nostrand Reinhold, ISBN: 0-442-01621-2. 
TURNER, B. A., [1978: 1997]. Man-made disasters, edited by B. A. Turner and N. F. 
Pidgeon. - 2nd ed. Oxford : Butterworth-Heinemann, Previous ed.: London: 
Wykeham, 1978. ISBN: 0-7506-2087-0 
TVERSKY, A. [19771. Features of Similarity, in Psychological Review, Vol. 84, No. 4, 
pp. 327-352. 
TVERSKY, A., & KAHEMAN, D. [1986]. Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics & 
biases, in Judgement & Decision Making, edited by H. R. Arkes., & K. R. Hammond, 
published by Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 0-521-32617-6. 
WATSON, I., [1997]. Applying Case-Based Reasoning: Techniques for Enterprise 
Systems, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Inc. ISBN: 1-55860-462-6. 
WATSON, I., & MARRIR, F., [1994]. Case-based reasoning: A review, The Knowledge 
Engineering Review, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 327-354. 
WINOGRAD, T. [1975]. Frame representations & the declarative /procedural 
controversy, in Representation & Understanding: Studies in Cognitive Science, 
edited by D. G. Bobrow & A. N. Collins, published by (New York), Academic Press. 
(Language, thought and culture : advances in the study of cognition). ISBN: 0-12- 
108550-3. 
YAGER, R. R. [1995]. On a measure of ambiguity, in International Journal of 
Intelligent Systems, Vol. 10, No. 10, pp. 1001-1019. 
ZADEH, L. A. [19821. A note on prototype theory and fuzzy sets, in Cognition, Vol. 12, 
pp. 291-297. 
ZADEH, L. A. [19931. Fuzzy sets, in Readings in fuzzy sets for intelligent systems, pp. 
27-64, edited by D. Dubois., H. Prade., & R. R. Yager, published by Morgan 
161 
Kaufmann Publishers, Inc., ISBN: 1-55860-257-7. 
ZEY, M. [1992]., Criticisms of Rational Choice Models, in Decision making : 
alternatives to rational choice models, pp. 9-31, edited by Mary Zey, published by 
(Newbury Park) : Sage, ISBN: 0-8039-4750-x. 
162 
APPENDIX A: RESULTS OF KNOWLEDGE ELICITATION EXERCISE 
1. In this section the results of the knowledge elicitation exercise undertaken by 
the author are presented. Examples taken from interviews with expert 
geophysicists will show, (i) how a grounded analysis of the data helped the 
knowledge engineer to identify the necessary process definitions and; (ii) how the 
focus of the knowledge elicitation exercise concentrated on the human and 
organisational preconditions relating to failures (or near failures). 
2. Please note, to demonstrate, (i) how processes and their emergent properties 
may be repeated in similar situations; (ii) how they may contribute to a process 
failure (or near miss) and; (iii) how a comparison with those failed (or nearly failed) 
cases can help a decision maker, it was necessary to restrict the sample space. In 
this example, the sample space was restricted to the petroleum engineering 
problem [implementing time-depth conversion]. Consequently, any further 
development of this methodology requires the technique to have applications over a 
wider engineering field, possibly even a generic application. It is argued that the 
Process model explanation and the associated representational methodology is 
independent of the problem domain and that the analysis and representation of 
other domains may follow a similar approach. Complete and full accounts of the 
interview transcripts, the grounded analysis and the subsequent Process model 
explanation of each case study are given in the following documents; 
1. \j unip er \ year3 \ ikoda Vom \, 
2. \juniper\year3 \ikoda\dick\, 
3. \juniper\year3 \ikoda\harry\, 
3. The following are used to demonstrate the comparison methodology and does 
not represent any judgement of any individual within IKODA Ltd. 
CASE STUDY 1: [TOM] 
4. The data in TABLE Al represents the beginning of the concept labelling 
process. The process is a two stage activity in which the author developed and then 
refined the nature of the concepts that were needed to account for the relevance of 
a particular paragraph. For example, one concept highlighted in paragraph 1 was 
(i) process overview. (See TABLE A2). Note, this category is a reflection of a specific 
conceptual level and represents a highly specific term. This fixed the analysis to 
particular aspects of the case study. In this example the analysis focused on a 
descriptive [process overview] of the PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: 
TOM]. Consequently, the analysis identified those sub-processes and their 
interactions as they related to the content and context of the [process overview] of 
the PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM]. Other concepts identified 
in paragraphs 2,3 and 4 are, (i) uncertainty is a function of seismic velocities; (ii) 
consequences of uncertainties may lead to minimum production and; (iii) position of 
depth control can be critical to seismic velocity estimation respectively. Again these 
are specific terms that will fix the analysis to some particular aspects of the 
PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM]. 
5. TABLE A3.0 illustrates the card for the concept [process overview: TOM]. It can 
be seen that the concept [process overview: TOM] was identified in a number of 
163 
paragraphs. TABLE A3.0 also includes a number of possible connections with other 
emergent concepts and earlier concept labels. For example, the [process overview: 
TOM] has been connected to CARD 14-PROCESS OBJECTIVES. This card represents 
the specified objectives and emergent objectives of the PROCESS: [implementing 
time-depth conversion: TOM]. These specified and emergent objectives can viewed 
as explicit and implicit statements. Explicit, in that it was explicitly stated by the 
project team and implicit, in that a grounded analysis identified it as an implicit 
requirement of the PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM]. For 
example, in this case study the explicitly stated objective was, (i) the generation of 
best estimate of reservoir depth over field area, while the implicit required objective 
was, (i) testing of new software against the requirements of case [TOM]. 
6. Another potential connection CARD 20-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL PROCESS 
CONSTRAINTS highlighted any constraints on the PROCESS: [implementing time- 
depth conversion: TOM]. Again some of these were explicit constraints that were 
part of the contract between the client and the company. Such constraints 
included, (i) financial and budgetary controls. Others only became clear after an 
analysis. For example, one emergent constraint included, (i) the need to test the 
new software. 
7. TABLE A3.1 illustrates a provisional definition for the concept [process 
overview: TOM], for which a memo was generated, shown in table A3.2. Table A3.2 
represents several important features. Firstly, the PROCESS OWNER, PLAYERS, 
ROLES and SUB-PROCESSES for PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM] 
are identified. Secondly, an indication of the possible decision problems that 
PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM] suffered are described. 
Lastly, the memo identifies those emergent questions that on reflection should 
have been asked at the time, but were not. In some situations an analysis of the 
concept definition may indicate that some of the recorded events may need to be re- 
categorised. For example, see Chapter 5, section 5.3.3 in which a number of 
different meanings were associated with [selective attention to technical rationale 
hides potential hazards: TOM]. These were defined as, (i) [stress escaping behaviour 
(encystment): TOM]; (ii) [narrow point of view (convergence): TOM]. If this occurs, 
then this can be classified as an nota bene (N. B. ) and attached to the memo. 
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TABLE Al PARAGRAPHS FROM INTERVIEW OF CASE-STUDY [TOM] 
Interview with Giles_P; March 17 1998, Field [TOM] 
Para 1 The process is taking a time interpretation which you have derived from your seismic 
survey and converting that into a depth interpretation. This can be used for predictive 
purposes which you compare to other sources of data such as bore-holes. Volumetrics 
and all the rest of it has to be done in depth so the time interpretation is not a lot of use. 
The real process of depth conversion is one of velocity estimation. That is the key 
estimating the seismic velocity. 
Para 2 There are two uncertainties in this process. There is how good your time 
interpretation is and your estimation of the seismic velocity. I think the key 
uncertainties are the seismic uncertainties. Because that is where the data is poorest or 
were you have little or less information to start with. 
Para 3 If there is a lot of well-control. For example, it is an old field and you have wells into 
the field, then those wells are fixed depth points with very little uncertainty. They will 
control your final depth map. However, when you are talking about areas where you 
have very little well-control. For example, in an exploration prospect. If you get your 
depth conversion wrong you could be widely out. This depends on the situation. One 
of the other problems is that you will do a depth conversion to do a prognosis for a 
new well, to predict where you should put that new well. If your depth conversion is 
wrong then obviously you may put that well in completely the wrong place. You may 
not want to put a well there at all if your depth conversion is unsafe. 
Para 4 You may have placed the well control points at what you may have think is the top of 
the structure. The velocity through the rocks to the top of the structure may be quite 
different from the velocity through the structure at the flanks, but your only control 
point is at the top. Therefore, estimating what is going on at the flanks could be quite 
difficult. This is usually the case, in that the hard information that you have is at the 
well locations. Unfortunately well locations are not randomly picked, they are picked 
for specific purposes. That is at the top of structure to maximise production. So your 
hard information is likely to be a bit biased. 
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TABLE A2 SIGNIFICANT CONCEPTS IDENTIFIED FROM TABLE Al 
Interview with Giles-P; March 17 1998, Field [TOM] 
Para 1 Process overview 
Para 2 Uncertainty is a function of seismic velocities 
Para 3 Consequences of uncertainties may lead to minimum production 
Para 4 Position of depth control can be critical to seismic velocity estimation 
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TABLE A3.0 EXAMPLE OF CONCEPT CARD FOR [Process overview: TOM] 
CARD 1 [Process overview: TOM] 
Para 1A time interpretation (derived from seismic) is converted into a depth map, compared 
with well data and used to define reservoir volumes. Depth conversion is a function of 
velocity estimation. 
Para 3 Depth conversion aids well prognoses and is used to predict suitable well locations for 
increased production. Uncertainty in depth conversion can lead to incorrect prediction, 
unsuitable well location and increased expenditure with little return. 
Para 6 PD was ultimately responsible for the process, in that he reported to Ikoda management, 
but GP initiated and terminated the process, although M did most of the work. 
Para 7 PD is a Principal geophysicist, GP is a Senior geophysicist and m is a geophysicist. 
Para 8 Ultimate responsibility is to client, with a secondary responsibility to IKODA senior 
management. 
Para 16 Additional problem of unknown extension crossing block boundary, leading to equity 
situation. 
Para 20 Key process is seismic velocity estimation. In which the area above reservoir (called 
overburden) is divided into layers and estimates of the seismic velocity for those layers 
are made. During seismic processing, a velocity field is generated in the processing 
sequence. These are known as stacking velocities. This is done on 1 km square grids. 
The interval velocities (derived from stacking velocities) are used in a geo-statistical 
examination to define a geo-statistical model. The model is used to predict velocities at 
well locations which are compared to actual well velocities. Correlations are used to 
establish a velocity model of the structure from which a depth map is constructed. Then 
volumetrics are produced. 
Para 20 Since information is optimised to enable best processing of seismic data, in terms of 
depth conversion, it may not be that accurate in helping to define interval velocity. 
Para 22 Estimation of depth map uncertainty is a function of the geo-statistical model, derived 
from seismic velocities. If unable to use seismic velocities, or if inappropriate to use 
seismic velocities, than more difficult to define uncertainty. 
Para 32 IKODA are co-developing new software package. Theoretically, it offered several 
advantages over other packages and was considered by senior management to be a vast 
improvement over current software. Project team used pre-release version on field 
[TOM], unfortunately, it failed to live up to expectations. 
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TABLE A3.0 EXAMPLE OF CONCEPT CARD FOR [Process overview: TOM] 
CARD 1 [Process overview: TOM] 
Para 38 On route to commercialisation, software developers had changed comparison 
methodology (senior management hadn't been told). It was unable to krig between 
seismic velocities and what is happening at well locations. 
Para 43 Velocity estimation is were the uncertainty does come in and without well control the 
more uncertain it becomes. Relationships developed at the well locations will begin to 
fall-down further away from the well, they become more uncertain. 
Links with CARD 2-DATA DERIVED FROM VELOCITY ESTIMATION CAN BE UNCERTAIN 
CARD 3-UNCERTAINTY CAN LEAD TO ERRORS IN [OIL-IN-PLACE] AND [GROSS ROCK 
VOLUME] ESTIMATES 
CARD 14-PROCESS OBJECTIVES 
CARD 16-IDENTIFYING KEY SUB-PROCESSES NEEDED TO MEET OBJECTIVES 
CARD 17-UNCERTAINTY IN SEISMIC VELOCITY ESTIMATION 
CARD 18-DESIRED END STATE 
CARD 20-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL PROCESS CONSTRAINTS 
CARD 22-SOFTWARE CRITICAL TO PROJECT COMPLETION 
CARD 28-SELECTIVE ATTENTION TO TECHNICAL RATIONALE HIDES POTENTIAL 
HAZARDS 
(1) Process definition 
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TABLE A3.1 PROVISIONAL DEFINITION FOR CONCEPT [Process overview: TOM] 
CARD 1: [Process overview: TOM] 
For field [TOM] the PROCESS was defined as [implementing time-depth conversion]. In this field the 
PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM] consisted of a time interpretation (derived from 
seismic velocities) being converted into a depth map, compared with well data and used to define 
reservoir volumes. The PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM] was used to predict 
suitable well locations for increased production. Note, any uncertainty in the PROCESS: [implementing 
time-depth conversion: TOM] can lead to incorrect prediction, unsuitable well location and increased 
expenditure with little return. 
A description of the PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion] is as follows. The area above 
reservoir (called the overburden) is divided into layers and estimates of the seismic velocity for those 
layers are made. That is during the processing of these seismic velocities a velocity field is generated in 
the processing sequence. These are known as stacking velocities. Interval velocities are derived from 
the stacking velocities and using a geo-statistical examination produce a geo-statistical model of the 
reservoir. This model is used to predict velocities at well locations which are then compared to known 
velocities at well locations. If a relationship can be seen to exist, then this relationship is used to predict 
velocities at know time points throughout field. Having a velocity and a time gives the depth and 
volumetrics. 
However, the geo-statistical methodology is not without some problems, (i) it is computational 
intensive; (ii) information is optimised to enable best processing of seismic data, but in terms of depth 
conversion it may not be that appropriate when being used to define interval velocities; (iii) the 
estimation of the depth map uncertainty is a function of the geo-statistical model derived from the 
seismic velocities and if seismic velocities can not be used or if it is inappropriate to use seismic 
velocities, than it is more difficult to define depth map uncertainty and; (iv) the relationships developed 
at the well locations can not be assumed to be uniform through-out the reservoir. 
Identified SUB-PROCESSES in the PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM] are, (i) loading 
seismic data; (ii) establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities; (iii) establishing geo- 
statistical model from interval velocities; (iv) predicting velocity at well location; (v) establishing 
velocity model of reservoir; (vi) combing velocity model and time interpretations and; (vii) producing 
depth map and volumetric calculations. 
PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM] was not without some problems. For example, a 
selective attention was given to the theoretical aspects of data processing generated hidden hazardous 
event sequences that almost had serious consequences for the outcome of the project. The needs of the 
software user and the abilities of the software supplied became separated. 
The minimum objectives were identified as, (i) best estimate of reservoir depth and; (ii) a measure of the 
uncertainty within that map. 
PD was the PROCESS OWNER in that he reported to Ikoda management and oversaw the PROCESS: 
[implementing time-depth conversion: TOM]. GP was the PLAYER who received the inputs from the 
PROCESS OWNER, initiated the PROCESS, sent the outputs back to the PROCESS OWNER, terminated the 
PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM] and defined the reservoir volumetrics. However, 
it was another PLAYER, M who loaded the data, established the geo-statistical from the seismic stacking 
velocities, defined the correlation between the predicted seismic velocities and actual well velocities, 
combined the seismic interval velocity and well data and defined the 
depth map of top reservoir. PD is a 
Principal geophysicist, GP is a Senior geophysicist and M is a geophysicist. 
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TABLE A3.1 PROVISIONAL DEFINITION FOR CONCEPT [Process overview: TOM] 
CARD 1: [Process overview: TOM] cont. 
The responsibility was defined as being to the client with a secondary responsibility to IKODA senior 
management. 
Identified roles for Principal geophysicist were, (i) to oversee process. Identified roles for Senior 
geophysicist were, (i) to receive data from process owner and send results of the process back and; (ii) 
to define reservoir volumetrics. Identified roles for geophysicist were, (i) to load data; (ii) to establish 
geo-statistical model from stacking and interval velocities; (iii) to define correlation between predicted 
seismic velocities and actual well velocities; (iv) to combine seismic interval velocity and well data and; 
(v) to define depth map of top reservoir. 
See also: 
CARD 2-DATA DERIVED FROM VELOCITY ESTIMATION CAN BE UNCERTAIN 
CARD 3-UNCERTAINTY CAN LEAD TO ERRORS IN [OIL-IN-PLACE] AND [GROSS ROCK VOLUME] 
ESTIMATES 
CARD 14-PROCESS OBJECTIVES 
CARD 16-IDENTIFYING KEY SUB-PROCESSES NEEDED TO MEET OBJECTIVES 
CARD 17-UNCERTAINTY IN SEISMIC VELOCITY ESTIMATION 
CARD 18-DESIRED END STATE 
CARD 20-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL PROCESS CONSTRAINTS 
CARD 28-SELECTIVE ATTENTION TO TECHNICAL RATIONALE HIDES POTENTIAL HAZARDS 
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TABLE A3.2 SHORT NOTE FOR CARD 1 [TOM] 
CARD 1: [Process overview: TOM] 
The PROCESS OWNER: Principal geophysicist was responsible for sending data to the PLAYER: Senior 
geophysicist and sending results to client and was given the ROLE: [to oversee PROCESS]. The PLAYER: 
Senior geophysicist was held responsible for, (i) receiving the necessary data from the PROCESS OWNER 
and initiating the PROCESS and; (ii) terminating the PROCESS and passing the results of the PROCESS to 
the PROCESS OWNER] and was given the ROLE: [to receive INPUTS and send OUTPUTS]. The PLAYER: 
Senior geophysicist also had an additional ROLE: [to define reservoir volumetrics]. The PLAYER: 
geophysicist was given the ROLES: (i) [to load seismic data]; (ii) [to establish geo-statistical model from 
stacking & interval velocities]; (iii) [to define correlation between predicted seismic velocities & actual 
well velocities]; (iv) [to combine seismic interval velocity & well data]; (v) [to define depth map of top 
reservoir]. 
Identified SUB-PROCESSES in the PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM] are, (i) [receiving 
data from clients and initiating PROCESS]; (ii) [loading seismic data]; (iii) [establishing interval 
velocities from seismic stacking velocities]; (iv) [establishing geo-statistical model from interval 
velocities]; (v) [predicting velocity at well location]; (vi) [establishing velocity model of reservoir]; (vii) 
[combing velocity model and time interpretations]; (viii) [producing depth map and volumetric 
calculations] and (ix) [terminating the PROCESS and passing results to client]. 
Note, during the PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM] selective attention was given to 
the theoretical aspects of data processing. This selectivity generated hidden hazardous event sequences 
that almost had serious consequences for the outcome of the project and demonstrated that the needs of 
the software user and the abilities of the software supplied must not become separated. 
EMERGENT QUESTIONS: 
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CASE STUDY 2: [DICK] 
8. In this section some examples of the grounded analysis of the case study 
[DICK] are presented. TABLE A4 represents the beginning of the concept labelling 
process. For example, in paragraph 1, several concepts were identified, namely (i) 
process constrained by time; (ii) process overview; (iii) definitions of responsibility. 
These and other significant concepts identified during the initial labelling activity 
are shown in TABLE A5. Following the example of case study 1: [TOM] the concept 
[process overview: DICK] was identified in a number of different paragraphs. This is 
seen in TABLE A6.0 and includes a number of possible connections with other 
emergent concepts and earlier concept labels. The analysis revealed explicit and 
implicit properties of the concept [Process overview: DICK]. This can be seen in 
TABLE A6.1, in which explicit properties were identified as PROCESS OWNER, 
PLAYERS, ROLES and SUB-PROCESSES etc. However, one emergent property (or 
implicit property), were problems surrounding the loading of data leading to a close 
association between the oil company and the project team. The other emergent 
property, was the concern over the implications this close association may have for 
the degree of independence required by the financial considerations of the project. 
This is particular important since the two emergent properties, as represented by 
the concept definitions [Data calibration problems: DICK] and [Independence of 
assessment: DICK] form a connection with the concept definition [Process overview: 
DICK]. This is expressed in the concept CARDS 11 & 24, DATA CALIBRATION 
PROBLEMS & INDEPENDENCE OF ASSESSMENT, represented in TABLES A7.0 and 
A8.0 respectively and will be considered below. TABLE A6.2 represents the 
hypertext link between the results of the grounded analysis, represented by the 
short memo on definition [Process overview: DICK] and ACTUALITY WINDOW of the 
PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: DICK] and will be discussed in 
section 7.4. 
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TABLE A4.0 EXAMPLE PARAGRAPHS FROM INTERVIEW OF CASE-STUDY [DICK] 
Interview with Peter_D; May 13 1998, Field [DICK] 
Para 1 The client required it to be done quickly. It was a ten day time frame in which, there 
was loading the seismic on the work station, interpreting the seismic time horizons 
depth, converting those time horizons and then producing volumetrics on the depth 
converted maps. Because it was a land case there were problems with the land seismic 
aspect of it, the time interpretation as well as the depth conversion. Having done the 
very quick interpretation, I then began looking at the refining of that initial depth 
conversion. In summary, it was quick look and then a refinement option. I was given it 
by the client and was responsible for it, but another person helped in the mapping side 
of it. Since the job was being done through IKODA, I was really responsible to IKODA 
management. However, to get the job done on time I acted directly with the client. 
Para 2I have at least 25 years in this type of work with a major oil company. Currently, as an 
independent consultant and working for IKODA. I would describe myself as fully 
qualified to do all the necessary work and to take the necessary decisions for the whole 
process. I am an applied scientist, since most of my career has been involved in the 
application of science to problems. I would say that I am a geophysicist. 
Para 3 The process objectives as given by the client, were to do an independent interpretation 
and volumetrics for a field which had just been discovered. The reason that it had to 
be independent assessment was its use as a financial justification for another company. 
This required an independent technical assessment of this field, rather than an 
operators assessment. It was an audit of the operators work. It was just that, an 
independent assessment and independent interpretation and making a judgement based 
on that assessment and interpretation. It was auditing the original interpretation. 
Therefore, as well as doing an independent assessment, it was also a comparison 
process. 
The first process was data loading. That is, loading the data (in the rawest possible 
form as un-intrepretated seismic data, but still fully processed) onto a workstation and 
thereby produce an interpretation of that data. This interpretation would include a time 
map of the structure. The time interpretation was very standard and there were not to 
many problems with that. Then there was the decision to be made as to how to take 
that interpretation of the seismic data and actually map it. There was a number of 
options available there. Finally how to take that time interpretation and depth convert 
it. That was essential the procedure. 
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TABLE A4.0 EXAMPLE PARAGRAPHS FROM INTERVIEW OF CASE-STUDY [DICK] 
Para 3 cot/d I was given the oil company's previous interpretation of that data, all the information 
they had on the wells and the ties to the seismic, they also gave me the time frame 
involved. I admit that there was a mixture of how much of their knowledge I actually 
took and used in the project and how much I did independently. Although I felt that 
there was a balance between a completely independently interpretation and using some 
of the information they had correlated. This was really dependent upon the time and 
that it was compatible with the specific objectives that I was given. It was recognised 
that i would have to use a lot of the information that they had already put together and 
also take it on face value. However, this was not a problem, it was the loading of the 
data which was problematical. There were a few problems that had to be overcome. 
The minimum objectives would be a depth map on each of the perspective horizons 
(and there were two horizons) independently arrived at and a short file note two or 
three pages describing how the interpretation was arrived at and how it compared to 
the interpretation of the company who owned the field. That is the client of the 
company that initially approached IKODA. 
Para 4 The initial stage, was a essentially a phone from the company who asked IKODA to do 
the work and to tell IKODA what was needed. I went and discussed it over a meeting. 
They provided me with information on the field, with a report that their client had done 
and the data to work on. The first thing was to load the data on to the work station 
(which I didn't do myself but somebody in IK0DA did). It was sub-contracted to 
somebody in the IKODA staff. Then, there was a the first quick look at the data to make 
sure that it made sense. There was some significant data processing at this point. 
Because there was problems with the data, 1 then had to contact the client. However, 
to get the information that IKODA needed, they had to go back to their client. This 
could be very time consuming, so it was agreed very quickly that the only sensible 
thing to do it in the time was for me to contact the oil company directly. This worked 
very well. 1 could actually question about the data already given and they could 
supply me with extra data as needed. This was necessary in order to do thing in the 
time. 
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TABLE A5.0 SIGNIFICANT CONCEPTS IDENTIFIED FROM TABLE A4.0 
Interview with Peter-1); May 13 1998, Field [DICK] 
Para 1 Process constrained by time 
Process overview 
Definitions of responsibility 
Para 2 Defining point-of-view of PROCESS OWNER 
Para 3 Process objectives 
Process overview 
Independence of assessment 
Para 4 Initial contact with client 
Process overview 
Data calibration problems 
Process constrained by time 
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TABLE A6.0 EXAMPLE OF CONCEPT CARD FOR [Process overview: DICK] 
CARD 1 [Process overview: DICK] 
Para 1 The process consisted of loading the seismic on the work station, interpreting the 
seismic time horizons, depth converting those time horizons and producing volunnetrics 
on the depth converted maps. PD was responsible (process owner), but M helped in the 
mapping (processing interval velocities and combining velocity model with time 
interpretations). 
Para 3 The first process was loading the data (in the rawest possible form as un-intrepretated 
seismic data, but still fully processed) onto a workstation. An interpretation of the 
interval velocities from the stacking seismic velocities was produced, this included an 
interpretation of the seismic time intervals of the structure. The time interpretation was 
very standard and there were not to many problems with that. At this stage it would be 
necessary to decide on how the mapping (defining the velocity model) of the seismic data 
interpretation would be accomplished, how to combine the velocity model and time 
interpretation and depth convert it. 
Para 4 After M loaded the data, PD checked to make sure that it made sense and to ensure that 
the data could be processed. However, there was problems with the original data and PD 
had to contact the client. 
Para 7 The project finished with the team producing two depth maps and PD writing a report on 
the methodology used, how the maps compared to the originals and any 
recommendations for further work. 
Para 8 The initial checking was considered to be the beginning of the process quality control. 
PD states that, "it was a technical assessment of the best way to do the depth conversion, 
then actually carrying out the depth conversion, deciding on the way to do it and 
carrying out that work and finally writing a report at the end of the whole process. " 
Para 9 Time constraints did dictated the method used. 
Para 10 It was a sequential process there was no way of paralleling. 
Para 13 PD suggested that IKODA were "lucky" with this project. It confirmed the original work 
done. If it had "found something significantly different from the oil company's 
interpretation, then perhaps it would have been difficult in the time available to justify 
and to examine those differences. " 
Para 20 While there were data uncertainties, different vintages, processed differently, data 
missing and difficulties in tying data together, at the end PD was satisfied that the project 
team had produced the best technical estimate within the limits of the available data 
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TABLE A6.0 EXAMPLE OF CONCEPT CARD FOR [Process overview: DICK] 
Para 24 The main objective was to come up with a volume for this structure. In working out 
gross rock volumes, the depth conversion has a major effect on this and is usual one of 
the major uncertainties. As well as producing a time-depth conversion, the project team 
also looked at different scenarios of min possible and max possible oil-water contacts to 
produce a range of oil-water contacts. 
Para 25 There were calibration problems with the data on the work station. It was found that an 
interpretation of the seismic lines could not be made, since they did not appear on the 
screen properly. They needed some further processing. This required bulk shifting of 
each of the surveys to a common datum. These unexpected problems were overcome by 
a combination of working within the work station and contacting the oil company to get 
advice and ideas on how to correct those problems. 
Para 28 The use of the clients experience proved very useful in overcoming those problems. It 
enabled the project team to resolve the difficulties with the data very quickly. It was felt 
that without that help, the project team would not have managed to resolve the problems 
quickly enough to get the project done in time. 
Para 36 The project team focused on one method very early on in the project's life. It is possible 
that as a consequence of doing something this quickly, individuals may overlook critical 
aspects of the problem. As a result of the tight framework alternative scenarios and the 
implications of those alternative scenarios were not considered. While PD suggests that 
"within the time frame available, it could not have been done any better ", nonetheless "it 
is a concern that the output may not be the best estimate". There may be some 
unforeseen problems or circumstances that the project team have not addressed or have 
not identified. 
Links with CARD 2-PROCESS INITIATION 
CARD 3-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL DEPENDENCIES 
CARD 5-AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY 
CARD 10-UNCERTAINTY ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEPTH MAP 
CARD 11-DATA CALIBRATION PROBLEMS 
CARD 13-RESOLVING PROBLEMS 
CARD 14-PROCESS OBJECTIVES 
CARD 16-CONFIDENCE IN PREDICTIONS 
CARD 20-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL PROCESS CONSTRAINTS 
CARD 23-QUALITY CONTROL 
CARD 24-INDEPENDENCE OF ASSESSMENT 
(1) Process definition 
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TABLE A6.1 PROVISIONAL DEFINITION FOR CONCEPT [Process overview: DICK] 
CARD 1: [Process overview: DICK] 
For field [DICK], PROCESS was defined as [implementing time-depth conversion]. In this field the 
PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion] consisted of interpreting the seismic time horizons, 
converting those time horizons and then producing depth converted maps. Volumetrics on the depth 
converted maps were used to define reservoir volumes. Since there are financial considerations when 
defining reservoir volumes an independent technical assessment was required. In this respect the 
PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion] was a re-assessment of the original interpretation of the 
reservoir volumetrics. 
Identified key SUB-PROCESSES for PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: DICK] are, (i) loading 
seismic data; (ii) establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities; (iii) establishing 
velocities from well data; (iv) establishing seismic time intervals; (v) establishing velocity model of 
reservoir; (vi) combing velocity model and time interpretations and; (vii) producing depth map and 
volumetric calculations. 
PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: DICK] was not without some problems. For example, the 
process was heavily constrained by time and this coupled with problems surrounding the loading of data 
led to a close association with the oil company. Note, this close association may have implications for 
the notion of independence required by the financial considerations of the project. 
The minimum objectives were identified as, (i) a depth map on each of the perspective horizons (and 
there were two horizons), independently derived; (ii) a short report describing how the interpretation was 
derived and how it compared to the original interpretation. 
Although M loaded the data, established the interval velocities from the seismic stacking velocities and 
defined depth map of top reservoir, PD had ultimate responsibility for the PROCESS: [implementing time- 
depth conversion: DICK]. PD was the PROCESS OWNER and Ma PLAYER. PD is a Principal geophysicist and 
M is a geophysicist. 
Identified ROLES for Principal geophysicist were, (i) to oversee the process; (ii) to receive data from the 
client and send the results of the process back; (iii) to establish velocities from well data; (iv) to interpret 
the seismic time intervals; (v) to combine seismic interval velocity and well data and; (vi) to define 
reservoir volumetrics. Identified ROLES for geophysicist were, (i) to load data; (ii) to establish interval 
velocities from seismic stacking velocities and; (iii) to define depth map of top reservoir. 
See also 
CARD 2-PROCESS INITIATION 
CARD 3-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL DEPENDENCIES 
CARD 5-AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY 
CARD 10-UNCERTAINTY ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEPTH MAP 
CARD 11-DATA CALIBRATION PROBLEMS 
CARD 13-RESOLVING PROBLEMS 
CARD 14-PROCESS OBJECTIVES 
CARD 16-CONFIDENCE IN PREDICTIONS 
CARD 20-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL PROCESS CONSTRAINTS 
CARD 23-QUALITY CONTROL 
CARD 24-INDEPENDENCE OF ASSESSMENT 
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TABLE A6.2 SHORT NOTE FOR CARD 1 [DICK] 
CARD 1: [Process overview: DICK] 
The PROCESS OWNER, Principal geophysicist was responsible for overseeing the PROCESS: [implementing 
time-depth conversion: DICK] and was given the ROLE, (i) (to receive INPUTS and send OUTPUTS]. The 
Principal geophysicist was also a PLAYER in the PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: DICK] 
and had the additional ROLES, (ii) [to establish velocities from well data]; (iii) [to interpret the seismic 
time intervals]; (iv) [to combine seismic interval velocity and well data] and; (v) [to define reservoir 
volumetrics]. The PLAYER, geophysicist was given the ROLES, (i) [to load data]; (ii) [to establish interval 
velocities from seismic stacking velocities] and; (iii) [to define depth map of top reservoir]. 
Identified key SUB-PROCESSES for PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: DICK] are, (i) [to 
receive the necessary data from the clients and initiating the PROCESS] (ii) [loading seismic data]; (iii) 
[establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities]; (iv) [establishing velocities from well 
data]; (v) [establishing seismic time intervals]; (vi) [establishing velocity model of reservoir]; (vii) 
[combing velocity model and time interpretations] and; (viii) [producing depth map and volumetric 
calculations] and; (ix) [to terminate the PROCESS and passing the results of the PROCESS to the client]. 
Note, PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: DICK] was heavily constrained by time and this 
coupled with problems surrounding the loading of data led to a close association with the oil company. 
This close association may have implications for the notion of independence required by the financial 
considerations of the project. 
EMERGENT QUESTIONS: 
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9. TABLES A7.0, A7.1 & A7.2 represent the results of the grounded analysis of the 
concept [Data calibration problems: DICK]. This particular problem was 
highlighted in a number of paragraphs and in paragraph 26 it was stated by the 
project team that, "it could have been an area of potential failure. " To overcome 
these difficulties within the specified time constraints, the project team felt it 
necessary to develop a direct contact with the original data source. See paragraph 
25, TABLE A7.0. This was also highlighted in TABLES A7.1 and A7.2. However, 
while the project team acknowledged that the clients experience proved very useful 
in overcoming these problems, what they failed to realise was the contradiction 
surrounding this direct contact and the implications this may have had for the 
independence of the project results. This was considered in more detail in the 
concept [Independence of assessment: DICK]. 
10. TABLES A8.0, A8.1 & A8.2 represent the results of the grounded analysis of 
the concept [Independence of assessment: DICK]. Again this particular problem 
could be seen in various paragraphs. For example, in paragraph 3 the project 
acknowledged the need for an independent assessment. However, further on it was 
admitted that a lot of the information provided would have to be used without 
checking. While the project team may have felt that this was compatible with the 
overall requirements of the project objectives, questions of independence can be 
raised. An admission of the evaluation not being totally independent is presented 
in TABLE A8.1 and in TABLE A8.2 the idea that some measures of evidence to show 
that outcome of PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: DICK] is still 
compatible with the specific OBJECTIVES of [implementing time-depth conversion: 
DICK] is raised. 
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TABLE A7.0 EXAMPLE OF CONCEPT CARD FOR [Data calibration problems: DICK] 
CARD 11 [Data calibration problems: DICK] 
Para 1 Problems with the land seismic lead to problems with time interpretation as well as depth 
conversion. 
Para 4 Problems with the original data forced PD to contact client. 
Para 10 Since process was sequential, then problems at data loading phase would have a knock- 
on affect at interpretation, volumetrics and depth conversion phase. This could have 
serious implications, since project was time constrained. 
Para 20 It was reported, that there was a lot of uncertainty associated with the data, it was of 
different vintages and it had been processed differently. 
Para 24 Although the project team felt that there was a way to quantify the uncertainty associated 
with the depth map, it wasn't done because it couldn't have been done in the time 
available. 
Para 25 There were calibration problems with the data on the work station. It was found that an 
interpretation of the seismic lines could not be made, since they did not appear on the 
screen properly. Being land data they had used different data means for registering the 
data and they needed some further processing. This required bulk shifting of each of the 
surveys to a common datum. These unexpected problems were overcome by a 
combination of working within the work station and contacting the oil company to get 
advice and ideas on how to correct those problems. 
Para 26 "It could have been an area of potential failure. " 
Para 28 The use of the clients experience proved very useful in overcoming those problems. It 
enabled the project team to resolve the difficulties with the data very quickly. It was felt 
that without that help, the project team would not have managed to resolve the problems 
quickly enough to get the project done in time. 
Para 34 "The problem with the loading of the data could have developed into some more 
serious. " Previous data loading problems had occupied a project team for over a month. 
Such a delay would have upset the clients timetable and have serious implications for 
IKODA. 
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TABLE A7.0 EXAMPLE OF CONCEPT CARD FOR [Data calibration problems: DICK] 
Links with CARD 2-PROCESS OVERVIEW 
CARD 3-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL DEPENDENCIES 
CARD 5-AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY 
CARD 10-UNCERTAINTY ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEPTH MAP 
CARD 12-ANY SIGNS OF PROJECT FAILING 
CARD 13-RESOLVING PROBLEMS 
CARD 15-DID YOU LEARN ANYTHING? 
CARD 20-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL PROCESS CONSTRAINTS 
CARD 23-QUALITY CONTROL 
CARD 24-INDEPENDENCE OF ASSESSMENT 
(1) Problems with data loading 
(2) Unexpected data calibration problems 
(3) Uncertainty associated with loading data 
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TABLE A7.1 PROVISIONAL DEFINITION FOR CONCEPT [Data calibration problems: DICK] 
CARD 11: [Data calibration problems: DICK] 
Supplied data was found to be calibrated incorrectly. When load onto work station some of the seismic lines could not be interpreted. (They did not appear on the screen properly. ) The originators of the data had used a different data means for registering the data. Each of the surveys had to be shifted to a 
common datum before interpretation could start. This required re-processing and re-calibration. To 
overcome these problems within the specified project time it was felt that a direct contact with original 
source would be beneficial. 
See also; 
CARD 1-PROCESS OVERVIEW 
CARD 3-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL DEPENDENCIES 
CARD 4-MEASURES OF EVIDENCE FOR SUCCESS & OF FAILURE 
CARD 5-AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY 
CARD 10-UNCERTAINTY ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEPTH MAP 
CARD 12-ANY SIGNS OF PROJECT FAILING 
CARD 15-DID YOU LEARN ANYTHING? 
CARD 20-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL PROCESS CONSTRAINTS 
CARD 23-QUALITY CONTROL 
TABLE A7.2 SHORT NOTE FOR CARD 11 
CARD 11: [Data calibration problems: DICK] 
Since this particular project was a series of sequential processes constrained by time (there was no way of 
paralleling) any unexpected data calibration problems could have series implications. (It was expected 
that Principal Geophysicist could interpret data directly. ) When difficulties arose, it was felt that direct 
contract and the use of similar experiences would help to overcome these problems. This could raise 
questions over the requirements of an independent assessment and the appropriateness of the results of 
such an assessment. 
EMERGENT QUESTIONS: 
Is the data supplied compatible with the processing methodology? 
Why are data calibration problems so unexpected? 
What steps could you take to minimise the unexpected nature of the problem? 
How much influence will data problems have on the success or failure of the process? 
How could you resolve these problems without compromising the process independence? 
How could you justify your solution? 
In this respect, how would you define measures for success & failure? 
What evidence can you use to support those measures? 
Is a focus on defining evidence for process success ignoring evidence of failure? 
How would you answer the claim that you are biased towards defining process success? 
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TABLE A8.0 EXAMPLE OF CONCEPT CARD FOR [Independence of assessment: DICK] 
CARD 24 [Independence of assessment: DICK] 
Para 3 The client required an independent interpretation and volumetrics for a field. The reason 
that it had to be independent assessment was its use as a financial justification for 
another company. This required an independent technical assessment of this field, rather 
than an operators assessment. However, the project team admit that there was a mixture 
of how much of the clients knowledge they used in the assessment and how much they 
did independently. It was accepted that a lot of the information provided would have to 
be used without checking and that given the time constraints a balance between a 
completely independent assessment and using information provided by the client would 
have to be struck. The project team still felt that this was compatible with the specific 
objectives. 
Para 9 Time constraints did dictated the method used. 
Para 15 Quality control function of, (i) discussing with management on methodology to be used 
and; (ii) ensuring management reviewed results of interpretation and associated report. 
Para 20 Having a direct link to the oil company proved beneficial. 
Para 24 The oil companies data and report highlighted significant uncertainties. 
Para 25 Unexpected data problems overcome by combination of, (i) data processing within work 
station and; (ii) contacting oil company directly for advice on how to correct these 
problems. 
Para 28 The use of the clients experience proved very useful in overcoming those problems. It 
enabled the project team to resolve the difficulties with the data very quickly. It was felt 
that without that help, the project team would not have managed to resolve the problems 
quickly enough to get the project done in time. 
Para 36 Project team feel that within the time constraints, the generated reservoir estimate was 
the best possible. 
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TABLE A8.0 EXAMPLE OF CONCEPT CARD FOR [Independence of assessment: DICK] 
Links with CARD 2-PROCESS OVERVIEW 
CARD 3-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL DEPENDENCIES 
CARD 5-AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY 
CARD 10-UNCERTAINTY ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEPTH MAP 
CARD 11-DATA CALIBRATION PROBLEMS 
CARD 13-RESOLVING PROBLEMS 
CARD 14-PROCESS OBJECTIVES 
CARD 16-CONFIDENCE IN PREDICTIONS 
CARD 20-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL PROCESS CONSTRAINTS 
CARD 23-QUALITY CONTROL 
(1) The need for an independent audit 
(2) Admission that evaluation not being totally independent 
(3) Questions raised over independence of assessment 
TABLE A8.1 PROVISIONAL DEFINITION FOR CONCEPT [Independence of assessment: DICK] 
CARD 24: [Independence of assessment: DICK] 
The Principal Geophysicist admitted that "there was a mixture of how much of their knowledge I actually 
took and used in the project and how much I did independently. " The Principal Geophysicist stated that 
"there was a balance between a completely independent interpretation and using some of the information 
they had correlated together. " This may be looked upon as an admission of the evaluation not being 
totally independent. However, there was a belief that the outcome was still compatible with the need for 
independence as defined by specific objectives of the project. (See PROCESS OBJECTIVES. ) 
See also; 
CARD 2-PROCESS INITIATION 
CARD 3-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL DEPENDENCIES 
CARD 5-AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY 
CARD 10-UNCERTAINTY ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEPTH MAP 
CARD 11-DATA CALIBRATION PROBLEMS 
CARD 13-RESOLVING PROBLEMS 
CARD 14-PROCESS OBJECTIVES 
CARD 16-CONFIDENCE IN PREDICTIONS 
CARD 20-IDENTIFYING CRITICAL PROCESS CONSTRAINTS 
CARD 23-QUALITY CONTROL 
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TABLE A8.2 SHORT NOTE FOR CARD 24 [DICK] 
CARD 24: [Independence of assessment: DICK] 
Some concerns were raised over direct contact influencing independence of assessment. While there was 
a belief that the outcome was still compatible with the need for independence as defined by specific 
objectives of the project (See PROCESS OBJECTIVES), it may be appropriate to develop some measures of 
evidence that show outcome of process still compatible with specific objectives. 
EMERGENT QUESTIONS: 
How would you define a completely independent assessment? 
Using that definition, is your assessment independent? 
What evidence do you have that indicates assessment is compatible with objectives? 
If available, will you use company's previous work, to confirm your assessment? 
Would you be conditioned by the project constraints to look for similarities? 
How does the quality control of the project ensure independence of assessment? 
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CASE STUDY 3: [HARRY] 
11. In this section some examples of the grounded analysis of the case study 
[HARRY] are presented. [HARRY] is a on-going project and represents the new-case 
(ICI). TABLE A9 represents the beginning of the concept labelling process. For 
example, in paragraph 1, several concepts were identified, namely (i) process 
constrained by field geology; (ii) process overview. These and other significant 
concepts identified during the initial labelling activity are shown in TABLE A10. 
The concept [process overview: HARRY] was identified in a number of different 
paragraphs. This is seen in TABLE A11.0 and includes a number of possible 
connections with other emergent concepts and earlier concept labels. The analysis 
revealed explicit and implicit properties of the concept [Process overview: HARRY]. 
This can be seen in TABLE All . 
1, in which explicit properties were identified as 
PROCESS OWNER, PLAYERS, ROLES and SUB-PROCESSES etc. 
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TABLE A9 EXAMPLE PARAGRAPHS FROM INTERVIEW OF CASE-STUDY [HARRY] 
Interview with Giles_P, July 27 1998, Field [HARRY]. 
When we took it over, the idea was to try and use the seismic velocities and the well velocities. The 
difficulty is that while it is a producing field, the geology is very complex. It is a central salt dome 
which causes a lot of problems. Consequently, while there is a lot of well data, it is not that useful. 
So that was quite limiting, also we have to treat the field in two halves. So it is almost like doing 
two separate conversions. We have tried taking the seismic velocities, and extracting the interval 
velocities from those (sort of global stacking velocities) and then using those as the basis of the geo- 
statistics. The geo-stats are then used to predict the velocities at the well locations (based on those 
seismic velocities). These predicted velocities are compared with the velocities we are actual seeing 
at the wells. A correlation between the seismic interval velocities and well data is used to define a 
velocity model of the reservoir. This is used to produce a depth map which is then used to define the 
volumetrics of the field. So far the results have been fairly disappointing. The derived correlations 
have been in most cases very bad, almost like scatter plots. 
2. There are quite a few possible explanations for this problem, 
(i) the well picks themselves may not be very accurate. This is a problem, which we occasionally 
have (particularly in the shallower intervals). Sometimes in the shallower intervals, the depth picks 
are not made on full sets of data. Sometimes, they are made on very sparse sets of data and often 
compromised data. So they can actually be wrong. 
(ii) the more likely explanation is that the structure of the field is so complicated. That is, skewing 
the seismic velocities. Because of the way in which they pick the seismic velocities, it is essentially 
to get the best seismic image. For example, since we do not have the influence of the actual rock 
velocity which is want we want, but a lot of other influences which skew it in different directions. 
Depending on what it is, the seismic velocity is simply related to the rock velocity only in a very 
simple geometrical situation. So when you get complicated geometry's things cease to be simply 
related. If it is not simply related than that is going to scatter your points. 
3. There is a possibility, that it is not so much a software problem, but the use of the software in that 
we may not be using exactly right data model. There is always that possibility. However, we are 
not using the software we used in TOM. We are using the old software that does have that ability. 
So we have no reason to doubt the integrity of the results from the software. There is always doubt 
as to whether you are using it in the best way, but that is not a problem with the software but the 
user. It is probably more likely to be a problem with the data itself. 
4 Some of the intervals are not as bad as others. In the case [tom] we actual bundled together a lot of 
the overburden into one unit, which gave us a good result. This is what we used in one of the sides 
of this field. (The field has two flanks). As in [tom], bundling also gives a reasonable result. The 
problem is that we only have three wells to control it. While it looks good, there is not much 
evidence. However, this method will be used on the other flank. But I don't think that it is quite as 
good as the first flank. As in the case of [tom] we have a top interval and a middle interval, my 
feeling is that we may still have to use Dave's original velocity map for that layer just above the 
target horizon. We may just have use his map because I am not sure we can produce another map 
that has any sort of reasonable basis. The current situation in terms of process flow, is that we 
have 
failed at getting a correlation between the well velocities and the seismic velocities. If we cannot 
resolve that in a satisfactory manner, then we will have to abandon the attempt. 
If it is so noisy that 
it looks likely then it is not going to be of any use. If you cannot match the seismic velocities to the 
well velocities, then you cannot use the geo-statistical method. We are not sure 
how we are going 
to progress with this until we have spoken to the client. 
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TABLE A10 SIGNIFICANT CONCEPTS IDENTIFIED FROM TABLE A9 
Interview with Giles_P; July 27 1998, Field [HARRY]. 
Para 1 Process constrained by field geology 
Process overview 
Para 2 Possible explanations for disappointing results 
Well picks not accurate 
Process constrained by field geology 
Para 3 Possibility that problems with derived correlations influenced by inappropriate data model 
Para 4 Problems with correlation between the well velocities and the seismic velocities may force 
team to abandon to project 
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TABLE A11.0 EXAMPLE OF CONCEPT CARD FOR [Process overview: HARRY] 
CARD 1 [Process overview: HARRY] 
Para 1 The process consisted of loading the seismic on the work station, interpreting the 
seismic time horizons, extracting the interval velocities which are the basis of the geo- 
statistics. The geo-statistics are used to predict velocities at well locations. Predicted 
velocities are compared with actual well velocities and a correlation is derived. A 
correlation between the seismic interval velocities and well data is used to define a 
velocity model of the reservoir. This is used to produce a depth map which is then used 
to define the volumetrics of the field. However the results of the derived correlations 
have not been encouraging. 
Para 6 The approach taken determined by problem 
Para 10 I was the PROCESS OWNER in that I initiated the process. The PLAYER would be m and m 
would do all the geo-statistical analysis. I would be responsible to Ikoda management. 
Links with CARD 3- CRITICAL DEPENDENCIES 
CARD 5-AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY 
CARD 13-RESOLVING PROBLEMS 
CARD 14-PROCESS OBJECTIVES 
CARD 16-CONFIDENCE IN PREDICTIONS 
CARD 20-PROCESS CONSTRAINTS 
CARD 23-QUALITY CONTROL 
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TABLE A11.1 PROVISIONAL DEFINITION FOR CONCEPT [Process overview: HARRY] 
CARD 1: [Process overview: HARRY] 
For field [HARRY], PROCESS was defined as [implementing time-depth conversion]. In this field the 
PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion] consisted of interpreting the seismic time horizons, 
converting those time horizons and then producing depth converted maps. Volumetrics on the depth 
converted maps were used to define reservoir volumes. 
Identified key SUB-PROCESSES for PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: HARRY] are, (i) 
loading seismic data; (ii) establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities; (iii) 
establishing geo-statistical model from interval velocity; (iv) using geo-statistical model to predict 
velocity at well location; (v) establishing velocity model; (vi) combing velocity model and time 
interpretations and; (vii) producing depth map and volumetric calculations. 
The minimum objectives are, (i) a depth map on the perspective horizon. 
GP was the PROCESS OWNER and had ultimate responsibility for the PROCESS: [implementing time-depth 
conversion: HARRY]. M was a PLAYER and loaded the data and did all the geo-statistical analysis. GP is a 
Senior geophysicist and M is a geophysicist. 
ROLES for Senior geophysicist were, (i) to oversee the process; (ii) to receive data from the client and send 
the results of the process back; (iii) to define reservoir volumetrics. Identified ROLES for geophysicist 
were, (i) to load data; (ii) to establish interval velocities from stacking & interval velocities; (iii) to define 
correlation between predicted seismic velocities & actual well velocities; (iv) to combine seismic interval 
velocity & well data and; (v) to define depth map of top reservoir. 
See also 
CARD 3- CRITICAL DEPENDENCIES 
CARD 5-AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY 
CARD 13-RESOLVING PROBLEMS 
CARD 14-PROCESS OBJECTIVES 
CARD 16-CONFIDENCE IN PREDICTIONS 
CARD 20-PROCESS CONSTRAINTS 
CARD 23-QUALITY CONTROL 
191 
TABLE A11.2 SHORT NOTE FOR CARD 1 [HARRY] 
CARD 1: [Process overview: HARRY] 
The PROCESS OWNER, Senior geophysicist was responsible for [overseeing] the PROCESS: [implementing 
time-depth conversion: HARRY] and was given the ROLE, (i) [to receive INPUTS and send OUTPUTS]. The 
Senior geophysicist was also a PLAYER in the PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: HARRY] 
and had the additional ROLE, (ii) [to define reservoir volumetrics]. The PLAYER, geophysicist was given 
the ROLES, (i) [to load data]; (ii) [to establish geo-statistical model from stacking & interval velocities]; 
(iii) [to define correlation between predicted seismic velocities & actual well velocities]; (iv) [to define 
depth map of top reservoir] and; (v) [to define depth map of top reservoir]. 
Identified key SUB-PROCESSES for PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: HARRY] are, (i) [to 
receive the necessary data from the clients and initiating the PROCESS] (ii) [loading seismic data]; (iii) 
[establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities]; (iv) [establishing geo-statistical model 
from interval velocities]; (v) [using geo-statistical model to predict velocity at well location]; (vi) 
[establishing velocity model]; (vii) [combing velocity model and time interpretations] and; (viii) 
[producing depth map and volumetric calculations] and; (ix) [to terminate the PROCESS and passing the 
results of the PROCESS to the client]. 
EMERGENT QUESTIONS: 
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APPENDIX B: RESULTS OF PROCESS MODEL EXERCISE 
1. In this section the form of the process events of the case studies 
[implementing time-depth conversion: TOM] and [implementing time-depth 
conversion: DICK], are expressed as a vocabulary and organised by a Process 
Model algorithm. In section 7.4 completed Process model explanations of all 
three case studies are presented as graphical representations of hierarchical 
models of processes and process interactions with ROLES, PLAYERS, SCENARIOS, 
CONSEQUENCES, HAZARDS, REFLECTIONS, SUGGESTIONS and NEW OUTCOMES. 
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TABLE B1 PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: TOM]. 
[PROCESS: implementing time-depth conversion: Tom] 
2. [ROLE 1: to oversee PROCESS, PROCESS OWNER: principal geophysicist, RESPONSIBILITY: to 
receive INPUTS from CLIENTS & initiate PROCESS by sending INPUTS to PLAYER 1; to receive 
OUTPUTS from PLAYER 1& terminate PROCESS by sending OUTPUTS to CLIENTS, SUB-PROCESS 
1: receiving INPUTS from CLIENTS & sending INPUTS to PLAYER 1, SUB-PROCESS 9: receiving 
OUTPUTS from PLAYER 1& sending OUTPUTS to CLIENTS] 
3. [ROLE 2: to receive INPUTS & send OUTPUTS, PLAYER 1: senior geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 2: 
receiving INPUTS from PROCESS OWNER, SUB-PROCESS 8: sending OUTPUTS to PROCESS OWNER] 
[ROLE 3: to load seismic data, PLAYER 2: geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 3: loading seismic data] 
[ROLE 4: to establish geo-statistical model from stacking & interval velocities, PLAYER 2: 
geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 4: establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities] 
[ROLE 4: to establish geo-statistical model from stacking & interval velocities, PLAYER 2: 
geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 5: establishing geo-statistical model for interval velocities] 
[ROLE 5: to define correlation between predicted seismic velocities & well velocities, PLAYER 2: 
geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 6: using geo-statistical model to predict velocity at well location ] 
[ROLE 6: to combine seismic interval velocity & well data, PLAYER 2: geophysicist, SUB- 
PROCESS 7: establishing velocity mode] 
[ROLE 7: to define depth map of top reservoir, PLAYER 2: geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 8: 
combining velocity model & time interpretation] 
[ROLE 8: to define reservoir volumetrics, PLAYER 2: senior geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 9: 
producing depth map & volumetric calculations] 
4. [CLIENTS: senior management] 
[STAKE-HOLDERS: field owners] 
5. [POINT OF VIEW: proneness to failure] 
6. [BEGIN STATE 1: budget is known] 
[BEGIN STATE 2: completion date is known] 
[BEGIN STATE 3: time interpretations are known] 
[BEGIN STATE 4: well data is known] 
[END STATE 1: PROCESS will undergo TRANSFORMATIONS] 
[END STATE 3: PROCESS will meet all OBJECTIVES] 
7. [INPUTS: time interpretations are known, well data is known] 
[OUTPUTS: as defined by OBJECTIVES] 
[CONTROLS: as defined by TRANSFORMATIONS] 
[CONSTRAINTS: budget is known, completion date is known] 
8. [ENVIRONMENT: CLIENTS, STAKE-HOLDERS] 
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9. [CURRENT STATES: CLIENTS have OBJECTIVES, OBJECTIVE 1: generate best estimate of depth to 
reservoir, OBJECTIVE 2: ensure depth values are appropriate for defining structure of 
reservoir, OBJECTIVE 3: quantify uncertainty of depth map] 
10. [SUCCESS: of CURRENT STATES is given by EVIDENCE, EVIDENCE: as defined by NECESSARY 
EVIDENCE & POSSIBLE EVIDENCE] 
11. [TRANSFORMATION: BEGIN STATES to END STATES, SUB-PROCESS 3: loading seismic data, SUB- 
PROCESS 4: establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities, SUB-PROCESS 5: 
establishing geo-statistical model for interval velocity, SUB-PROCESS 6: using geo-statistical 
model to predict velocity at well location, SUB-PROCESS 7: establishing velocity model, SUB- 
PROCESS 8: combining velocity model & time interpretations, SUB-PROCESS 9: producing depth 
map & volumetric calculations] 
12. [SCENARIO 1: software unable to perform specific geo-statistical computations, SUB-PROCESS 
6: using geo-statistical model to predict velocity at well location, SUB-PROCESS 7: establishing 
velocity model, CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOME 1: project suffered time delay and cost overruns, 
HAZARD 1: selective attention to technical rationale hides potential problems] 
13. [NECESSARY EVIDENCE: [] 
[POSSIBLE EVIDENCE: [] 
14. [PROCESS: implementing time-depth conversion: Tom, SUB-PROCESS 3: loading seismic data, 
SUB-PROCESS 4: establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities, SUB-PROCESS 
5: establishing geo-statistical model for interval velocity, SUB-PROCESS 6: using geo-statistical 
model to predict velocity at well location, SUB-PROCESS 7: establishing velocity model, SUB- 
PROCESS 8: combining velocity model & time interpretations, SUB-PROCESS 9: producing depth 
map & volumetric calculations] 
15. [EVIDENCE: there is no indication that consequences of SCENARIO seriously damages PROCESS, 
CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOME 1: project suffered time delay & cost overruns, HAZARD 1: selective 
attention to technical rationale hides potential problems, REFLECTION 1: a concentration on 
the technical benefits of software may compromise project] 
[REFLECTION 1: a concentration on the technical benefits of software may compromise project, 
SUGGESTION 1: are the software requirements compatible with project requirements?, 
SUGGESTION 2: are you considering a `contrast and compare exercise' between original & new 
software? ] 
[SUGGESTION 1: are the software requirements compatible with project requirements?, NEW 
OUTCOME 1: a closer understanding between software and project requirements may result in 
fewer problems] 
[SUGGESTION 2: are you considering a `contrast and compare exercise' between original & 
neig' software?, NEW OUTCOME 2: project team may have greater confidence in ability of 
software] 
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TABLE B2 PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: DICK]. 
1. [PROCESS: implementing time-depth conversion: DICK] 
2. [ROLE 1: to oversee PROCESS, PROCESS OWNER: principal geophysicist, RESPONSIBILITY: to 
receive INPUTS from CLIENTS & initiate PROCESS by sending INPUTS to PLAYER 1; to receive 
OUTPUTS from PLAYER 1& terminate PROCESS by sending OUTPUTS to CLIENTS, SUB-PROCESS 
1: receiving INPUTS from CLIENTS & sending INPUTS to PLAYER 1, SUB-PROCESS 11: receiving 
OUTPUTS from PLAYER 1& sending OUTPUTS to CLIENTS] 
3. [ROLE 2: to receive INPUTS & send OUTPUTS, PLAYER 1: principal geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 2: 
receiving INPUTS from PROCESS OWNER & initiating PROCESS, SUB-PROCESS 10: ending 
PROCESS & sending OUTPUTS to PROCESS OWNER] 
[ROLE 3: to load seismic data, PLAYER 2: geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 3: loading seismic data] 
[ROLE 4: to establish interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities, PLAYER 2: 
geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 4: establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities] 
[ROLE 5: to establish velocities from well data, PLAYER 1: principal geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 5: establishing velocities from well data] 
[ROLE 6: to interpret seismic time intervals, PLAYER 1: principal geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 6: 
establishing seismic time intervals] 
[ROLE 7: to combine seismic interval velocity & well data, PLAYER 1: principal geophysicist, 
SUB-PROCESS 7: establishing velocity model] 
[ROLE 8: to define depth map of top reservoir, PLAYER 2: geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 8: 
combining velocity model & time interpretation] 
[ROLE 9: to define reservoir volumetrics, PLAYER 1: principal geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 9: 
producing depth map and volumetric calculations] 
4. [CLIENTS: senior management] 
[STAKE-HOLDER 1: field operators] 
[STAKE-HOLDER 2: business partner of field operators] 
5. [POINT OF VIEW: proneness to failure] 
6. [BEGIN STATE 1: budget is known] 
[BEGIN STATE 2: completion date is known] 
[BEGIN STATE 3: previous assessment of reservoir volumetrics are known] 
[BEGIN STATE 4: previous well data & ties to seismic are known] 
[END STATE 1: PROCESS will undergo TRANSFORMATIONS] 
[END STATE 3: PROCESS will meet all OBJECTIVES] 
7. [INPUTS: previous assessment of reservoir volumetrics are known, previous well data & ties to 
seismic are known] 
[OUTPUTS: as defined by OBJECTIVES] 
[CONTROLS: as defined by TRANSFORMATIONS] 
[CONSTRAINTS: budget is known, completion date is known ] 
8. [ENVIRONMENT: CLIENTS, STAKE-HOLDERS] 
9. [CURRENT STATES: CLIENTS have OBJECTIVES, OBJECTIVE 1: to determine best technical 
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assessment of depth to reservoir, OBJECTIVE 2: to determine best technical assessment of 
reservoir volumetrics, OBJECTIVE 3: to ensure that technical assessment was independent, 
OBJECTIVE 4: to quantify uncertainty of assessment] 
10. [SUCCESS: of CURRENT STATES is given by EVIDENCE, EVIDENCE: as defined by NECESSARY 
EVIDENCE & POSSIBLE EVIDENCE] 
11. [TRANSFORMATION: BEGIN STATES to END STATES, SUB-PROCESS 3: loading seismic data, SUB- 
PROCESS 4: establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities, SUB-PROCESS 5: 
establishing velocities from well data, SUB-PROCESS 6: establishing seismic time intervals, 
SUB-PROCESS 7: establishing velocity model, SUB-PROCESS 8: combining velocity model & time 
interpretation, SUB-PROCESS 9: producing depth map and volumetric calculations] 
12. [SCENARIO 1: project suffers from data calibration problems, SUB-PROCESS 3: loading seismic 
data, SUB-PROCESS 4: establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities, 
CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOME 1: problems with data resulted in project team having a direct 
contact with company's original report] 
13. [NECESSARY EVIDENCE: [] 
([POSSIBLE EVIDENCE: [] 
14. [PROCESS: implementing time-depth conversion: DICK, SUB-PROCESS 3: loading seismic data, 
SUB-PROCESS 4: establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities, SUB-PROCESS 
5: establishing velocities from well data, SUB-PROCESS 6: establishing seismic time intervals, 
SUB-PROCESS 7: establishing velocity model, SUB-PROCESS 8: combining velocity model & time 
interpretation, SUB-PROCESS 9: producing depth map and volumetric calculations] 
15. [EVIDENCE: there is no indication that consequences of SCENARIO seriously damages PROCESS, 
HAZARD 1: direct contact may threaten independence of assessment, REFLECTION 1: although 
direct contact with data source was beneficial questions of independence need to be 
considered] 
[REFLECTION 1: although direct contact with data source was beneficial questions of 
independence need to be considered, SUGGESTION 1: will the development of measures of 
evidence demonstrating outcome of process still compatible with objectives help to address 
these concerns? ] 
[SUGGESTION 1: will the development of measures of evidence demonstrating outcome of 
process still compatible with objectives help to address these concerns?, NEW OUTCOME 
1: 
evidential demonstration of independence may increase clients confidence in predicted 
reservoir volumetrics] 
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TABLE B3 PROCESS: [implementing time-depth conversion: HARRY]. 
1. The below represents the known inputs of the case study 3: HARRY. These 
inputs form the basis of the hierarchical graphical representation shown in 
FIGURE 7.6 in section 7.4. 
1. [PROCESS: implementing time-depth conversion: HARRY] 
2. [ROLE 1: to oversee PROCESS, PROCESS OWNER: senior geophysicist, RESPONSIBILITY: to receive 
INPUTS from CLIENTS & initiate PROCESS by sending INPUTS to PLAYER 1; to receive OUTPUTS 
from PLAYER 1& terminate PROCESS by sending OUTPUTS to CLIENTS, SUB-PROCESS 1: 
receiving INPUTS from CLIENTS & sending INPUTS to PLAYER 1, SUB-PROCESS 11: receiving 
OUTPUTS from PLAYER 1& sending OUTPUTS to CLIENTS] 
3. [ROLE 2: to receive INPUTS & send OUTPUTS, PLAYER 1: senior geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 2: 
receiving INPUTS from PROCESS OWNER & initiating PROCESS, SUB-PROCESS 10: ending 
PROCESS & sending OUTPUTS to PROCESS OWNER] 
[ROLE 3: to load seismic data, PLAYER 2: geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 3: loading seismic data] 
[ROLE 4: to establish geo-statistical model from stacking & interval velocities, PLAYER 2: 
geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 4: establishing interval velocities from seismic stacking velocities] 
[ROLE 4: to establish geo-statistical model from stacking & interval velocities, PLAYER 2: 
geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 5: establishing geo-statistical model for interval velocities] 
[ROLE 5: to define correlation between predicted seismic velocities & well velocities, PLAYER 2: 
geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 6: using geo-statistical model to predict velocity at well location] 
[ROLE 6: to combine seismic interval velocity & well data, PLAYER 2: geophysicist, SUB- 
PROCESS 7: establishing velocity model] 
[ROLE 7: to define depth map of top reservoir, PLAYER 2: geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 8: 
combining velocity model & time interpretation] 
[ROLE 8: to define reservoir volumetrics, PLAYER 1: senior geophysicist, SUB-PROCESS 
9: 
producing depth map and volumetric calculations] 
4. [CLIENTS: senior management] 
[STAKE-HOLDERS: field owners] 
5. [POINT OF VIEW: proneness to failure] 
6. [BEGIN STATE 1: budget is known] 
[BEGIN STATE 2: completion date is known] 
[BEGIN STATE 3: time interpretations are known] 
[BEGIN STATE 4: well data is known] 
[END STATE 1: PROCESS will undergo TRANSFORMATIONS] 
[END STATE 3: PROCESS will meet all OBJECTIVES] 
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7. [INPUTS: time interpretations are known, well data is known] 
[OUTPUTS: as defined by OBJECTIVES] 
[CONTROLS: as defined by TRANSFORMATIONS] 
[CONSTRAINTS: budget is known, completion date is known] 
8. [ENVIRONMENT: CLIENTS, STAKE-HOLDERS] 
199 
rry 
3R'; . OIL 
LI6RARY 
EtaCýtt+ýEERiý( 
